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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, a version of physicalism is formulated and
fvaluated. A number of potentially devastating objections are consid-
ered and strategies of d~fense are suggested.
In Chapter 1, the underlying philosophical and scientific motiva-
tions for pursuing the physicalist program are explored and three are-
as of critical concern are identified: ontology, objectivity and ex-
planation, Criteria of adequacy and acceptability for formulations of
the physicalist doctrine ~re proposed.
In Chapter 2, a taxonomy of physicalist theses is developed in
te~s of general categories of entity (i.e., linguistic and non~lin­
guistic) and types of relation between classes of entities (i.e., re-
ductive and non~reductive). A number of extant formulations of physi-
calism are located within the taxonomy and evaluated with respect to
the criteria of adequacy. It is concluded that none of the formula-
tions considered is adequate; and, it is argued that, in general, for
a formulation to be adequate it must include both linguistic and non-
linguistic theses and must not consist of only non-reductive theses.
In Chapter 3, the problem of identifying the physical bases is ad~
dressed. Plst strategies are reviewed and their shortcomings identi-
fied. An alternative strategy is suggested which is based upon a prin-
ciple for circumscribing the subject matter and research questions
studied in physics. Threft presuppositions of this strategy are isolat-
ed and defended against objections. It is concluded that the physical
bases do not suffer from any pernicious indeterminacy and that they
can be developed in a way which do~s not trivialize the theses or de~
prive them of their intended content. However, it is not clear that
paradigmatically non-physical entities (e.g., mental states) cau be
definitively excluded from the bases, a prospect which threatens basic
physicalist motivations.
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In Chapter 4, a set of theses is developed which satisfies the cri-
teria of adequacy. Two objections are formulated; (1) that the theses
are "utopian" and (2) that they suffer from physicalist indetermina..:y
and, hence, are not acceptable on physicalist grounds.
In Chapter 5, three standard metatheses are formulated that charac-
terize the scope of application, the empirical status and the methodo-
logi.cal roles of the theses. It is argued aCJ~inst this "Received View"
that the scope of the theses is not well defined and that the theses
have a dubious empirical content. It i~ suggested that the theses be
viewed, not as empirical hypotheses, but. as "regulative ideals" for
natural science. This revision provides a means for responding to the
objections that the theses are "utopian", that they suffer from physi-
calist indeterminacy, that their scope is ill-defined and that they
have dubious empirical content. Finally, strategies of defense against
the objection that the bases could include non-physical entities are
suggested and the outlook for the program is briefly surveyed.
Thesis Supervisor: Jerry Fodor
Professor of Philosophy
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1. THE PROBLEM OF FORMULATION
The doctrine )f physicalism consists of a set of claims concerning,
roughly, the nature of reality and the structure of scientific knowl-
edge. Such theses as "Everything is physical", "No difference without
a physical difference", 1 "The physical truth determines the whole
truth about nature",2 and "Theories in science are reducible to physi-
cal theory" hav~ been entertained, developed and endorsed by leading
philosophers for over forty years. Such claims hold forth the promise
of solving a multitude of philosophical and scientific problems in ad-
dition to giving expression to a number of deeply entrenched philo-
sophical beliefs; further, the success of the physicalist program in
science is thouqht by its proponents to yield substantial gains in
scientific understanding; and, the doctrine is believed to playa ma-
jor role in the ongoing practice of science and philosophy. In short,
if physicalism is a tenable doctrine, then it is an extremely impor-
tant one. 3
1 The principle of the indiscernibility of physical identicals.
2 The principle of physical truth determination.
3 In this work, the following distinctions will be honored;
1. The doctrine of physicalism consists of a set of three types
of claim as follows: (a) theses, which are explicit viewf
concerning nature and science, (b) presuppositions, which are
claims that are presupposed by the theses, and (c) metathes~
es, which are claims concerning the theses (e.g., that the
theses are efmpirical).
2. The program of physicalism is the enterprise consisting of;
(a) formulating the doctrine, (b) defending the doctrine
.. 6 -
The history of physicalism has not been smooth sailing, tespite its
attractiveness, the doctrine has proven difficult to formulate rigor-
ously in such a way as to both avoid the objections of critics and re-
tain its significant content. 4 Original physicalist formulations
(e.q_, those of Carnap, Feigl, Hempel) were typically very strong def-
initional and derivational theses concerning relations between terms,
laws and theorie~ of the special sciences and tho:3e of physics; and,
they were motivated by, inter olia, the verificationist theory of
meaning and t~e view that all substantive claims in philosophy can be
couched in linguistic terms. This latter view we shall refer to as
"the replacement thesis",
During the time since the orj,CJinal presentation of physicalist doc-
,
trine, a number of developments have shown that (1) the original for~
mulations of the theses are untenabl~ and (2) the program as a whole
may be doomed to failure.
First, the original formulations are untenable because (a) they are
too strong as constraints on the structure of science and (b) they are
inadequate as expressions of physicalist views. They are too strong
because there are branchea of science which fail to satisfy them but
against objections, (c) verifying the doctrine by assessing
relevant evidence, and (d) the actual construction in science
of a system of knowledge which exhibits the properties de-
scribed by the theses (this will be refered to as "the work-
ing out of the program in science").
4 See Field (1972), p_ 357, fn. 13, for explicit recognition of this
difficulty.
.. 7 ..
which are, nonetheless, legitimate branches of natural science.
Clearly, tne strategy behihd this objection presupposes that there are
ways, independent of specific formulations of physicalism, for distin-
guishing legitimate from illegitimate branches of science. This is es~
sential for any construal of physicalist theses as empirical; as we
shall see below, the supposed methodological role of the theses com-
plicates this situation since many physicalists (e.g., Quine) ~ake
their doctrine to formulate criteria for assessing the legitimacy of
theories in different branches of science. Despite this complication,
it iG generally agreed that the strong reductionist claims of the ear-
ly physicalists are too strong for either correctly describing or con-
straining theories in science. This is so because, roughly, if an 1n-
,
dependent criterion of scientific objectivity does exist, then
classical reductionism is too strong if there could exist theories in
science that are objective in accorda»ce with such a criterion but
which fail to satisfy !~he reductionist theses. Essentially, this has
been shown by proponents of a "functionalist" meta theory for current
cognitive psychology.5
Strong reductionist theses are inadequate expressions of the physi-
catist position because they could be satisfied while the basic physi-
calist concerns of a unified ontology and a unified explanatory system
wou.ld not be satisfied. As we shall see,' liberation from the strong
S See Putnam (1960), Fodor (1965).
, See Chapter 2.
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forms of the verificat~onist theory of meaning, the replacement thesis
and classical reductionism has opened up considerable latitude in the
kinds of thesis that are available for the expression of physicalism.
In particular, adequate formulation of the doctrine will be seen to
require linguistic and non"linquistic theses. 7 Further, less stringent
theses, admitting a variety of relations between linguistic or non-
linguistic objects in the different branches of science, wlll be seen
to provide more accurate and more plausible formulations of physical-
ist belief.'
Second, and more critical with respect to the survival of the pro-
gram, there are a number of objections to physicalism which are de-
signed to show tpat, even if the formulations of the doctrine are mod-
ified to accomodate the above described developments, the progr~m is
doomed to failure. Chomsky and others have been concerned with diffi-
7 A linguistic thesi6 here is one t/hich quantifies over linguistic ob-
jects, as classical definitional and derivational reductive theses
do.
• Relaxatio, of the criteria for relating the terms of the special
sciences to those of physics as well as for relating the theories
anj the objects in the domains of the theories of the special sci~
ences to the theories ana objects of physics, will be seen to yield
more accurate formulations of the physicalist position as well as
more plausible ones; apparently, early physicalists opted for im-
plausibly strong formulations that, even if they had succeeded,
would not have expressed what the physicalist wants to say. We note
that early physicalists were not entirely in agreement concerning
the proper formulation of their position. For example, Quine (1966)
and Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) presented versions of the doctrine
that signaled the difficulties of the original formulations both in
terms of the implausibility of the reductionist theses and the need
for explicitly non-linguistic theses.
- 9 -
culties involving the principled identification of "the physical ll that
is presupposed by any non-trivial formulation of the doctrine; to
date, there have been no adequate responses to these concerns.' Fur-
ther, Goodman and Putnam have contended that physicalism is, at best,
in a position comparable to that of the phenomenalist program that
preceded it: that is, physicalism is, at best, a program with too many
promises of success and too t~w actual successes.
Despite these developments and difficulties, physicalism, vaguely
construed, continues to exert a powerful command over intuition and a
strong directive force in science. As a consequence, physicalists are
reluctant to abandon their doctrine and, hence, are faCdd with the
task of formulating a version which adequately expresses their views
t
and, yet, which avoids the objections of critics and does not hold out
promises that are not likely of fulfillment. Opponents of physicalism,
of course, believe that the prospects of successfully completing this
task are poor.
A number of questions emerge from this rough overview as very much
in need of being answered;
• As we shall see below, it is a presupposition of the theses of phys-
icalism that there be distinctions between physical and non-physical
branches of natural science, theories and ontologies that are based
upon considerations relevant to the physicalist program (cf., Chap·
ter 3). Opponents hold that any such divisions are based upon fac-
tors that are arbitrary with respect to the physicalist program
(e_g., soeto-historical factors); hence, the theses are thought to
be devoid of subst'.ntial content.
.. 10 -
1. What does an adequate formulation of physicalist doctrine con~
sist in?
2. Can such a formulation survive the objections of the ~ritics?
3. If so, what is the outlook for the physicalist program with re-
spect to (i) the verification of the theses and (ii) the work-
ing out of the program in science?
It is the objective of this project to provide answers to these ques-
tions.
The plan for proceedin9 towa~d this objectiv~ is as follows: in the
remainder of this chap~er, the principle motivations of physicalists
will be clarified; it will be seen that physicalists are guided by
powerful convictions and by the promise of significant cognitive and
non-cognitive g~ins. Toward the end of the chapter, criteria of ade-
quacy for formulations of physicalism will be stated in terms of how
well a formulation expresses physicalist motivations. In Chapter 2, a
review of major physicalist proposals of past and present physicalists
will be made; it will be seen that all formulations fail to sa~isfy
our criteria of adequacy, and we shall summarize the central reasons
for such failures as an aid to avoiding such a problem for our own
formulation. In Chapters 3 to 5 we shall put forward a full statement
of physicalist doctrine including presuppositions (Ch. 3), theses (Ch~
4) and metatheses (Ch. 5); it will be seen that the theses are ade~
quate by our criteria and that most of the standard objections to the
program can be fended off. Finally, strategies of defence against the
- 11 -
most difficult of the objections will be considered and the prospects
of the program will be considered. It will be seen that physicalism is
vulnerable to the objection that the theses are not acceptable empiri-
cal theses of natural science and to the objection mentioned above
that the doctrine is hampered by many promisory notes that are unlike-
ly of fulfillment (i.e., physicalism is a "utopian" doctrine.) Propo"
sals will be made for how the metatheory can be revised so as to avoid
these objections while retaining the significant content of the theses
as well as their important methodological role in science. We will
conclude with some remarks concerning the future of the program.
1.1 MOTIVATIONS FOR THE PHYSICALIST PROGRAM
,
Preliminary to our discussion of the motivations of the physicalist
program, two distinctions must be made. First, we distinguish between
issues concerning the growth of scientific
knowledge and issues concerning the structure of scientific knowledge.
The first are highly important issues that have figure'd centrally in
many discussions of physicalist reduction as a form or scientific de~
velopment. Such issues are not of direct interest to us in the current
project; they are orthogonal to the second class of issues that con-
cern the logical and epistemological structure of scientific knowledge
at any given stage of development. It is this class of issues with
which we shall be directly concerned. For example, we shall be con-
cerned with views about what logical and epistemological relations
- 12 ..
betwen theories in different brancnes of science ought, ideally, to
exist; "ideally" in the sense that a corpus of knowledge exhibiting
such structural relations ought to be a goal of scientific activity.
Thus; characterization of such an ideal can be viewed as a characteri-
zation of a g~al state toward which scientific progress ought to be
aimed; for someone working within a program accepting such a charac-
terizal~ion, the goal state will play a major methodological role in
directing inquiry and evaluating developments. In this way, growth is-
sues and structural issues, though distinct, are clearly relevant to
each other. In what follows, we shall De concerned primarily with
physicalism taken as a doctrine about the structure of science; in the
final chapter I we shall discuss how such a doctrine bears on scientif~
ic growth.
Second, we disting\lish between "unitary science" and "unified sci..
ence",10 A view of science as unitarl will be taken as a view of sci-
ence as ideally consisting of a single total theory in one language
and embodying a set of basic explanatory principles that are suffi-
cient for explaining al' laws and all specific events within the do~
main of scientific study (i.e., a unitary explanatory system). For a
physicalist, unitary science is usually conceived of as physics con-
stituting the total explanatory system of science, on such a view, the
physiQal vocabulary and the eBPlanatory principles couched in that vo-
so See reigl (1963) for a discusJJion of this distiction; our develop·
ment differs somewhat from bitJ t
.t 13 -
cabulary suffice for all scientific description and explanation. What
is essential to this view is that science does not con~ist of any
branch of science other than physics. II All "special sciences" serve
only heuristic purposes that "in prirciple" could be served by an
ideally completed physics. On this view, the idea of structural rela-
"tions between branches of science has no place; it is the expression
of a strong, eliminative physicalist positiona i.e., that every spe-
cial science is eliminable i.n favor of physics. As a structural posi-
tion, the ideal of unitary science expresses the view that science is
monolithic and embodied completely by physics; as this pertains to
growth issues, scientific activity ought to be directed toward the ab-
sorption of all explanation into physics and the gradual elimination
of the special $ciences. 12
In contrast to unitary science i~ ~ified scie~, the main fea-
tures of which are. (i) th~re are principled divisions between branch-
es of science and (i1) there are principles which specify relations
that sciences must bear to some basic science (e.g., physics, psychol-
091). Thus, the unification consists, not in the eliminability of all
branches in favor of one, but in the kinds of relations that the
branches bear to the basic branch. Physicalism, in the spirit of uni-
11 Whel"e branches of science are individuated by such considerations
as. canonical vocabulary, problems and questions addressed, pat-
terl1~B of explanation, etc.
12 See Quine (unpublished), Davidson (1970) and Fodor (1978).
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fied, not unitary, science is the topic of the current project. 13
Thus, in what follows, we shall be concerned with the physicalist pro-
gram conceived of as a program for unified science and as constituted
by a set of struc~ural principles that characterize the unifying rela-
tions in scientific knowledge. We now tur~ :0 a discussion of the un-
derlying motivations for such a program.
There are, at least, three such kinds of motivation:
1. The doctrine of physicalism serves to express certain deeply
entrenched ontological and epistemological convictions of its
proponents.
2. The success of the program would result in substantial cogni-
tive gains.
,
3. The success of the program would result in substantial non~cog-
nitive gains.
We shall consider these in turn. 11
13 Such a view does not preclude the possibility that a given branch
of science might be eliminable in favor of physics; what the view
affirms is that this is not the paramO\lnt goal of scientific activ-
ity. Rather, as we shall see, such elimination could, in many cas-
es, only result in an undermining of "the aims of inquiry.1I Fur"
ther, this view may be better conceived in terms of relations
between levels of organization and of theory rather than relations
between branches of science; for this to succeed however, the rele-
vant notion of levels must be clarified.
14 Another motivation would be that there is strong reason to believe
that the program will be successful. However, this project will be
concerned primarily with the ! prior~ features of the physicalist
program; questions of evidence for s~ecific claims or for the over~
all success of the program will only be briefly touched upon at the
end.
.. 15 ..
Typical formulations of physicalist theses have, either implicitly
or explicitly, been motivated to express a certain view of science:
viz., that physics occupies a special position relative to all other
branches of science. Physicalists who have been explicit in this
write as follows:
Mathematical physics, as the most basic and comprehensive of
the sciences, occupies a special position with respect to
the overall scientific framework. In its loosest sense,
physicalism is a recognition of this special position. IS
It [the claim that there is no mental difference without a
physical difference] is a way of saying that the fundamental
objects are the physical objects. It accords physics its
rightful place as the basic natural science without ventur-
ing any dubious hopes of reduction of other dieciplines .•. 16
This second thesis of physicalism claims that the facts and
laws of the natural and social sciences can all be derived -
at least i~ principle ~ from the theoretical assumptions of
physics. We may formulate lhis second thesis as the belief
in the possibility of a unitary explanatory system. 17
A review of physicalist writings reveals that there is considerable
variety in the kinds of relations which are thought to hold uetween
physics and other scientific disciplines in virtue of this special
place of physics in the structure of science. Physicalist theses have
typically characterized those relations and have been concerned with,
at least, three areas. ontology, objectivity, and explanation. 18
15 See Hellman ,nd Thompson (1975), p. 551.
16 See Quine (1979), p. 163,
17 See Feigl (1963), p. 227.
18 Physicalist theses have often been formulated in terms of formal
relations between linguistic objects in different branches of sci~
ence. But. in most cases, it has clearly been the intent of the
- 16 -
First, with respect to ontology, the physicalist holds that the on-
tology of physical theory is sufficient to incorporate the ontology of
any other branch of science, As a result, physica.~ t sm rules out tlonto-
logically independent" objects or attributes (i.e., objects or attri-
butes that fall outside of the physicalist ontology). such entities as
spirits and entelechies or vital forces are unacceptable posits to the
physicalist because they are entities introduced for an explanatory
purpose but do not fall within the physical ontology. All physicalists
appear to be in agreement with respect to the fundamental ontological
concerns of the program, although we shall see that ~here ar: many
different ways of construing these concerns,
Second, seve~al physicalists 1 ' have been concerned with the condi~
tions of objective knowledge; that is, they have attempted to formu-
late principles which characterize conditions under which there is an
objective fact of the matter in some domain of inquiry.20 The theses
proponents of such theses to be expressing claims (or the equiva~
lent of clailns) concerning the above areas. Our concern in this
section is with the basic interests of physicalism rather than with
issues of how best to express theses that serve those interests.
See Feigl (1963), Nagel (1961), Hellman & Thompson (1975), Boyd
(unpublished), Fodor (1975) for explicit discussion about how best
to express physicalist concerns.
19 For example Quine, Friedman, Hellman and Thompson.
20 The notion of "objectivity" within science is, at best, a. partially
analyzed one. Although emphasis in the philosophical literature has
focused upon inter-subjective testability as a condition of objec-
tive knowledge, this is not sufficient. Physicalists have focused
on the "factual basis" required for objective knOWledge and have
made proposals concerning necessary conditions for objective knowl-
edge in terms of relations to a physical basis of fact or truth •
... 17 -
of physical truth determination and of the indiscernibility ()f physi-
cal identicals formulate, respectiv~ly, a condition for objective
truth which all claims to objective knowledge must satisfy and a can~
dition for objective difference in some respect between any two ob-
jects. WitIlin a physicalist view of science, all claims to objective
truth and all putative similarities and differences must be correctly
related to physical truth and physical similarities and differences. 21
Although not all physicalists have been explicitly concerned with
questions of objectivity, no physicalist would deny either of the
principles mentioned above.
Finally, physicalists have, until recently, been QUit6 explicitly
concerned with e~lanation in science. The physicalist's view has been,
that scienco should be a unified explanatory system in which branches
of science are organized hierarchically with physics as the basic sci-
ence, and, in which the laws and individual phenomena at each level in
the hierarchy are explainable in terms of the laws and individual phe-
A,omena at lower levels. 22 With the rejection of classical reduction-
Our approach assumes that there are, at least, these two components
(i.e., inter-subjectivity and factuality) to an adequate analysis
of objectivity. We observe that there are notorious difficulties
involved in making such an assumption, since the idea of a "factual
basis" needs clarification. It is this that physicalists concerned
with objectivity have sought to provide.
21 An example of employment of such principles is Quine's discussions
of "indeterminacy" in linguistics and psychology.
22 Versions of this picture have been provided by Oppenheim & Putnam
(1958), Causey (1977), Feigl (1963), Hempel & Oppenheim (1953), and
Nagel (1961).
.. 18 ..
ism,23 these explanatory concerns of physicalism have tended to be
minimized or overlooked or to be judged as "utopian." In the interest
of presenting a plausible doctrine many physicalists24 have advanced
versions of the doctrine that eschew explanatory concerns and are pri-
marily concerned with ontology or objectivity. An emerging issue which
we mention now and discuss latel' in this section is whether or not ex-
planatory concerns are an integral part of the physicalist program,
and hence, whE:ther or not any adequate formulation of physicalist doc-
trine must audress itself to such concerns. 25
So far, we have seen that the physicalist view of science involves
acknowledgement of physics as occupying a special position in the
structure of scientific knowledge; that special position consists in
being most basic and comprehensive with respect to ontology, objectiv-
ity and explanation. As a result, formulations of physicalist theses
have been typically designed to accord physics its special position by
characterizing the relations that ought to hold between it and the
other sciences in virtue of that position. Now, bypassing for the mo-
ment questions of how best to formulate these theses, it might be
23 See Fodor (1975, 1978), Hellman & Thompson (1975), Boyd (unpub-
lished), for arguments. See below, Chapter 2.
2~ For example, Davidson, Boyd, Quine, Fodor, and Hellman & rhompson.
25 This issue is significant with respect to a number of questions;
(1) what formulations are adequate?, (2) how much room "for retreat
does physicalism have when faced with objections?, (3) when studyM
ing inter-theoretic relations in science, what questions ought to
be addressed and what are the constraints on answers to those ques-
tion.?
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asked, "Why should physics be accorded this special position in sci-
ence?", or alternatively, "What motivates the physicalist view of sci.--
ence?".
We note that some motivation for the physicalist view of science
originates from within science itself and will be discussed later in
the sections on the cognitive and non~ cognitive gains of the physi-
calist program. But, in addition to explicitly scientific concerns,
physicalists have revealed a philosophical bias in their program which
influences their conception of science. At a minimum, an understanding
of this bias will give us some insight into the powerful grip that
physicalism exerts on intuition.
The philosophical bias of the physicalist program invol~es a cer-
tain view of nature expressed in such passages as the following:
He [the physicalist] is content to declare bodies to be fun-
damental to nature in somewhat this sense: there is no dif-
ference in the world without a difference in the positions
or states of bodies. is
This view of nature, that bodies are fundamental to nature, requires
some unpackin9~ There are two components of the view: the first con-
cerna what exists and is an assertion of the classical materi~list
view that matter, or bodies, and states of matter are what exist in
nature. 27 Further, this ontological picture involves a set of "basic"
21 See Quine (1979), p. 162.
27 Kany contemporary physicalists have, with the developments in mod~
ern physics, dropped talk of matter or bodies in formal presenta-
tions of their doctrine. The ontological basis for physicalism is
- 20 -
material states and a set of "basic" matel"ial objects out of which all
complex material states and objects are composed. The second component
of this view of nature is a claim about determination: all attributes
of matter (bodies) are determined by the basic material states. Once
':ht! basic material states are fixed all other states or att.ributes are
fixed. The fundamental intuition lying behind this view of nature may
be expressed as follows: it is in virtue of what something is made of
(i.e., the fundamental constituents of matter and their attributes)
and how it is put together (i.e., the arrangement of the basic con-
stituents) that it has all of the other attributes it does.
The above described view of nature, or variants of it, is very much
at the core of ~e physicalist program. We have described it as a
philosophical bias of the program because, although it influences an
approach to the conduct of science, its significance transcends sci-
ence. More specifically, this view is an assertion of "the matter de ...
pendence of mind" and as such bears directly on the classical disputes
between idealist and materialist forms of realism. An opposed view,
"the mind dependence of matter", would undercut the primacy of matter
in our view of nature and replace it with mind (e.g., mental activity)
as the determinant of what matter is like. 28 For our current purposes,
not seen as being populated by objects, bndies or matter as we or-
dinarily conceive of these. In less formal discussions, the more
familiar terms are still employed. Set below, Chapter 4, for more
formal development of the physicalist ontological position.
28 An alternative to these positions is one advocated by Goodman which
affirms the value of both approach while denying each its claim to
- 21 -
we must only see that the physicalist, in being committed to the mat-
ter dependence of mind, holds that whatever the properties of mind,
especially whatever properties it has concerning knowing and repre-
senting nature, they are all determined by matter and its states. The
strong alternative view would deny matter this special place by claim-
ing that matter has that place only in a representation that is creat-
ed and changeable by the mind; hence, mind occupies a position of pri-
macy with respect to nature. The physicalist, of course, has a
predictable reply to this.
The bearing of this dispute on the structure of science is clear:
if one affirms the matter dependence of mind, then fairly rigid con-
straints on the scientific representation of mind and its place in oa-
f
ture (especially its relations to physical phenomena) are imposed; if
one denies such dependence, then the structure of a scientific repre-
sentation is constrained in a quite different way (e.g., the converse
of the principle that there can be no mental difference without a
physical difference might be endorsed). It should be clear that one
cannot resolve the philosophical dispute by studiously watching the
'primacy. Essentially, the re~ent dispute between Quine and Goodman
involves the "monopolistic" character of Quine's physicalism. See
Quine (1978), Goodman (1979), and Putnam (1979). It should be kept
in mind that a denial of the matter dependence of mind need not
consist in an affirmation of the mind dependence of matter; if, for
example, some mental states do not depend on matter, that is suffi-
cient for rejection of the matter dependence of mind ao a general
view about the relation between mind and matter. The physicalist,
of course, denies that there are any mental states that are inde~
pendent of the physical (matter).
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progress of science, since how science is conducted depends directly
upon what position one takes with respect to the question at issue.
Insofar as science currently proceeds in accordance with an assumption
of the matter dependence of mind, it is exhibiting a philosophical
bias; and, the physicalistic view of science is an explicit affirma-
tion of that bias.2~
At this point, one might ask, "Why accept this view of nacure?".
As we have suggested, the evidence for this view to be gleaned from
the progress of science is of questionable value. The philosophical
arguments in support of either side of the dispute are stunningly un-
convincing to opponents, Perhaps the situation is, as Goodman might
put it, "less like arguing than like selling", That is, to adopt one
or the other of the two philosophical positions is to be justified
more in terms of what such an adoption produces by way of achieving
certain goals than by explicit arguments for its truth. It was essen-
tially this approach that we adopted in this project when we proposed
to evaluate formulations of physicalism in terms of how well they re~
alize the motivations of the progr&m.
2~ This way of putting things glosses over the complex and important
issues concerning the empirical status of physicalist principles
and their methodological role in science. That the principles are
often conceived of in both of these ways complicates the construal
of the physicalist's view of nature as a bias. OUf view is that,
ultimately, physicalism does embody such a bias, but that such a
bias is not arbitrarily adopted and that empirical considerations
bear on such an adoption. See Chapter 5 for further discussion •
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The impact of the above de~cribed view of nature upon science is
fairly straightforwa~d. Insofar as it is a goal of science to provide
an adequate representation of nature, then the materialist conception
of nature leads to a view of science in which the ontology is a mater-
1al (or, physical) one and all the attributes of mat~rial objects are
determined by the basic attributes of matter: hence, the physical de~
termination of (i) truth ana (ii) sameness and difference. Further,
the view of nature sU9gests the idea that explanation of any phenom-
enon, if possible at all, should be possible in terms of the basic
constituents and their attributes. In short, for the physicalist, his
view of science (i.e., that physics occupies a special position in
science with respect to ontology, objectivity and explanation) is in-
f
fluenced by his view of nature.
To summarize, the first motivation of the physicalist program is to
express two related views; (1) a view of rlature which constitutes the
adoption of a fundamental philosophical stance concerning the primacy
of matter and (2) a view of science which is partly informed by the
view of nature and which asserts the special position of physics in
relation to all other sciences. As we have noted above, however, the
physicalist's view of science is not only motivated by his philosophy;
rather, there are independent reasons originating from within science
that, at least, reaffirm that view. Further, those same considerations
constitute additional justification for the physicalist prugram in the
sense of characterizinq the gains of adopting such a program. It is to
those "cognitive" and "non~cognitive" gains that we now turn ..
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The second type of motivation for the physicalist program involves
the "cognitive gains" that would result if the program were to be suc-
cessful. By a cognitive gain is meant some improvement in our corpus
of knowledge and consequent understanding; and, there are at least two
ways in which the success of the physicalist program would result in
cognitive gain: the first involves solution of specific philosophical
and scientific problems, and the second involves improvements in some
of the global features of our knowledge (e.g., consistency, parsimony,
simplicity, explanatory power).
Physicalists have always seen advantages in their approach result-
ing from solutions it would provide to problems in such areas as: (i)
mental phenomenal (i1) moral and aesthetic phenomena, (iii) biological
phenomena, (iv) semantical phenomena, (v) social phenomena, and (vi)
the theories of each of these. The physicalist program, if successful,
would show how each of (i)-(v), insofar as they are real and objeca
tive, fit into a scientific conception of the natural order; and, it
would provide a basis for resolving foundational questions concerning
theories of each. An additional problem that would be partially solved
concerns the delimitation of the boundaries of objective knowledge
within science; that is, boundaries between knowledge that concerns
'matters of fact and knowledge that involves a component of subjectivi-
ty, or relativity to the knowing subject. The principles of physical
truth determination and of the indiscernibility of physical identicals
are candidates for principles that would serve this purpose. As we
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shall see below, they have played a central role in recent physicalist
thought concerning the distinction between objective and non-objective
branches of knowledge (e.g., Quine's concern about the lack of objec~
tive status of linguistics and psychology, )
The second kind of cognitive gain that would result if the physi-
calist program were to be successful involves global improvements in
our corpus of knowledge. There are three such kinds of improvement
that have interested physicalists: (i) ontological parsimony, (i1)
unification of the overall scientific explanatory system and a result-
ing increase in simplicity and consistency of our knowledge, and (iii)
a substantial increasa in our understanding of nature.
There appears to be a consensus among physicalists that the program
is motivated by ontological concerns; and, inter alia, those concerns
involve a certain kind of parsimony: viz., that of not exceeding the
ontology of physical theory for any scientific purpose. That is, with
respect to the ontology of science, nothing more need be posited than
what is included in the domain of physics. From an ontological point
of view, therefore, there is only one kind of entity in nature: physi-
calism is a brand of mon~sm. Essentially, this monism requires that
every individual in nature is either a basic physical constituent or a
complex physical entity composed of basic constituents. Further, every
class of entities in nature is a class of physical entities. And fi~
nally, every attribute that occurs in nature is ~n attribute of a
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physical entity and is realized30 by the physical attributes of such
entities. In short, everything in nature is physical. 31
To better understand what kind of parsimony this is, it is impor-
tant to see what it is not; it is neither a parsimony of theoretical
kinds of ~ntity nor a parsimony of kinds of attribute nor a parsimony
of the individuals in nature. That is, ontological parsimony does not
put any restrictions on the groupings of individuals for the purposes
of theoretical inquiry; nor does it entail that entities in n~,ure
must only have physical attributes rather than possessing more ab-
stract attributes as well. 32 Hence, this ontological parsimony does
not involve any restrictions on what we can say about objects in na-
ture; it only requires that the things we say something about be phys-
,
ical things,33 Finally, there is no suggestion in this parsimony that
30 Below (Chapter 4) we shall discuss what "realization" is. We use
this notion because (1) there are good reasons for not adopting the
very strong physicalist position that evel'Y attribute is a physical
attribute and (2) it captures a significant sense in which the on-
tology of nature does not exceed the physical ontology.
31 Not every physicalist would state his position this way of ~ourse,
stronger versions would have it that all attributes are physical
attributes as well. Because, on our view, this is patently false,
weaker forms of physicalism must be explored.
32 Such attributes must, according to the physicalist, be related in
specific ways (e.g., by a realization relation) to physical attri-
butes however.
33 See Quine (1951) and Hellman and Thompson (1977) concerning the
distinction between ideology and ontology; also, see Chapter 3 be-
low. The amount of independence between what the physicalist be-
lieves to exist and what he believes to be constraints upon what we
can say about what exists has been a critical issue throughout the
history of the program.
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there be a reduction in the number of individuals in nature, except
insofar as is entailed by the inclusion of the individual domains of
each branch of science within the domain of physics.
Having said what ontological parsim~ny does and does not consist in
for the physicalist, we now ask, "Why is this ontological par$imony a
cognitive gain?". Of what value is ontological parsimony that i~
should be a positive 9Hin if realized by the physicalist program?
Let us begin by pointing out that ontological parsimony is not in~
trinsically a significant cognitive goal; alone, it is at best an
aesthetic property of a system. However, ontological parsimony is an
important property of a system insofar as it contributes to an in-
,
crease in the understandinq provided by the system. There are at
least two ways that ontological par"imony can contribute to under~
standing: first, by leading to a decrease in the number of mysteries
in nature; such reduction can come about by there being fewer "funda-
mental" mysteries (i.e., those which are not explainable within a giv-
en explanatory system because they are basic) and by there being a ba'~
sis for explaining higher level phenomena not previously understood.
In the case of physicalism, one of the attractive features it shares
with its ancestors (i.e., materialism and mechanism) is that it prom-
ises to provide a basis for solving the problem of mind-body causal
interaction. If interaction at the level of physics is well understood
in terms of some class of basic processes and interactions, and if all
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interaction at other levels can be related to physical il.teraction,
then there are no mysterious interactions in nature in addition to the
basic ones. 34 such an approach decreases the number of mysteries be-
cause it avoids positing "special" interactive forces between mind and
body and it avoids leaving the interaction unexplained or denied. 35
A second way in which ontological parsimony can contribute to 10-
creasing understanding is by leading to integration of an associated
explanatory system. Essentially, a parsimonious basis <:reates the pos-
sibility for explaining more and more phenomena with ~ single class of
fundamental objects, processes and attributes. Notice that, although
ontological parsimony creates such a possibility, by itself it cannot
guarantee actualization: the existence of an explanatory system with
,
certal.n properties is an independent requirement for attaininq such
increases in understanding. Ontological parsimony of the kind advocat-
ed here need not l~ad to increases in understanding if, for example,
non-physical attributes of physical systems cannot be explained in
terms of physical attributes of those systems. In such a case, the de-
34 Two proposals consonant with physicalism for solving this problem
are (1) the token identity of mental events, states and processes
with physical events, states and processes and (2) the I·superveni-
ence" of the mental upon the physical. See Kim (1979) for a lucid
discu&sion of this latter proposal as it bears on issues of causa-
tion.
35 A burden of the physicalist position involves showing that it is
not trivially satisfied by locating all mysteries in the domain of
physics; that is, showing that it does not avoid proliferation of
ontological kinds by simply increasing the number of theoretical
kinds in physics.
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crease in fundamental mysteries secured by a parsimonious basis is
offset by the existence of higher level mysteries comparable to the
mystery of mind-body interaction. This is possible even if it is
claimed that all instances of non-physical attributes are realized by
instances of physical attributes. 3s
The second type of global improvement that has been sought by phys-
icalists'is unification and simplification of the overall explanatory
system in science. Because such a goal has always been associated with
classical definitional and derivational reductionist programs, it is
important to see that those programs were only one way of attempting
to unify and simplify the scientific explanatory system. With the dem-
ise of those programs, it is incumbant upon physicalists to understand
~
what the goals of those programs were and to seek new ways of achiev-
ing those goals. In the case of unification and simplification (as
with parsimony) the fundamental motivation for trying to achieve them
is to effect increases in understanding by reducing the number of
unexplained phenomena and laws in science and by increasing the expla~
natory power of explaining laws. By subsuming more and more phenomena
and explanatory principles under quite general principles, the expla-
natory power of the latter is , in general, thereby increased. 37 It is
36 One of the key explanatory questions involved here, which drives
much physicalist thought is, roughly, "In \tirtue of what do certain
physical ~ttributes realize certain non~physical attributes?". See
below (Chapter 4) for further discussion.
S7 See Fodor (1978) for an important discussion of how this strategy
can fail. Also, see Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956) for a discussion of
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an important goal of the physicalist program to subsume as many phe~
nomena and explanatory laws as possible under basic physical laws; the
problem besetting contemporary physicalists is how to conceive of such
a pursuit of unification in science without running into the difficul~
ties encountered by classical reductionism. 3 '
Parsimony of ontology and simplicity and unity of the scientific
explanatory system have been seen to be cognitive gains of the physi w
calist program because they contribute to increases in the understand-
1n9 provided by that system. We now turn to explicit discussion of 1n-
creasing understanding as the fundamental cognitive gain that would
result if the physicalist program were to be successful.
Essentially, understanding is gained in science, at least, insofar
as (i) there is a decrease in the number of fundamental mysteries,
(ii) there is a decrease in the number of total mysteries throughout
the scientific system, and (iii) the explaining principles have more
and more explanatory power. The physicalist program can lead to such
understanding through ontological parsimony (which can have the effect
of reducing fundamental and total mysteries) and through unification
(which can lead to reductions in the total number of mysteries and in~
the notion of "explanatory power".
38 Nancy Cartwright has further suggested that a principle motivation
of derivational reductive programs was to ensure the consistency of
the system of scientific knowledge; as with simplicity and unifica-
tion, this goal can be achieved in other ways. See Cartwright
(1979).
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creases in the explanatory power of explaining principles). Further,
physicalism leads to understanding by epitomiting a s:andard practice
in science of seeking to explain the properties and behaviors of com-
plex phenomena in terms of the properties and behaviors of simpler
phenomena of which they are composed. 39 Such patterns of explanation
can achieve increases in understandin9 based upon all of (i)~(iii) in~
safar as successes decrease the need for positing new basic phenomena,
lead to answers to questions concerning complex phenomena (thereby re-
ducing the total number of mysteries), and tend toward unification of
the total system (thereby increasing the explanatory power of the ex-
plaining principles). Hence, proposals that physicalism be taken to
require "microreduction" of one branch of science to another, or that
physicalism inv61ves explanation of abstract properties of entities in
terms of their physical realization, or that physicalism involves ex-
planation of regularities in one branch in terms of underlying physi-
cal mechanisms are all construals of the physicalist program eKplicit-
1y involving explana~ory concerns of the kind we are considering that
lead to increases in understanding. The issue, mentioned earlier, to
which we now turn, is whether formulations of the physicalist program
that do not explicitly address these concerns are adequate formula-
tions.
39 Thus, Niels Bohr (1961) has described the essence of scientific ex-
planation as consisting in explaining the complex in terms of the
simple; and, Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) have assimilated their
version of the physicalist program to liThe Democritean Tendency" in
science to explain a wide range of diverse phenomena in terms of a
few basic phenomena.
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By an adequate formulation of physicalist doctrine we mean one that
is such that, if the program based upon that formulation is success-
ful, then the motivations of the program will have been served. We
shall argue that a formulation that does not explicitly address expla-
natory cOllcerns is not adequate: i.e., that it is possible that a pro-
gram based upon such a formulation could be successful and yet the mo-
tivations of the program not be served. 40
Of the three traditional areas of physicalist concern (i.e" ontol-
ogy, objectivity and explanation), explanation has been neglected in
recent physicalist writings in favor of the other two. Our present
claim is that formulations of physicalist doctrine that are exclusive-
1y concerned with ontology and objectivity are not adequate because
,
the success of a program based upon such formulations is compatible
with a failure to increase understanding. Our argument for this claim
is tha~ formulations concerned with only ontology and objectivity pro-
vide no guarantee that the success of the program will not lead to a
body of scientific knowledge that is permeated by mystery and lacking
in unity. The point here is that success of a physicalist program con-
cerned with only ontology and objectivity could make no substantial
40 We remind the reader that rejection of classical reductionism (con-
strued as definitional and derivational reduction of syntactic ob-
jects) does not entail the rejection of the explanatory concerns
that motivated that proqram. Hence, one should not jump to any con~
elusions about the feasibility of a physicalist program with ex~
plicit explanatory concerns. What we now know is that, if we have
explanatory concerns, we should not try to formulate them in
strong, purely syntactic terms.
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difference to the understanding provided by a system of scientific
knowledge. This is because only by developing certain types of expla~
nation is it possible to rid a scientific representation of nature of
a host of "vertical" mysteries: such as mysterious non-physical attri-
butes of physical objects and the existence of mysterious non-physical
regularities and their exceptions. In addition, if objectivity is ex-
pressed in terms of the principle of physical truth determination, in
the absence of explanatory connections between different branches of
science, such determination is an additional mystery. Such a formula-
tion of physicalism exerts little influence on the structure of the
explanatory system in science. 11 In a nutshell, for the success of the
physicalist program to guarantee satisfaction of all of the fundamen~
tal motivations bf physicalists, explanatory unification of scientific
knowledge is required. Therefore, we shall adopt the view that explic-
it explanatory theses are required for an adequate formulation of
physicalist doctrine. such a requirement bears directly on the evalua-
tion of recent moves made by physicalists to avoid objections; specif-
ically, any reformulation of the doctrine designed to avoid objections
but which weakens the formulation so as to not address explanatory
~1 Hellman and Thompson are sensitive to the problem that a purely on-
tological formulation of physicalism is not adequate; the point
here is that what they augment the doctrine with (i.e., physical
truth and reference determination) does not substantially improve
the situation regarding the explanatory motivations of the progra~.
C1lss~cal reductionism, on the other hand, bolstered by the D~N
model of explanation, purported to address the explanatory motiva-
tions of the program. As we shall see below, the shortcomings of
the D~N model undermine this effort.
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concerns will be avoiding the objections at the cost of the adequacy
of the formulation; our view is that this is too high a price to
pay.42
The third class of motivations for the physicalist program involves
"non-cognitve" gains that would result if the program were to be sue'"
cessful. By a non-cognitive gain is meant some advantage that would
result for the behavior of humans; and, the primary advantage of this
kind involves the role of physicalist doctrine in the conduct of sci-
entific inquiry. As we shall discuss below, physicalist principles can
potentially contribute to scientific practice in two ways: (i) by sug-
gesting and providing some definition to a wide ~lass of research
,
questions, and (1i) by providing a basis for evaluating the accept-
ability of scientific theories (e.g., by placing constraints upon for~
mulations in physics and the special sciences).43
42 The failure of adequacy is, of course, relative to our criteria; it
is surely appropriate to formulate weaker versions of the program.
Our main point is that, in doing so, one should be aware of the
differences in motivations achieved. our criteria serve the expQsi~
tory purpose of affirming a certain set of motivations as highly
desirable. Weaker formulations fulfill fewer of these motivations
thereby lessening the worth of the program. The genet'al maxim we
believe ought to be observed in the design of any system of knowl R
edge is to opt for the maximum criteria of adequacy possible; if
unavoidable difficulties are encountered, then (and only then)
ought the criteria be weakened.
43 As we sh~ll see, there is some difficulty in determining what de-
gree of abstraction is required in formulating such constraints.
History has taught us that strong syntactic constraints are not ab~
stract enough in that they fail to allow for variability in the
forms of scientific theories and in thfJ kinds of relations between
higher and lower level theories. As we hope to show, while synt~c~
tiQ constraints are not sufficiently abstract, explicit ontologi-
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1.2 CRITERIA OF ADEQUACY AND ACCEPTABILITY
Given the discussion of physicalist motivations in the last sec-
tion, the objective of this section is to formulate criteria of ade-
quacy and acceptability for formulations of physicalist doctrine
which will be employed in subsequent chapters as a basis for evaluat-
ing specific physicalist proposals. By the adequacy of a formulation
we mean whether or not it expresses the motivations of the program;
our approach to understanding the formulation problem confronting
physicalists is that there are a number of reasonably well defined ob-
jectives which physicalists seek after and which the physicalist pro-
gram should be designed to reach. Hence, any formulation of the doc-
trine should have the property of being such that if the program based
,
upon that formulation is successful, then the principal objectives of
the program will be reached. 41 Therefore, the criteria that a formula-
tion of physicalism must satisfy include:
1. It must express the physicalist's view of nature and science. 15
cal, determinationist and explanatory constraints are. However,
syntactic constraints had the virtue of being actually employable
in practice; it is not so clear that more abstract constraints will
have this property.
44 This strategic approach has not been explicitly emplQyed by many
physicalists (much to the detriment of the program); exceptions in~
elude Fodor, Hellman and Thompson and the adamantly no~~physicalist
Nelson Goodman (in his discussion of systems building in general).
4~ I.e. , that nature consists of physical systems and that all attri-
butes of such systems are determined by basic physical attributes;
and that science reflects this view of nature by according to phys-
ics a special place in the structure of scientific knowledge.
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2. It must promise to realize the cognitive gains of ontological
parsimony, theoretical unity, consistency, simplicity, in-
creased scientific understanding and provision of solutions to
specific scientific and philosophical problems.
3. It must provide usable principles for directing scientific in-
quiry.
These criteria will provide a measure of adequacy for formulations
of physicalist doctrine; clearly, a formulation that satisfies all of
them will be of more potential importance than one which does not.
Further, failure to satisfy anyone of them, en the view taken in this
project, raises serious questions about the value the physicalist pro-
gram as formulated; and hence, the justifiability of pursuing the pro~,
gram, especially in the face of objections, is suspect. Unless a for-
mulation satisfies all of the criteria, we shall judge it to be
inadequate and in need ;)f replacement because, although such formula-
tions may be easier to establish than stronger ones, they are not ex-
presaive of the deeper motivations behind the program.
Once the question of adequacy of a formulation is settled, the
question of its acceptability arises. By an acceptable formulation is
meant one which is (i) adequate, (it) immune from the objections of
critics, and (iii) plausible on the basis of relevant evidence. The
Qurrent project will focus on the issues associated with formulating
an adequate version of physicalism and on the objections of critics to
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adequate formulations. The question of plausibility on the basis of
relevant evidence will not be discussed because, on our view, the em-
pirical situation is not sufficiently clear to make such an evalua-
tion. In the last chapter, we shall briefly discuss a program of re-
search which would eventually issue in a sufficiently clear body of
relevant evidence to evaluate the plausibility of the program.
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2. A REVIEW OF PAST FORMULATIONS
The objective of this chapter is to review past formulations of
physicalist doctrine and to explore, relative to our criteria of ade-
quacy, the reasons for their failure. Preliminary to this will be a
discussion of the general formulation problem with respect to physi-
calist doctrine.
Essentially, the formulation problem facing us is to develop a set
of theses which are jointly sufficient for (1) expressing the physi-
calist's views of nature and science, (2) realizing the cognitive
gains of the program if it is successful, and (3) serving as usable
and fruitful principles for guiding scientific inquiry. What, then, is
a plausible strategy for solving this problem?
In answering this question, we shall begin by discussing the gener-
al character of physicalist theses and the ways in which they can
vary. Typical formulations include the following;
1. All scientific te~s are definable in physical terms.
2. All scientific theories are derivable from physical theory.
3. Every event is a physical event.
4. The physical truths determine all the truths about nature.
S. The laws of the special sciences are explainable by the laws of
physics.
The general form of such theses may be construed as involving a rela-
tion between two classes of objects. Hence, there are, at least, two
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ways in which such theses can vary: (i) they can vary with respect to
the kinds of objects that are members of the two classes, and (ii)
they can vary with respect to the character of the relation between
the two classes.
Concerning the kinds of objects that are members of the classes,
there are two general categories of interest: linguistic and non-lin-
guistic. Each of these categories further sub-divides into the various
kinds of linguistic object (e.g., terms, sentences, theories)1 and the
various kinds of non-linguistic object (e.g., events, states, proper-
ties). Further, the objects in the two classes may vary in what we
shall call their "type" (e.g., mental l physical). It is a characteris-
tic of a~l physicalist theses that for each kind of linguistic or
I
non-linguistic object adverted to there is a special class of objects
which is designated as being of the phrsical type and which occupies a
special place in relation to all other objects of that kind. Each of
these classes of physical object will be called a "base class" and
their properties will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
Concerning the kinds of relations between classes, we shall distin-
guish two general categories;
1 The idea that a theory or an explanation is a linguistic object is
controversial at best; to sidestep debate we shall assume that they
are not and that it is only formulations of theories or 8!planations
that are relevant to the physicalist; suc~formulationswe take to
be lingui.tic in eharacter.
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1. a reductive rel~tion between two classes involves a mapping
from the members of one class to the members of the other;
2. a non-reductive relation does not involve such a mapping, but
rather, involves only preservation of global features of the
two classes (e.g., degree of explanatory power, simplicity,
unity).
For each of these two general categories of relation there is ~onsid-
erable variability possible concerning the specific relations that may
be instances of them. Such variation depends upon the type of con-
straints that are imposed upon reductive and non-reductive relations
between classes; for example, as Goodman has discussed at length,2 the
criteria of definition (a reductive relation between classes of terms)
may vary between intensional equivalence, extensional equivalence, ex-
tensional isomorphism, etc.
Thus, there are two general dimensions along which physicalist
theses can be arranged: kind of entity in the classes and kind of re-
lation between the classes. 3 Hence, there are, at least, four general
2 See Goodman (1977), Chapter 1.
3 Our introduction of a taxonomy of physicalist theses based upon
kinds of enti(t and kinds of relation is motivated by aeveral con-
sideratIons. ) it will help in clarifying the logical relations
between different theses, (i1) it provides a structure in which the
wide diversity of physicalist views that have appeared in the liter-
ature can be located and assessed relative to one another, (iii) it
highlights the degrees of freedom in the formulation of physicalist
theses and emphacizes the fact that what choices are made at these
points are crucial for fonmulating theses that will successfully
serve the purposes motivating the physicalist. As we shall see,
there is a history of poor choices that have led to inadequate for~
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kinds of physicalist thesis that are possible:
1. !inguistic-reductive: e.g., every theory in the special sci-
ences is derivable from physical theory (plus bridge princi-
pIes) ;
2. linguistic-non-reductive: e.g., every theory in the special
sciences is reducible (in the Kemeny and Oppenheim sense 4 of
'reducible') to physical theory;
3. non-linguistic-reductive: e.g., every event 15 a physical
event;
4. non-linguistic-non-reductive: e.g., the physical facts deter-
mine all the facts of nature. 5
With respect to the formulation problem for physicalism, the choice
,
of what specific kinds of object and of what specific kinds of rela~
tion are to be employed in formulating phy ;·~icalist theses is made on
the basis of what will serve best for satisfying the criteria of ade-
quacy, and with an eye to acceptability, what will serve best in
avoiding certain objections and difficulties. That is, solution of the
mulations.
4 See Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956) for details of their view of theory
reduction. Their use of 'reduction' and its cognates is different
from that found in this project. The usage here will always be ac-
cording to the technical sense described above unless otherwise in-
dicated.
5 Jerry Samet has pointed out that the above four kinds of thesis are
the "pure cases"; there are hybrid theses that are possible (e.g.,
the special sciences are about the sam~ things that physics is
about), Our discussit,n will be organized around the pure cases; hy-
brids will be discussed where appropriate.
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formulation problem comes down to making a set of choices, based upon
physicalist motivations and interests, among specific instances of the
various kinds of physicalist theses: to arrive at an adequate formula-
tion, what one wants to express and what goals one wants to achieve
will play a major role in choosing the kind of objects and the kind of
relations that constitute the theses that are formulated. 6
We now shall review a number of past formulations of physicalist
doctrine and exhibit their shortcomings. The following conclusion will
be drawn from this review: that formulations of physicalist doctrine
must not consist of only linguistic or only non-linguistic or only
non-reductive theses (i.e., the doctrine must be expressed by a combi~
nation of lingu~stic, non-linguistic and reductive theses, although,
some non-reductive theses could also be included). The reasons for
this will be explored as we proceed; roughly, the main reason is that
physicalism is a doctrine concerning both the formal system of science
and its intended interpretation; and, because most interesting theses
concerning the one are not equivalent to n01' entailed by the~es con~
cerning the other, sepG~ate theses are required if the full content of
the doctrine is to be expressed.
6 Despite the obviousness of these remarks, they are in need of saying
in order to partially arrest the drifting away from basic goals that
has characterized recent physicalist thought.
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To establish the claim that an adequate formulation of physicalism
must include linguistic, non-linguistic and reductive theses, we shall
proceed by cases and show that formulations that consist exclusively
of linguistic or non-linguistic or non-reductive theses fail to satis~
fy the criteria of adequacy.
2.1 PURELY LINGUISTIC FORMULATIONS
Clearly, an exhaustive discussion of all possible formulations of
physicalist theses is too formidable a task; hence, our approach will
be to consider some central cases. For linguistic formulations
we shall discuss: (i) theses concerning the definability of terms as
expressions of physicalist ontological concerns, (i1) theses concern-
ing semantic relations between theories or formal relations between
terms as expressions of physicalist theses concerning objectivity, and
(iii) theses concerning derivation or truth determination as expres-
sions of physicalist explanatory concerns. It will be seen that in
each of these cases the indicated physicalist concerns are not ade-
quately expressed by the theses p'Jt forward. Further, a diagnosis of
these failures will reveal that they are based upon properties shared
by all members of the class of purely linguistic theses; hence, we
shall conclude that purely linguistic theses are inevitably not ade~
quate as expressions of the complete physicalist doctrine. It is, of
course, left open whether linguistic theses are components of an ade-
quate formulation.
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The idea that a purely linguistic thesis is sufficient to express
the physicalist's views about ontology dates back to Carnap's program
of replacing all substantive philosophical claims with claims concern M
ing language (the so-called "formal mode"). What we shall now see is
that this program, at least as applied to the physicalist program in
science, is seriously misguided.?
The physicalist ontological position is, roughly stated, that
everything is physical; in science, this amounts to saying that the
ontology of every branch is included in the ontology of physics.
Since ontology concerns individuals, classes and attributes, the physM
icalist holds (roughly) that the ontology of physics includes all in-
dividuals, classes and attributes that are in the domains of all other
,
branches of science. This has seemed to many physicalists as expressi-
ble by the claim that every term used in science is definable' in the
vocabulary of physics,'
7 See Carnap (1934, 1961a) for discussion of the proposal.
8 The criteria of definability can vary; we shall assume that the cri-
terion relevant to the physicalist is nomological, extensional
equivalence. If it were stronger than this, it would be hard to see
how physicalism could provide a true definitional thesis. Observe
that such a criterion is too weak for full expression of attribute
identity.
, What it means for the attributes adverted to in other branches of
science to be included in the ontology of physics is not yet clear.
The possibilities that are available include; (i) all attributes are
physical attributes, (ii) all instances of attributes are identical
to instances of physical attributes, (iii) all instances of a given
attribute are realized by instances of one specific physical attri-
bute, (iv) all instances of a given attribute are realized by in-
stances of some physical attribute or other. The issue facing the
Now, this view that the physicalist ontological position can be eK-
pressed by a claim concerning the definability of terms in the physi-
cal vocabulary presupposes the following equivalence:
(R) Each thing is physical j.f and only if it is such that there
is a term that refers to it and that term is definable in
physical terms.
Because we are concerned to distinguish individuals, classes and at-
tributes when considering the issues here, we 'shall resolve (R) into
three separate claims as follows:
(RI) Each individual is physical if and only if it is such that
there is a term that refers to it and that term is definable
in physical terms.
,
(RC) Each class is physical if and only if it is such that there
is a term that refers to it and that term is definable in
physical terms.
(RA) Each attribute is physical if and only it is such that there
is a term that expresses it and that term is definable in
physical terms.
Each of these claims has a form that can be represented in the follow-
ing way.
(RF) (x)[(Px) iff (Et)(Rtx ~ (Ep)(Dtp»]
ontological physicalist with respect to attributes is serious; if,
as is plausible, a strong identity the~is like (i) is false, how can
the physicalist save face while acknowledging "property dualism"?
However, this issue is orthoganol to the problems with linguistic
formulations.
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where
'x' is a variable ranging over individuals, classes, or
attributes
'P' stands for 'is physical'
't' is a variable ranging over terms
'pi is a variable ranging over physical terms
'0' stands for 'is definable by'
'R' stands for either 'refers to' or 'expresses'
depending upon whether the variable ranges over
individuals, classes or attributes.
To demonstrate the inadequacy of linguistic reductionism as an ex-
pression of the physicalist ontological position, it will be shown
that the above equivalences fail to hold in both directions. That is,
the following two claims will be shown:
(L/R) that everything (individuals, classes, attributes) could be
physical and yet there not be a physically definable term
referring to/expressing each thing
(R/L) that everything (individual, class, attribute) could be re~
ferred to/expressed b~ a physically definable term and yet
not everything would be physical.
We shall consider arguments for these two claims in turn.
The strategy behind existing arguments for (L/R) has been to show
that the ontology of physics cannot be specified by a system of defi-
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nitions, and hence, the physicalist ontological claim that everything
is physical cannot possibly be correctly expressed by a definitional
thesis: (R), (RI), (RC), and (RA) do not hold even for the ontology of
physics, let alone the ontology of all of science. 10 Toward this con-
elusion, Hellman and Thompson argue as follows;
When it is contemplated, moreover, that no matter how so-
phisticated the list [of basic physical predicates] and the
"defining machinery", there are bound to be entities com-
posed of "randomly composed" parts of other entities which
elude description in the physical language, then it is evi-
dent that something is wrong with the whole approach. 1t
The argument, concerning individuals, appears to be that the defining
power of the physical language is not rich enough, no matter how
strong it is made, to build expressions that would be satisfied by en~
tities composed,of randomly selected parts of other entities. The
force of this argument, however, is elusive. Why should randomly se-
lecting parts of other entities inevitably lead to the composition of
entities which "elude description in the physical language"? Hellman
and Thompson's presentation of the argument leaves unstated the as~
sumptions that it depends upon; we can only speculate as to their
identity. First, the physical language, P, is finitary (i.e., it has a
countable alphabet, finitely long wffs and finitely long proofs); and,
10 Boyd has observed that it is possible that the ontologies of other
branches of science could in fact bo captured by a system of physi-
cal definitions even though the ontology of physics c~nnot. Despite
such a possibility, the fact concerning the physical ontology is
sufficient to defeat the definitional thesis. See Boyd (unpub-
lished) for discussion.
IS See Hellman and Thompson (1975), p. 553.
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Isecond, the intended interpretation of P has an infinite domain
(denumerable or non-denunlerable). 12
Given these assumptions, there are straightforward arguments to
show that combining "randomly selected parts" of entites in the domain
inevitably leads to the composition of more entities than there ~
descriptions in p.lS What is troubling about Hellman and Thompson's
statement of the argument is that they chose to focus on "random se-
lection of parts", something which leads to the desired conclusion
only in the presence of assumptions at least as strong as those stated
above. Nonetheless, their strategy of exhibiting the inadequacies of
the physical language for describing the physical ontology constitutes
a significant development in physicalist thought. In the context of
,
the present discussion, their reconstructed argument delivers a coun-
terexample to (RI) by showing that (L/R) is true for objects in the
physical domain. We bypass for now the question of whether their argu-
ment can be generalized to other categories of individuals (e.g.,
events); answering such a question depends upon ones theory of such
categories. 14
12 A third assumption might be that members of the domain have infi-
nitely many parts although this can be relaxed without significant
changes in the conclusion; it is not clear what Hellman and Thomp-
son assume in this regard.
13 The argument turns on the differences in cardinality of the class
of terms in a finitary language and the class of entities construc-
tible from an infinite domain of individuals.
14 See J.J. Thomson (1977) for a theory of events that quite readily
leads to the same conclusion as that just obtained for objects.
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Another argument along these same lines but somewhat more explicit-
ly stated has been offered by Boyd:
Briefly the problem about definability arises because there
are a continuum of possible physical states (if the true
laws of physics are anything like those we now accept) but
only countably many possible "definitions" in the vocabulary
of fundamental physics. IS
The problem here is straightforward: the cardinality of the set of all
physical states is greater than the cardinality of the set of all
physical definitions; hence, there must be some physical states for
which there is not an associated physical definition. Hence, the phys-
ieal language is not adequate for describing the full physical ontolo-
gy (in this case, physical states); hence, we have a counterexample to
(RA) since (L/R) vis! vis states (a category of attributes) is
true. 16
Again, the argument is presented without explicit statement of all
the premises upon which it is based; what, for example, is the feature
of "the true laws of physics" that leads to the indicated conclusion?
Presumably, it is that some such laws express continuous, monotonic
real valued functions; thus, if for each value of the function there
is a distinct physical state (type), then there are uncountably many
physical states (one for each real number in the interval of the reals
for which the function is defined). And, if the physical language is
15 See Boyd (unpublished), p. 15.
11 States are sometimes treated as individuals (i.e., dated and locat-
ed particulars); the discussion here concerns only kinds of states,
or "Itate types", which we include as a category of attribute.
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finitary, then the set of physical descriptions available is counta~
ble; thus the argument goes through easily.
In reply, one might try the following argument: of course, it is
true that taken collectively the class of all physical states outruns
the class of all physical definitions; but, for any given physical
state, a physical description can be constructed; the problem is not
that there is a physical state that is not physically definable; it is
that we cannot define them all at the same time. Heu~e, the linguis-
tic construal of the physicalist ontological claim is immune from the
objection (i.e., (L/R) is not shown to be true by the cardinality ar-
gument.)
,
What is wrong with this reply is that, even if its premises are
true (something which is not clearly the case) they are beside the
point and do not entail the desired conclusion that the alleged coun-
terexample to (R) does not exist. Why does it fail?
Our reconstruction of Boyd's argument is supposed to show that a
linguistic construal of the ontological thesis fails of its purpose
because (i) the equivalence (R) cannot avoid the cardinality objection
if the universal quantifier ranges over a non-denumerable domain and
the existential quantifiers range over denumerable domains and 'Rtx'
expressol a rela~ion which 15 (at least) a many/one mapping from the
domain of 't' into the domain of 'X'I (ii) physics and its intended
interpretation provide such a~ interpretation for (R) at least with
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respect to states; and (iii) if (R) is ~als~ for physics and its in-
tended interpretation, then the physical ontology is not definable and
thus the full content of the ontological thesis is not expressed by
the linguistic thesis. The reply, however, says only that it is always
possible to reinterpret terms to refer to something else. This is true
but irrelevant since it doesn't eliminate the counterexamle to (R):
(R) must be false if the above described conditions hold. And, if (R)
is false the linguistic and ontological theses are not equivalent, no
matter that terms can be reinterpreted. Therefore, a claim about defi-
nitions cannot serve as a statement of the physicalist ontological
claim. 1 ?
The above argument has general applicability to other ontological
,
categories; it applies to any entity that is characterizable along the
continuum (e.g., properties, relations, events, objects). Since it is
plausible that such entities, in ea~h of these categories, exist in
the ontology of physics, numerous ~ounterexamples to (R) are in the
11 A possible reply is that all the physicalist wants to say is that
everything is physically describable, hence physical. Therefore,
the cardinality objection is not appropteiate to physicalist con~
cerns. But, the problem is; can the full force of the ontological
position be captured by a purely linguistic thesis? The answer to
this is "no". The reply suggests that there is a hybrid thesis that
captures the ontological position; however, relative to the purpos-
es of the present discussion (i.e., the prospects of purely lin~
guistic theses), the reply is beside the mark; (i) it is not purely
linguistic, (i1) it has its own difficulties, as we shall see be-
low, concerning its assumption that every state is describable,
(iii) it doesn't save (R), and hence, any view that presupposes
(R), It simply suggests an alternative claim that the physicalist
might want to make instead of the ones being considered.
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offing. Regarding classes, it is a commonplace that there are more
classes than there are terms in a finitary language; hence, any lin-
guistic thesis designed to express the ontological claim that every
class is a clas& of physical objects (or a class of classes of physi-
cal objects, etc) must fail.
To sum up this first class of cardinality objections against purely
linguistic formulations of physicalist ontological claims: the cen~
tral difficulty in all instances (i.e., Hellman and Thompson's argu-
ment concerning individuals, Boyd's argument concerning attributes,
and the argument concernin9 classes just mentioned) is that the formu~
lation of a thesis that presupposes (rt) must fail to adequately ex-
press the ontolo~ical cla~ if (R) is falee, (R) must be false if the
language adverted to by the linguistic thesis is finitary and the do-
main of the intended interpretation of the language is uncountable -
the reason being that there are simply more entities in the domain
than there are terms in the language. Since these claims and the
claim that the intended interpretation of natural science is uncounta-
ble are not controversial, we conclude that if the language of natural
science is finitary, then (R) is false and the linguistic construal of
the physicalist ontological claim is inadequate. It appears that the
only line of reply left open to proponents of purely linguistic con-
struals of physicalism is to explore whether the ir.troduction of an
infinitary or higher order language would save (R) and hence the whole
approach. We shall defer discussion of this issue until later.
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A second class of cardinality arguments against the left/right di-
rection of (R) has been considered; these arguments differ from the
first kind in that, rather than arguing that there are more members of
the domain of interpretation than there are terms, they argue that
there are members of the domain that are not describable in a finitary
language. A very quick ~rgument to this effect is found in Earman's
comments on Hellman and Thompson's 1975 paper. In discussing the rele-
vance of infinitary languages to problems with physicalism, he writes;
To provide some motivation for focusi,ng on such languages I
suppose that we want to e4!press the "state description" of
the world as a sentence. Such a sentence may need to have an
uncountable number of conjuncts, each of which specifies,
say, the values of certain physical fields at some space~
time point on a given "time-slice". And, to characterize
the relevant features of such state descriptions, we may
need an infinite string of quantifiers ••• 18
,
For present purposes, the idea of a total state description of the
world at a time requires that we work in a language rich enough to
provide descriptions of every space-time point and to combine such de-
scriptions to form a conjunction of uncountable length. Such a re-
quirement is not met by a finitary language; hence, assuming that we
are working with only finitary languages, we have an example of a sin-
91e state which is not describable within those lanquages. Therefore,
another counterexample to (R) vis! vis states is plausible. We leave
aside for now the question of whether more powerful languages would
help in sidestepping this objection.
'8 See Ba~an (1975), p. 565.
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It might be replied that it is easy to find finite expressions that
refer to the total state of the world at some time: e.g., 'the total
etate of the world right now', or less trivially, some finite set of
physical equations which are defined for every spacetime point on a
given time slice. A key issue raised here concerns the limits of "ac"
ceptable physicalistic descriptions and definitions"; Earman's objec-
tion sU99~sts that it is not possible to find finite expressions that
are physicalistically acceptable and which represent a full state de~
scription of the world. It is clear that if the only such descriptions
must involve uncountable conjunctions, then the resources of a fini~
tary language will not suffice. The reply suggests that there are fin-
itary expressions that suffice for such purposes. Howev"r, the first
,
such description (i.e., 'the total state of the world right now·) is
deficient; it does not provide a way of discriminating different cur-
rent states and it provides no resources for characterizing theoreti-
cally relevant features of the present state. As a result, such a de-
scription can play no significant role in a physicalistic system; it
is a trivial description which is not physicalistically acceptable,l'
A related line of attack against the left/right direction of (R) is
based upon the so-called IImultiple realizability" of some kinds of
states (e.g., some kinds of mental states). The functionalist view of
1. The second suggested description (i.e., a finite set of equations
in a finitary language which characterize all relevant properties
and Ire defined for each spacetime point) may be more promising,
although it is too vaguely stated to be assessed.
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mind, for example, holds that some mental states are definable in
terms of their "causal role" in the mental life of individuals who can
be in them; since a given causal role can be played by a diversity of
physical m~chanisms, even if each instance of a functional state is to
be identified with an in~tance of some physical state, there is no
physical state which is nomologically correlated with that functional
state. Hence, predicates which express functional states are not defi-
nable in physical terms. 20 So far we don't have a counterexample to
(R) (i.e., a non~definable physical state), although we have two
claims that must give the physicalist pause:
1. That there is no physical state that is nomologically correlat-
ed with a given functional state;
t
2. That predicates that express functional states are not defina-
ble in physical terms.
To have a counterexample to the left/riqat direction of (R), we must
have a state which is physical and which is such that there is no term
that both expresses it and i~ physically definable. Let us see if ~
counterexample can be develope,:!.
20 Anticipating the following cliscussion a bit I we point out that
tllese claims concern only first order, finitary physical states.
We shall see below that the reasoning just stated is defective in
that the premise that there is no physical state that is nomologi M
cally correlated with a given functional state is arguably false;
there are both first and higher order physical states that are can~
didates for beinq so correlated.
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To facilitate discussion, we shall grant that functional states
need not be physical states (i.e., not every state is physical); the
brand of physicalism we countenance allows that there are non-physical
states (and other attributes) but requires that actual or nomological-
1y possible realizations of such states be physical. 21 Further, let us
allow that th~ class of all nomologically possible realizations of a
functional state, F, is a well defined class, although not one that is
particularly easy to list; hence, the physical realization of every
actual or nomologically possible instance of F is a member of that
class.
Now, it may be supposed that, allowing cert~il1 constructive appara-
tus for taking s~ates and forming new states out of them,22 there is a
single physical state which corresponds to this class, and hence,
which is nomologically correlated with F. This state is "the physical
realization of F i~ nature": all and only the nomologically possible
realization, of F are instances of it. And, now it may be asked wheth-
er or not that state is expressed by a physically definable predicate.
If the answer is "no", then we have another counterexample to (R)
(i.e., we will have a physic~l state that is not expressed by a physi-
cally definable term.) We shall consider two cases corresponding to
different ways of construing the con$tructed physical state; (i) as a
first order disjunctive physical state and (i1) as a second order
21 Below, in Chapter 4, we shall discuss what a realization is.
22 For example, disjunctions of states yield new states .
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state.
In the first case, the correlated state is the physical state, P,
which is either PI or P2 or P3 or •.. , where the ' ••. 1 continues until
the class of all possible physical realizations of F is exhausted. The
predicate expressing this state ~ould then be of the form IPl v P2 v
P3 v ... '. If the class of possible realizations of F is finite, then
there is no problem; but, if, as is most probable, the class is infi-
nite, then no expression in a finitary, first order language would ex-
press the physical state in question. Again, the question of whether
adverting to an infinitary language would av~1d the objection arises.
Bypassing this question, we see again that if physicalist formulations
are restricted to finitary languages, then the linguistic construQl of,
the physicalist ontological claim is unacceptable. This time the coun~
terexample to (R) depends upon there being a physical state that is
constructible out of an infinite cla~s of other states. 23 If such a
construction is acceptable, then the counterexample follows from the
difference of cardinality of that class and the finite length of ex~
pressions in finitary languages. 24
23 The reply that this state can be simply named by a finite expres~
sion fails for the same reason that it failed earlier.
24 The problem here is not the failure of nomologicality (cf., Fodor
(1975), O.vidson (1970» but of expressibility; th~re is no first
order physical expression in Q finitary language that picks out the
class of all nomologically possible realizations of F. Hence, tlere
i, a state that is not expressed by a physically definable term be-
cause it is disjunctive ana has an infinite number of disjuncts.
In reply to those who might think that the problem is one of fail-
ure to be nomoloqical (e,g., because the predicates expressing such
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The second case (i.e., the correlated physical state is a ~econd
order state) appears to be more promising. A second order physical
state is one which is characterized in terms of a quantification over
first order physical states. If we could find a condition which all
and only the members of the class of physical reallzations of F share,
then we could specify a second order physical state P corresponding to
the class as follows: P is the second order physical state of being in
some first order physical state which •.• , where the' I stands for
some condition which a physical state must have to count as a realiza-
tion of F (e.g., a certain causal role).25
The strategy then is to have in our language a stock of terms ex-
pressing second,(and higher) order physical states; such terms effi-
ciently bypass the need for individually specifying each realization
of higher order states. Notice that no guarantee is made that there
will be enough terms for all such states; the current concern, how-
ever, is with individual states that are difficult to define. Here,
states are not natural kind predicates and, hence, don't occur in
any laws), it is suggested that the most plausible way of constru-
ing nomologicality is in model theoretic terms; on such a constru-
al, the states in question are seen to be nomologically correlated.
The view that the failure is one of nomologicality is endorsed by
Fodor and Davidson. However, they have adopted a different strategy
from ours; vir., to restrict consideration to the actual realiza-
tions of a given state (or, to actual events) and to point out that
a disjunctive state (event) built up from the instances is not
likely to be lawfully correlated with the realized state (event).
Our opproach, however, starts with the assumption of a class of all
possible realizations of a given state; hence, nomologicality of
the correlation is assured.
25 See Putnam (1970), Pield (1975) for discussion of this proposal.
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however, if cardinality problems don't threaten, then triviality prob-
lema do. That is, the problem facing the proponent of this approach is
to find for each state (or other attribute) a condition which any
physical state must satisfy to count as a realization of that state.
To find such a condition is to sail between the Scylla of enumerating
a non~enumerable class and the Charybdis of saying only that each
physical state in the class is a realization of the non-physical state
in question. The latter alternative, though expressible, is not clear-
ly worth expressing: e.g., for F, the namologically correlated physi-
cal state is the second order physical state of being in some first
order physical state which is a realization of F. What is wrong here
is not that we haven't deflected the alleged counterexample to (R),
but that we have done so at the cost of creating mysteries. In the
absence of an explanatory condition in other terms, what makes each
physical realization a realization of F is unclear and apparently
primitive. Now, such a specification serves well enough to avoid the
counterexample to (R), but the physicalist should ask if the price is
too high, given the 9~als of the program.
Although there have been proposals for how to avoid both problems
and to specify the conditions on higher order physical states,26 all
such proposals have, to date, been vague. They constitute promises as
yet unfulfilleu; hence, for now, though we are sympathetic to such
21 See Putnam (1970), Field (1975), Shoemaker (1979), Boyd (unpub-
lished) for some general sU9gestions. Also see below (Chapter 4)
for our discussion of "realization theories",
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proposals, we cannot count them as an adequate buttress for the ap-
proach appealing to higher order physical states to avoid the objec-
tion that there are states not expressible in a finitary language.
Thus, the second objection to the left/right direction of (R) stands
In summary, the first class of cardinality arguments discussed
above (i.e., those of Boyd and Hellman and Thompson) have shown that
no first order, finitary language is adequate for describing all indi-
viduals, attributes or classes in the physical ontology; hence, (R),
(RA), (RI), and (RC) all fail in the left/right direction. Therefore,
if physicalist linguistic theses are restricted to such a language,
then purely lin~istic formulations are inadequate expressions of
physicalist ontological concerns. The failure is clearly connected
with the restricted expressive power of finitary languages; hence, the
issue of whether appeal to infinitary or higher order languages can
deflect the objections and preserve the linguistic approach is left
open by this argument. Our consideration of the second class of objec-
lions to the left/right direction of (R) (i.e., Earman's objection and
the objection based upon the multiple realizability of states) has
further suggested that there are individual states that may not be ex"
27 It might be objected that the proposals that h~ve been made do not
avoid the counterexample to (R) since the conditions suggested are
not specified in "physical" terms, although they are conditions
that specify a physical class. We shall bypass this objection,
since the problem of identifying any non-trivial conditions is dif-
ficulty enough, at a later point, this further problem will have to
be faced.
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pressible in a finitary first order language. Thus, there is addition-
al support for the failure of (R) for such languages. We also saw that
higher order finitary languages might also be unacceptable for ex-
pressing such states, although such an avenue has not been completely
closed off. 28 For now, modulo finitary first order languages, we con"
elude that the physicalist ontological position does not entail the
linguistic theses thought to be equivalent to it. 29
We shall now turn to a discussion of the problems besetting the
right/left direction of (R): i.e., if each thing is such that it is
referred to by a physically definable term, then it is physical.
Again, it will be seen that counterexamples plausibly exist; hence,
every individual (or attribute) could be referred to by a term defina~
,
ble in physical terms and yet it not be the case that every individual
(or attribute) is physical. Because the failure of the left/right di-
rection is sufficient for rejecting the equivalence (R), our discus-
sion of the problems with the right/left direction will be brief. We
mention them to introduce ideas that will be useful later and to alert
the reader to the fact of their existence.
28 Pending the oytcome of the search for non-trivial conditions occur~
ring in the specifications of higher order physical states.
2' With respect to a different and much weaker supposed entailment
(viz., if everything is physical, then every term used to refer to
a physical thing is physically definable), it is also clear that
finitary languages are unacceptable and that higher order languages
may be so as well. This is possibly what many physicalists have had
in mind, although it fairs no better tham the stronger claim we
have been considering_
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Again, Hellman and Thompson have suggested a counterexample.
Against the claim that a strong form of reductionism30 entails ontolo-
gical physicalism they argue as follows:
To see this, consider a very simple theory, E, containing
just two non-logical one-place predicates, P and Q, and the
following non-logical axioms:
1. ExEy(x; y & (z)(z = x v z =y»
2. Ex(Px & (y)(Py ---> Y = x»
3. Ex(Qx & (y)(Qy ---> y =x»
4. (x)(Px v QX)
That is, E asserts thdt there are exactly two objects and
that exactly one object is a P and exactly one object is a Q
and everything is a P or a Q. Now, in E, the following is
provable: (x)(Qx <---> -Px). In other words, Q is definable
in terms of P. Yet, this doesn't guarantee that all objects
are, or are exhausted by, P-type things. In fact, in every
model of E: there are two disjoint subsets of entities, one
P-type, the other Q-type,31
Strictly speaking, this line of argument provides us with a counterexw
ample to the right/left direction of (R): we have a situation in which
every object is referred to by a predicate that is either a P-term or
a term definable by P-terms and yet not everything is a P-type thing.
30 They construe physical reductionism to be the claim that:
[ .•• lin the theory consisting of all the 'lawlike truths of
science (stated in an adequate language), including, of
course, physical theory, every scientific predicate is defi-
nable in physical terms. That is, for every n-place predi~
cate P, the laws of science entail a formula of the form;
(xl).,.(xn)(Pxl ••• xn <---> A), where A is a (finite) sen-
tence containing only physical vocabulary as non-logical
terms, and occurrenQes of n distinct variables xl,._., xn.
31 See Hellman and Thompson (1915), p. 557.
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t.:,
Despite the directness of this argument, it is not completely sat~
isfying; first, how much does it depend on there being only two predi-
cates in the formal system?; second, are negative definitions accepta-
ble for the physicalist?; and third, does anything depend upon there
being a finite domain?
In a footnote, Hellman and Thompson claim that nothing depends upon
there being only two predicatesl
If '_!cte is made of certain relative terms, clearly within
physicalist vocabula~y as conceived by traditional reduc-
tionist positions, e.g., predicates of location, then paral-
lel arguments can be constructed for~heories containing any
finite number of predicates. (emphasis added)32
But predicates of location, like negative definitions are suspect: the
locatability of pll phenomena is allowed for by some dualist posi-
tions. What the dualist denies and the physicalist asserts is that the
phenomena themselves are physical; and being physical is not a simple
matter of being located. s3
Although Hellman and Thompson have presented a counterexample to
(R) as it was presented, the question arises as to whether the physi-
cal reductionist can't simply reply that the position refuted is not
his; not just any definition is physicalistically acceptable. In par-
32 See Hellman and Thompson (1975), p. 557.
33 Some physicalists would dispute this claim contending that being
located in the space-time continuum is the only mark of the physi-
cal that withstands close scrutiny: being physical is just a matter
of being located if being physical is anything at all. See below
(Chapter 3) for discussion of this and other attempts to character-
ize "the physical".
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ticular, definitions that are negative or locational are not accepta-
ble. Hence, Hellman and Thompson have failed to establish what they
intended to because their argument depends upon physicalistically i1-
licit definitions: there are restrictions on what an acceptable defi-
nition in physical terms isr
The question that now arises is: what are the restrictions? Al-
though Hellman and Thompson have not provided a conclusive counterex·
ample to a clarified formulation of (R), they have shown that the bur-
den is on the physical reductionist to produce motivated restrictions
on physical definitions which are sufficient to avoid the counterexam-
ples. Hence, in the case of individuals, there is at least a question
as to whether or not the physicalist can restrict the definitions so
I
as to preserve the entailmant from definability to ontology.
In the case of attributes, there are also difficulties. That is,
the physjcal definability of a predicate expressing an attribute does
not guarantee that the attribute is a physical attribute. The point
here is that nomological coextensiveness of predicates A and B is not
sufficient for identification of the attributes expressed by A and B.
So, even if all predicates in science are either physical primitives
or definable in terms of such primitives, there is no entailment of
the ontological claim that every attribute is a physical attribute.
such definability is quite compatible with "property dualism". Hence,
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the right/left direction of (RA) is false. 34
Many contemporary physicalists have abandoned this very strong on-
tological claim; and they have opted for weaker theses concerning ei-
ther the instances of non-physical attributes (token identity) or, as
mentioned above, the physical realizations of attributes. Neither of
these views is a consequence of the physic~l definability of all terms
in science. However, although the definability claim is not suffi-
cient to express the ontological claims of the physicalist, it may
still be of interest with respect to other goals (e.g., explanation).
Finally, we point out that, regarding classes, the arguments cited
above concerning individuals defeat (RC) in the right/left direction.
That is, it fol!ows from the the claim that there could be non-phy~i-
cal individuals that had physical definitions that there could be
classes of non-physical individuals that had physical definitions.
In this section, we have seen the general failure of equivalence
between formal claims concerning the physical definability of terms in
the language of science and ontological claims concerning the physical
34 Of course, nothing we have said rules out the possibility that at-
tributes expressed by some predicates used in "non-physical branch-
es of science" are physical attributes. The point here is essen-
tially that whether an attribute is physical or not does not depend
on the specified relations between linguistic items; in particular,
nomological co-extensiveness of terms is not a sufficient condition
for attribute identity, What it does depend upon are relations be~
tween attributes. See Putnam (1970), Malinas (1973), Swinburne
(1982), Sober (1982), Causey (1977), Ene (1976), Shoemaker (1979),
and Achinstein (1974) for discussion of the myriad of issues and
position. involved here.
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nature of all individuals, classes and attributes, Proponents of
purely linguistic construals of the physicalist ontological claim are
committed to this equivalence; hence, we conclude that a purely 1in-
guistic construal is inadequate. This conclusion depends upon viewing
the "language of science" as having the characteristics that were ex-
ploited in the arguments cited above.3~ At this point, we have not yet
addressed the issue of whether this construal is acceptable; nor have
we fully explored the generality of the arguments with respect to lan-
guages with different properties. Within these limitations, the moral
is: to propose a thesis concerning the physical character of all phe-
nomena, quantify over the phenomena themselves rather than the lin-
guistic objects that are used to talk about those phenomena (i.e.,
formulate non~lihguistic theses). A deeper moral, which we shall con-
tinue to develop throughout this project, is that an adequate physi-
calist doctrine, being concerned with both the formal system of scien-
tific knowledge as well as the intended interpretation of that formal
system (i.e., nature) had better honor the known results and difficul-
ties concerning relations between formal systems and their intended
interpretations; for example, incompleteness, the existence of non-
standard models, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, cardinality considera-
tions. As a consequence of such findings, and because the physicalist
is concerned with both nature and the formal system of science, sepa-
35 I.e., the characteristics of finitary, first order languages, in
the case of the arguments against the left/right direction of (R).
No such restriction was made in the discussion of the right/left
direction,
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rate theses concerning each may be required for adequate expression of
the physicalist doctrine.
The second category of physicalist concern for which linguistic
theses have been proposed is that of objectivity. Physicalists con~
cerned with the theses of the indiscernibility of physical identicals
and of the determination of all facts by the physical facts have ex-
pressed their concerns linguistically as follows.
(1) For every non-physical predicate and every distinction it
makes, there is a physical predicate that makes that distinc~
tion. 36
(D) The physical truth determines the whole truth about nQture. 31
These formulations of theses concerning objectivity are typical in the
,
respects that we shall be considering: the appeal to linguistic ob-
jects (i.e., predicates in the case of (I) and truths formulable in a
languaqe in the case of (0).) And, it is these respects that we shall
argue make the formulations inadequate expressions of the physicalist
position that they are intended to express, although they do formulate
theses of interest in their own right. We shall contend that (I) and
(D) formulate theses concerning the formal system of science, but not
theses concerning nature; two additional theses may be called for to
fully express the physicalist position regarding objectivity in na-
's See Hellman an' Thompson (1975) for their formalization of this
claim.
31 See 2uine (196gb), Hellman and Thompson (1975), Friedman (1975) for
discussion and ways of formalizing this claim.
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ture. 3 '
What (1) fails to capture is the thesis that all distinctions be-
tween objects are associated with physical distinctions between ob-
jects. The reasons are by now familiar: quantification over predi-
cates is limited to, at most, a denumerably infinite domain, whereas
the class of all possible distinctions is non-denumerable. Hence, the
thesis (1) fails to capture the full force of the "ontological" claim
of indiscernibility. The strategy for demonstrating this follows along
the lines employed above in showing that (R) was false; hence, it
could be shown that it was possible for two objects to exist which
differed in some physical or non-physical respect but for which there
were not predicates available to mark the distinction. We shall bypass
,
the details of this arqument. 39
A stmilar, but more complicated, line of reasoning can be directed
against (0). The notions of truth and of elementary equivalence 40 are
38 Such objectivity is to be thought of in terms of determination of
fact and indiscernibility of objects; at issue, is whether this is
best thought of in purely linguistic terms or in terms of the enti"
ties and attributes that exist in nature and are referred to and
expressed by linguistic objects. See, also, Horgan (1981), Haugland
(1982), and Kim (1982a) for further discussion of how to express
these claims.
,. Quineans may reply that quantification over respects, differences,
properties, etc is illicit and that the linguistic construal is the
only one possible. See Quine (1978, 1979) himself for non-linguis-
tic construals that avoid the problem at hand.
40 In Hellman and Thompson (1975), the thesis ot physical truth deter-
mination is developed in terms of elementarily equivalent models.
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unavoidably tied to the notion of an interpreted language; and, the
notion of an interpreted languag,! is not nec~ssarily adequate for dis-
cussing all of the feal~res of ~tructures that interpret languages. In
general, theses about language al;e not equivalent to theses about
structures; hence, with regard to the structures that interpret the
language of science, the determirlation41 of "fact" should be expressed
by a thesis that is about the stt'uctures themselves. 12
The problem in the case of both (I) and (0) is not that they tail
to be true; but rather, it is that they fail to express the right
theses: i.e., a thesis concerning all similarities and differences in
nature and a thesis concerning all facts about nature. Alternatively
put, they expre~s t~eses that are simply about the wrong things and
that are not equivalent to any releva.lt true theses about the right
things. Again, the moral is: if you want to express a thesis concern-
ing all phenomena in nature, quanttify over those phenomena rather than
over the linguistic objects that you use to describe those phenome~
na. 43
41 The notion of "determination" in theses about nature (e_g_, The
physical phenomena determine all the phenomena) may have a quite
different content than the notion of "determination" used in (0).
42 Hellman and Thompson (1975, p. 558) app~ar to be aware of this
shortcoming of their formulation of the thesis of truth determina-
tion. A formulati~n concerning structures might plausibly be
couched in te~s of isomorphism of structures.
43 (1) ana (D) may be perfectly goc,d theses concerning the objectivity
of sc:ientific knowledge and preciicates.
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In addition to the inadequacies of linguistic construals of con-
cerns about ontology and objectivity, past linguistic construals of
explanatory concerns have also been deficient. Recal1 44 that the ex-
planatory concerns of the physicalist program involve (i) reduction of
the total number cf mysteries in nature, (ii) reduction of the number
of fundamental mysteries, and (iii) increase in the power of explana-
tory principles. Classical physicali.st formulations consisted of, in
addition to definitional theses, theses concerning the derivability of
the laws of every special science from the laws of physics plus bridge
principles. 45 It was believed that such derivability theses were ade-
quate expressions of the physicalist's explanatory concerns because
such derivations were thought to entail (a) the explanation of the de-
rived laws, (b) the explanation 10 physical terms of all phenomena
subsumable under the derived laws, and (c) an increase in the explana-
tory power of the physical laws, as a consequence of their increased
generality.
44 See Chapter 1.
45 There is difference of opinion about whether the physical laws in-
volved in such de~ivations are the "basic laws of phl"sics" or laws
which are not necessarily consequences of the basic laws but which
are obtained Py substitution of physical definitions for defined
non-physical terms in some nnon-physical law", Our current concerns
in no way depend upon how this dispute is resolved. See Kim (1978),
Boyd (unpublished), Spector (1978), Hellman and Thompson (1975,
1977) for discussion of these issues .
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That such a formulation is not an adequate expression of the expla-
natory concerns of physicalists is due to the fact that it depends
crucially upon a shortcoming of the D-N model of explanation; that
is, such a formulation presupposes that derivation from a set of laws
is sufficient for explanation by those laws. As is well known, this
presupposition is dubiouS. 46 At best, the view under consideration
must be supplemented in some way to guarantee explanation; and, it is
entirely possible that the manner of supplementation will not be lin-
guistic in character.~7 If so, then a purely linguistic construal of
explanatory concerns fails of its purpose. In our estim~tion, the
idea that a purely linguistic feature of a derivation could be suffi-
cient to sort out the explanatory derivations from the non-explanatory
,
ones is most implausible. Hence, at this point, we reject purely 1in-
guistic theses as candidates for expression of physicalist explanatory
concerns.
An important instance of this general problem has been discussed by
Fodor in his "Computation and Reduction".48 There he convincingly ar llll
gues that "the classical reduction of psychology to neuropsychology"
(or physics) can result in a loss of explanatory power. Put in the
46 See Bromberger (1966).
47 For example, it might be required that the derivation be from laws
concerning objects that are parts of wholes which the derived ~aws
are about. See Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) and Causey (1977) for
discussions of such a view.
~8 See Fodor (1978).
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terms of our discussion, what Fodor suggests is that the
neurophysiological translations of psychological laws (given defini~
tions of psychological terms by terms drawn from the neurosciences)
will fail to provide adequate explanations of the phenomena subsumable
under the psychological laws. 4 ' The reason for this is that defini-
tions constrained by only nomological coextensionality need not pre-
serve features of the defined p~edicates that contribute essentially
to their roles in (psychological) explanation. Fodor argues that this
is plausibly the case for psychological predicates that express the
content of a mental state and neurophysiological predicates that may
be nornologically coextensive with them. 5o
If Fodor's argument is sound, then it provides a counterexample to
,
the claim that the derivability of a class of laws from another class
entails that the phenomena subsumed tInder the members of the first
49 Hence, goal (b) above will not be satisfied.
50 The alleged loss is ~aid by Fodor to cons;.st in: (i) a loss of the
distinction between arbitrary and coherent relations between
states, (ii) an inability to state in neurophysiological terms gen-
eralizations statable in psychological terms, (iii) an inability to
make the same explanations in both fields, and hence, (tv) a loss
of explanatory power. Given (i) - (iv) and assuming that the dis-
cussion is concerned with "non-eliminative programs", then "total
science" does not lose explanations as a result of reduction as Fo-
dor sU9gests; but, neither is it unified by reduction in the way
thought by classical reductionists. Lower level sciences do not
gain in the explanatory power of their principles as a result of
such reduction; and, neither are the phenomena and laws studied in
the higher level sciences expl.ained by lower level sciences. On the
other hand, if one is concerned with an eliminative reductive pro~
gram, then reduction would result in a loss of explanations and ex-
planatory power of total science.
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class are explained by the members of the second and, hence, that the
laws in the second class gain in explanatory power. This point, in
conjunction with the idea that the derived laws themselves are not a
fortiori explained, substantially undermines the classical reduction~
ist program with respect to the explanatory goals of physicalism.
In the same paper, Fodor goes on to discuss potential additional
constraints on the (derivational) reduction of psychology to neurophy-
siology which would effectively rule out the possibility of loss of
explanatory power resulting from a "successful" reduction. But, in
doing this, Fodor is quick to point out that, although such con~
straints may be forthcoming in the psychology/neurophysiology case,
they are almost ,certainly not going to be forthcoming in the psycholo-
gy/physics case. For the physicalist this is sad news, since it is re-
duction to physics that is of primary importance.
Fodor appears to have provided good grounds for believing that
classical derivational reduction of theories is not the proper expres-
sion of the physicalist's concerns with explanation, since such reduc-
tion is compatible with a consequent failure to increase explanatory
power. As we have emphacized above, an adequate expression of the
physicalist view would not be compatible with such a failure.
Therefore, the general d\~iousness of the alleged entailment of ex-
planation by derivation, the likelihood that this cannot be generally
guaranteed by supplying additional linguistic constraints, and final~
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1y, Fodor's specific ar9~ments and conclusions suggest that the clas-
sical linguistic construal of physicalist ~xplanatory concerns fails
to adequately express the intended physicalist thesis: i.e., that all
laws of the special sciences and their instances are explained in
physical terms, that the explanatory power of the explaining princi-
ples is increased by such explanation and that the total understanding
yielded by science is thereby increased. 51
In addition to classical reductionism, physicalists have proposed
alternative, and logically weaker, linguistic theses roncerning inter-
theoretic relations. One such thesis, advanced by Quine 52 and devel-
oped by Friedman53 and by Hellman and Thompson, 54 is the thesis of
physical truth qetermination: the physical truth determines the whole
truth about nature. As discussed above, this thesis does not adequate-
ly express the physicalist's ontological claim about the physical de-
termination of all phenomena, but nonetheless, it may accurately ex-
press important relations between physical truth and all other truth,
especially the truths developed in the special sciences.
51 It will be seen below that many physicalists view these goals as
"utopian" and in need of modification for a realistic physicalist
program.
52 See Quine (196gb).
53 See Friedman (1975).
54 See Hellman and Thompson (1975).
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As formulated by Hellman and Thompson, the thesis gives expression
to a linguistic, non-reductive thesis which expresses the physic~l-
ist's intuition that "given a full characterization of things in phys-
leal terms, one and only one f~ll characterization of things in (non-
physical) terms is correct." 55 The inadequacy of this claim as an
expression of explanatory concerns is self-evident: if anything, the
claim demands that an explanation (of the determination) be provided.
At a minimum, an explanatory thesis must be reductive in that it r~-
lates individual members of each class (i.e., it relates the explained
and the explaining phenomena, laws, terms, etc); hence, Hellman and
Thompson truth determination is clearly inadequate for expressing ex~
planatory concerns. 56
55 Their formalization of truth determination gives precise content to
the notion of truth determination in model-theoretic terms which
expresses the ic1ea that, given any two "standard" models of natural
science, if they are elementarily equivalent with respect to the
physical sub-vocabulary of the language of science, then they are
elementarily equivalent with respect to the non-physical sub-vocab-
ulary of the language of science. In short, if you fix the physical
truths, then you fix all the truths. We must bypass discussion of
the interesting details and issues raised by their proposal; we
shall be focusing only on its non-reductive and linguistic fea-
tures.
55 Hellman (1978) discusses connections between physical and non-phys-
ical terms; thus, he seems to view truth determination as "reduc-
tive" in our sense. However, since the connections are not nomolo~
gical in Hellman's view, there is little reason to believe they
constitute explanatory connections. Thus, whether one views Hellman
and Thompson truth determination as reductive or non-reductive, it
is not likely to satisfy explanatory goals of the program.
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An alternative expression of truth determination, offered by Mi-
chael Friedman, which he calls "weak reducibility", might also be con-
sidered as an expression of physicalist explanatory concerns. He
writes as follows:
Let 'Flx', 'F2x', ••• ,'Fnx' be the primitive predicates of
the theory to be reduced. Let a physical realization be a
mapping 8 which associates each 'Fix' with a set of open
sentences containing only physical predicates, B('Fix') =
['Alix', 'A2ix', .t.]. For any sentence containing only
predicates from among 'Flx', 'F2x' I"', 'Fnx', we can define
truth under the realization B and satisfaction under B -
they are defined just like satisfaction and truth, except
that the clause for atomic formulas now reads; A sequence s
satisfies 'Fix' under B iff there exists an 'Ajix' in
B('Fix') such that s satisfies 'Ajix'. Let us now define
weak reducibility ..• : a theory is weakly reducible to phys-
ics if there is a physical realization B of its primitive
predicates such that for each predicate 'Fix' and each
spacetime point q, 'Fix' is true of q just in case some
'Ajix' in ~('Fix') is true of q (i.e., 'Fix' is not co~xten~
sive with any single physical predicate, but rather with a
'disjunction' - possibly infinite - of physical predicates)
and in every model of physics the theory comes out true un-
der B.5'
Here we have the non~physical truths as semantic consequences of the
physicaL trutll51 the potentj.al derivations of the former from the lat-
ter are mediated by (possibly infinite) disjunctive physical defini-
tions of non~physical predicates. If we assume that the thesis of weak
reducibility of all theories by physics is correct, would it adequate-
ly capture the desired physicalist explanatory concerns? The answer
is clearly notl First, weak reducibility does not avoid the general
difficulties associated with the required entailment of explanation by
derivation: Friedman has generalized classical derivational reduction
17 See Friedman (1975), p. 358-9.
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and has not provided any additional criteria which would sort out ex-
planatory from non-explanatory derivations. Second, weak reducibility
is vulnerable to Fodor's objection that in certain cases derivational
reductions can lead to no gain in explanatory power. This is for the
same reasons cited above with respect to strong, linguistic reduction.
Third, Friedman highlights an explanatory concern mentioned earlier:
what principles are there which account for the inclusion of specific
physical predicates in the class of physical predicates assoc.lated
with a given non-physical predicate? The position raises que!ltions
that it cannot answer, and hence, at the least, it must be supplement-
ed to yield a more adequate physicalist position concerning explana-
tion. Realization of non~physical attributes by physical attributes
should be explained in an adequate physical system; this means that
some account must be given of membership in the class of physical
predicates associated with a given non-physical predicate. Without
such an account, mysterious physical/non-physical connections "bound.
Hence, although Friedman may have offered a good account of truth de~
termination in science, his thesis does not adequately express physi~
calist explanatory concerns.
Finally, Hartry Field58 has offered a formulation of inter-theoret-
ic reduction which may be more promising than any of the alternutives
so far considered; unlike Friedman, he employ's Putnam's idea of sec~
ona order physical propet'ties, and associated definitions, to general-
.1 See Field (1975).
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ize classical reductionism so as to handle the difficulties posed by
functionalism in psychology (and plausibly elsewhere). Thus, he formu-
lates the physicalist claim of inter-theoretic reductionism just as
the classical reductionist with the exception that the bridge laws may
include second order physical definitions of non-physical predicates
(i.e., definitions which correspond to specifications of second order
physical properties).
Field's formulation is clearly vulnerable to the general difficulty
posed for all derivational theses based upon the presupposition that
derivation entails explanation. How~ver, it is not clear that his for-
mulation is vulnerable to Fodor's objection or to the objection raised
against Friedmaq. Recall that a second order definition involves
quantification over physical properties and specification of a condi-
tion that a physical property must satisfy to fall within the class of
~roperties that are associated with the second order physical proper-
ty. Hence, this position avoids the problem encountered by Friedman,
but, only if the condition is ..~n-trivial. Regarding Fodor's objec-
tion, all depends upon the character of the condition supplied by the
definition. If the condition is explanatorily equivalent to the origi-
nal predicate, without simply includin9 it then the use of second or-
der definitions may avoid loss of explanatory power: i.e., the physi~
cal laws using second order physical predicates may be able to expla~n
the instances of the non-physical law which it reduced as well as that
law itself. At this point, we leave this as an open issue pending the
development of relevant second order, physical definitions.
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In any event, Field's formulation, insofar as it adverts directly
to derivation (without providing purely linguistic grounds for distin-
guishing explanatory derivations) is vulnerable to the first objec-
tion. At the least, such grounds must be provided to save the purely
linguistic expression of physicalist exp~anatory concerns.
To summarize this section: purely linguistic theses advanced so far
are clearly not adequate expressions of physicalist concerns about on-
tology, objectivity and cxplanati~n. In the case of ontology and ob-
jectivity, it is clear that no such thesis could be anequate if the
restriction to a finitary language is made; in the case of explana-
tion, the issue remains ~pen.
,
2.2 PURELY NON-LINGUISTIC FORMULATIONS
Many recent proponent~ of purely non-linguistic theses (e.g.,
everything is physical, the physical phenomena determine all the phe~
nomena) have typically been quite aware of the differences
between these theses and linguistic theses of the kind considered in
the last section. s, In the wake of the variety of difficulties that
classical, linguistic reductionism has encountered, the principle con-
tention of such thinkers has been that one can be a physicalist with-
out being committed to implausibly strong views about the formal
.
structure of science. For example, DavidsonJs doctrine of "anomalous
" See Hellman and Thompson (1975), Fodor (1975), Davidson (1970),
Boyd (unpublished), Quine (1978, 1979).
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monism" is the view that (i) every event is a physical event, (ii) the
Inental supervenes upon the physical, (iii) there are no nomological
correlations of mental and physical phenomena, and hence, (iv) there
are no psycho-physical laws. Physicalism, on this view, is compatible
with the existence of no strong formal or explanatory connections be~
tween theories in different branches of science.
In a quite similar vein, Quine writes as follows:
It [his brand of physicalism] is not a reductionist doctrine
of the sort sometimes imagined. It is not a utopian dream of
our being able to specify all mental events in physiological
or microbiological terms. It is not a claim that such corre-
lations even exist, in general to be discovered; the group-
ings of events in mentalistic terms need not stand in any
systematic relation to biological groupings. What it does
say about the life of the mind is that there is no mental
difference without a physical difference. so,
Because both Davidson and Quine discuss their physicalism in the
context of discussions of mental phenomena, it is not entirely clear
that what they have to say generalizes to all of science; that is, it
is not entirely clear whether a version of physicalism that requires
only an ontological claim plus a superveni~nce or indiscernibility
claLm and that does not require any stronger systematic relations be-
twe~n physical and non~physical phenomena or theories is sufficient,
on their view, for all of science. We shall take them to hold that it
is sufficient. 61
60 See Quine (1979), p. 163.
61 This is p=rhaps debatable, because both Quine and Davidson believe
that there is something special about the mental that distinguishes
- 81 -
A third version of physicalism that imposes minimal requirements on
the formal structure of science is found in Fodor's introductory chap·
ter to The Language Of Thought. The doctrine of lithe generality of
physics" constitutes his concessions to previous physicalist strivings
for a unified science. On this view, the ontology of physics is ade-
quate for serving as the ontology of dll science, but it is not re-
quired that there be lawlike correlations between physical and higher
level phenomena. To paraphrase Fodor, the natural kinds studied in
psychology and the other special sciences need not correlate in law~
like fashion with tne natural kinds studied in physics. Further, he
does appear to build into his position views at least as strong as 5U-
pervenience and indiscernibility: he require3 that individual physical
events "realize'" individual non-physical ovents, or alternatively,
that physics provides the mechanisms that underlie the phenom~nd stud~
ied in the special sciences. 12
it from science: viz., the methodology of ascription of mental at~
tributes is different from a scientific methodology. Hence, it
might be claimed that this weak physicalism is only intended to ap-
ply to the mental-physical case. However, in Quine (1978), he is
quite unequivocal re~arding the applicability of his claims to all
of science. Hellman and Thompson similarly characterize their view
as requiring no nomological correlations and no psycho-physical (or
other such) laws; they appear to differ from Quine and Davidson in
that they emphacize certain linguistic claims although there is no
reason for Quine or Davidson to deny them.
82 See Fodor (1975). Other philosophers who have emphacized non-lin~
guistif: physicalism include Boyd (unpublished) and Kim (1982a). In
all sucb views, it is important to clarify, when giving up nomolo-
gical t~~e-type correlations in favor of individual physical/non-
physical associations, whether the associations are nomological,
are merely contingent, or are of some intermediate degree of coun~
terfactual force.
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Although there is some difference between the views of Quine, Da-
vids~n, Fodor, and Hellman and ThompGon, they appear to be in agree-
ment on the idea that a version of physicalist doctrine that requires
(i) that every individual is physical and (11) that all phenomena de-
pend upon physical phenomena is a sufficient expression of the physi-
calist position in science. such a view does not require (iii) that
there are nomological correlations between physical and non-physical
phenomena or (iv) that terms drawn from the vocabularies of the spe~
cial sciences enter into lawlike sentences with terms drawn from the
vocabulary of physics or (v) that the lawlike sentences which express
the laws of the special sciences are derivable from lawlike sentences
that express physical laws, or (vi) that there be explanati~ns of
non-physical phenomena (individual and regularities) in terms of phys-
teal phenomena. 53 Of course, if such stronger connections (i.e.,
(iii)-(vi)) are developed they are not to be eschew~d; the point of
the position being considered is that physicalism does not require
such connections in order to serve its underlying motivations.
13 Foc1ar appears to hold a "token explanation" doctrine on which the
physical mechanisms underlying individual psychological phenomena
are studied and used to offer explanations of the phenomena that
depend upon them. However, he also appears to reject the idea that,
in general, the hiqher level laws are derivable from or explainable
in tel~S of physical laws and he rejects the idea that, in g~neral,
there are psychophysical laws. As we shall see below, it is impro-
bable that one can hold all of these positions concurrently.
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Now, it sho~;ld be evictent to the r~ader that such a version of
physicalism 1s not adequate by our criteria; it fails because, al-
though it expresses the important features of the phY~licalist view of
nature, it does not make any demands upon the formal system of science
vis a vis explanation. As a consequence, the program of physicalism
based upon such a formulation of the doctrine could be "SUCCE:ssful u
and yet fail to realize the goals of the program~ In our estimation,
physicalists who opt for this weak version of the doctrine have re-
treated much too far ba~k from the original strong formulations of the
doctrine.
N(~ all physicalists who have e~phacized the non-linguistic side of
the d~ctrine have retreated so far; that is, some recent physicalists,
have not restricted themselves to claims concernin; ontology, superve-
nience, and indiscernibility. Beginning 't/it~l purely non-linguistic
claims, such thinkers have suggested that there are some fairly strong
consequences for the formal system of science that follow from the
non-linguistic claims. Hellman and rhompson, for example, appear to
suggest that from ~he physicalist view that "the physical facts deter-
mine all the facts" (i.e., ontological determination) it follows that
"the physical truths determines all truths l4bout nature u • 64 As noted
above, such a view is, by itself, too wnak to satisfy the criteria
concerning explanation. In addition, Hellmar and Thomp~on explore the
idea that their weakened form of physicalism leads logically t~ ex-
64 See Hellman and Thompson (1915) p. 553.
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plicit f physical definability of terms in the formal system of sci~
ence: i.e., it is suggested that a set of purely non-linguistic theses
may, in the presence of non-rontroversial assumptions, lead to ~tron9
linguistic _laims concerning ~ne structure of scientific knowledge.
Hellman and Thompson claim to have shown that such an argument, al-
though very interesting, ultimately fails. 55
However, other physicalists have more or less directly suggested
that non"'liuguistic phrsical:i.sm does have certain strong consequences
f~r the formal syste~ of science. Kim, for example, has argued that,
given th~ supervenience thesis, there must be ncmological correlation~
between physical and Al l"'physical attributes and, hence, that the
physical definability of non-physical turms is possible; this, of,
coursEl , r~Jpens the door to the derivation and explanation of oon-
physical laws by physical laws. 56
Less directly, Field and Friedman, heginning with reflections upon
the ontologi,:al view that ment~i states are "functional states" that
may have multiple physical r~alizations, have generalized classical
linguistic reductionism in different ways.61 The strategic suggestion
is that, as our conception of the kinds of systematic correlation~ be-
tween physical ~nd non-physical phenomena ev)lves, our conception at
65 See Htllman and Thow,son (1975), p. 561-~.
66 See Kim (1978).
&7 See Fie,J.d (1975), Friedman (1'375). ,
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the formal structure that reflects these relations can and must evolve
concordantly. Whether Field and Friedman believe that there are logic-
a1 arguments from non-linguistic to linguistic theses is not clear
from their writings; they do appear to believe that there are stronger
non-linguistic theses than supervenience which are plausible (i.e.,
certain kinds of nomological correlations) and that the existence of
such correlations opens the door to a revitalized form of linguistic
reductionism.
Finally, Putnam has contended that a purely ontological form of
physicalism that eschews nomological correlations of physical and
non-phy~ical attributes and associated linguistic relations is unten~-
ble: as he puts it, "type-type correlations" are required as a part of
I
a minimal physicalist position. 68 Again, such correlations invite con-
sideration of strong physicalist theses concerning definition and der-
ivation in science.
To this point, we have seen that there are, at least, two brands
of non~linguistic physicalism advertized in the literature. The first,
advocated by Quine and Davidson, requires sup~rvenience without call-
ing for nomological connections between physical and non-physical phe-
nomena; as a result, the formal connections betweeu various branches
of science need only be quite minimal. The second view, advocated by
'8 See Putnam (1979). It is not entirely clear from his discussion why
he believes this and wnether his emphasis is on explanatory con-
cerns or more fundamental epistemological concerns.
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Kim and suggested by the work of Field, Friedman and Putnam, holds, in
addition to ontological and supervenience claims, that such claims en-
tail that there are nomological correlations between physical and
non-physical phenomena and that these are expressible in the form of
explicit definitions, thus imposing stronger requirements upon t~e
formal structure of science.
What will be of interest to us in this section are the ideas that
(i) supervenience theses entail nomological correlations between the
supervening properties and the properties supervened upon, and (ii)
there are arguments leading from such non-linguistic theses to strong
linguistic theses concerning the structure of science. Thus, we are
interested in t~e idea that apparently minimal formulations of physi-
calism (e.g., those of Quine and Davidson) are seriously underestimat-
ed by their proponents.
The key question that we shall address is whether a purely non-lin-
guistic formulation of physicalist doctrine is adequate by our cri-
teria. As we have already observed, the first form of non-linguistic
physicalism is clearly not adequate because it fails to impose any
structure upon scientific knowledge such that the explanatory goals of
the program are attained. There are two lines of reply to this charge.
The first is to challenge the criteria of adequacy as too restrictive;
as we have already acknowledged, the criteria are proprietary but well
motivated. The second reply is to adopt the other view regarding
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non-linguistic physicalism: that is" to adopt the view that a purely
non-linguistic formulation of physicalism is adequate because (i) it
explicitly captures the ontological views of the physicalist and (it)
it has consequences regarding the structure of scientific knowledge
that are sufficient for satisfying the remainin~ criteria. s9
To summarize: a purely non-linguistic formulation of physicalism is
adequate if and only if it has consequences which are jointly suffi-
cient for satisfying the criteria of adequacy; the cri.teria can be
satisfied only if a versiun of physicalism involves fairly strong
claims regarding the formal structure of science. Hence, the Quine-Da-
vit~on brand of non-linguistic physicalism is not adequate by the cri~
teria, assuming Fhey are right that it has no strong consequences con-
cerning the formal structure of science. However, this raises ~he
question of how certain non-linguistic theses that are generally
agreed upon by all physicalists (e.g., supervenience) are logically
related to linguistic theses concerning science. If non-linguistic and
linguistic theses are logically independent of each oth~r, then a
purely non-linguistic formulation of physicalism must be counted as
not adequate; if, on the other hand, they are not independent, then a
"purely non-linquistic" formulation could be counted as adequate if it
" Such a rep!y is somewhat paradoxical since it involves showing that
a up\4rely non-linguistic" formulation is adequate because it has
consequences for the formal structure of science (i.e., it is not
really a purely non-linguistic view). The point may better be con-
ceived in terms of the dependence of the one type of thesis upon
the other.
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had the right logical consequences. 70
In the remainder of this section, we shall briefly desclibe two
lines of argument that have appeared in the literature which bear on
the issue as we have just formulated it. Specifically, Kim?! has pre-
sented an argument designed to show that, beginning with an assumption
of the supervenience of one class of attributes upon another (e.g.,
the non"physical attributes supervening upon the physical attributes),
it can be inferred that (i) there are nomological correlations between
attributes in the supervening class and attributes in the superveni~
ence base, (ii) there are definitions, in a sufriciently rich lan~
guage, of terms designating the attributes in the supervening class by
terms designating the attributes in the supervenience base, and (iii),
there are resulting derivations of theories concerning the supervening
attributes from theories concerning the attributes supervened upon.
The argument presented for these conclusions is premised upon the as-
sumptions that the attributes in the supervening class are instantiat-
ed and that the attributes in the supervenience base are finite in
number. An interesting line of future research would be, if Kim's ar-
gument is sound, whether it can be generalized to cases in which not
70 The reader is reminded that the consequences in question are those
which follow in the presence of modest assumptions about the lan-
guage of science and its interpretation. Also, "linguistic" formu'"
lations will include theses concerning explanation formulations;
thus, derivation and definition are not the only pertinent rela-
tions between linguistic objects in science.
7' See Kim (1978).
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all attributes in the supervening class are instantiated and in which
the supervenience base is not of finite cardinality.
A second line of argument, presented by Hellman anu Thompson, 72
would appear to close off th~ prospects for successfully generalizing
Kim's argument. Essentially they argue from an assumption of superve-
nience 73 to the claim of the implicit definability of terms expressing
non-physical attributes by terms expressing physical attributes. 74
They then suggest that an application of the Beth definability theorem
would appear to lead straightforwardly to the explicit definability of
the non-physical terms by the physical terms, and hence, to the deriv-
ability of theories couched in the former vocabulary from theories
couched in the lptter vocabulary. However, they argue against this
move on the grounds thut the Beth theorem is not applicable in the
case of physicalism because the class of models which constitute the
"standard" models for scientific theories is a proper subclass of all
the models for those theories: i.e_, there are "standardnesf'tI require"
ments on what counts as an accept .bIe model for scientific theories,
and such requirements effectively rule out some models of such thea"
ries as not acceptable. Since the Beth theorem only applie& to theory
classes (ire., the class of all modelti for a theory), it is not appli-
72 See Hellman and Thompson (1975).
73 They do not make this assumption entirely explicit, although it is
definitely suggested by their discussion.
74 A thesis they call "the physical determination of reference",
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cable in the case of physicalist science.
We shall not pursue further an assessment of the ~erits of either
Kim's or Hellman and Thompson's arguments, although such pursuit is an
important area of future inquiry. Such inquiry is not required for
current purposes because, no matter how it turns out, our arguments
above against purely non~linguistic versi.ons of physicalism suffice to
show th~t linguistic theses are required for any adequate formulation
of physicalist doctrine. If linguistic theses are consequences of
non-linguistic theses (plus modest background assumptions) so much the
better; but, such a relation is not required; what is required is that
linguistic theses feature in a formulation of physicalism.
,
2.3 PURELY NON-REDUCTIVE ~ORMULATIONS
We nuw t~rn to a discussion of pure1x non-reductive formulations of
physicalist doctrine. Recall that a non-reductive relation between two
classes is one that does not involve any
specific mapping between the members of the classes; rather, the rela-
tion involves "global" characteristics of the classes such as simplic-
ity, explanatory power or some kind of systematic covariation of the
properties of the ~embers of the two classes (e.g., as in truth deter~
mination).75
75 Non~reductive truth determination does not involve any pal~ticular
mapping between sentences of the two classes (mdppings do exist of
course). Rather, it involves systematic covariation of the truth
values of the sentences in the two classes: once the truth values
of the sentences in the determining class are fixed, the truth va.l-
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The problems with this form of thesis wi~h regard to the adequacy
of a formulation of physicalist doctrine are apparent. Because such a
view does not presuppose specific mappings between elements of the tWI)
classes involved in the relation, this type of position cannot be an
adequate expression of any physicalist concern that presupposes such a
map~ln9: for example, (i) ontological views which identify or other~
wise associate individuals or attributes in the two classes and (ii)
views concerning explanation of reqularitjes or instances of regulari~
ties in one class by specific explanatory principles in the other
class. We take this shortcoming to ~~ sufficiently obvious as to not
warrant further development.
2.4 f~RELY REDUGTIVE FORMULATION~
To complete our discussion of the "pure forms" of phy~\icalist the-
sis, Wd shall make a few comments regarding purely reductive formula-
tions. We remind tile reader of the distinction between
reductive relations as we are defining them and "classical reduction-
ism." The former is any relation between two sets of objects which in-
volves a specific mapping from one set to the other; clearly, this is
an exceedingly weal: notion, and the formulation of interesting physi~
calist reductive theses will depend upon the introduction of con-
straints upon the malJpings. "Classical reduction", on the other
hand,76 is an instance of two reductive relations introduced for spe-
ues of the sentences in the determined class are fixed.
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cific purposes (e.gt, unification of ontology and unification ol an
explanatory system). The constraints on the mappings'? are designed to
isolate mappings which insure (i) the identity of individuals and at-
tributes and (ii) the explanation of la~s and their instances. As we
saw above, these constraints do not isolate relations that realize the
goals of the program; he~ce, the formulat1on was judged inadequate.
Retaining the goals of the program, we saw the door opened for search-
in9 out alternative theses which would realize the goals. Thus, we
have rejected classical r~ductionism without rejecting the physicalist
program. Further, for present purposes, rejecting classical reduction-
ism is not equivalen~ to rejecting reductive relations in general. Un-
like the other pure cases, a purely reductive version of physicalism
cannot be shown 1n general to lead to inadequate formulations. Whether
or not a purely reductive formulation is required for all purposes we
shall leave open, although it probably is not since the goals of ob-
jectivity may plausibly be realized by non~reductive forms of truth
determination and supervenience.
To summarize the main results of this chapte:, essentially the
above described form of argument that we applied to classical ruduc-
tionism78 was applied to a variety of purely linguistic, purely non-
16 I.e., explicit definability of terms and derivability of theories.
77 I.e., nomological coextensiveness of terms and logical entailment
of one theory by another.
78 I.e., to show that it is not sufficient for realizing the goals of
the program.
• 93 -
linguistic and purely non~reductive formulations of physicalist doc-
trine. The results were that each of these pure forms cannot lead to
an adequate formulation; hence, ~t is to be concluded that any ade-
quate formulation of physicalist doctrine must involve some linguis-
tic, some non-linguistic and some reductive theses. In the next three
chapters, we shall develop an adequate formulation of the doctrine
which consists of these types of thesis.
3. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PHYSICALISM
The objective of this and the next two chapters is to formulate an
adequate version of physicalist doctrine; in so doing, we shall en~
counter a variety of objections posed by critics of physicalism over
the years. Our task comes down to that of weaving a path through those
objections and arriving at a formulation that satisfies our criteria
of ade~Jacy. Given our discussion in the last chapter, this will re-
quire that we formulate a doctrine that consists of a combination of
linguistic, non-linguistic and reductive theses. Further, because a
goal of the physicalist program is to describe a structure for all of
natural science, our formulations must be pitched at a level of suffi-
cient generalit~ to both retain significant content and yet accomodate
variab~lity in ontology and patterns of explanation among different
branches of science.
Our plan is, first, in this chapter, to discuss the vexing problem
of the identification of the physicalist bases; a set of three presup~
positions of the theses will emerge as a re$ult of this discussion.
Such presuppositions will be seen as required by any significant for-
mulation of physicalist theses, since the content of physicaliJm de-
pends upon there being a principled identification of the physical
bases and such an identification of the bases depends upon the truth
of the presuppositions. Objections to the presuppo~itionswill be for-
mulated and defended against. Second, in Chapter 4, we shall formu~
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late a set of theses which address the three areas of physicalist con-
cern (i.e., ontology, objectivity and explanation) and which are re-
sponsive to the results of Chapter 2. Objections to the theses will be
considered. Third, in Chapter 5, three metatheses concerning (1) the
scope of the theses, (ii) their empirical status, and (iii) their
methodological roles in science will be developed. Various objections
will be formulated and defended against. Alternative metatheories to
those commonly held for physicalism will be considered; anct, as we
shall see, the existing metatheses will require some revision. Fourth,
the resulting physicalist doctrine, consisting of presuppositions,
theses and metatheses will then be shown to be adequat~ by our cri-
teria as well as responsive ~o t~e major objections that have been ad-
vanced against it. Finally, we shall make some observations concerning
the acceptability of the doctrine and the problems and prospects for
working out the physicalist program in science.
3.1 IDENTIFYING THE PHYSICAL OASES
Given that the general form of physi~41ist these~ involves a rela~
tion between two classes of objects, one of which is designated as
"the base class" ~nd contains physical objects, 1 any adequate formula-
tion of physicalist theses requires an antecedent specification of
what "the physical" consists in. Further, because of the variability
1 In this discussion, 'object' is being t&ken as a term picking out
such diverse things as events, states, terms, theorie$, and ~biects
(in a narrower sense).
- 96 -
in kinds of physicalist theses (e.g., linguistic, non-linguistic) and
the variability of the categories within those kinds (e.g., events,
states, properties; law statements, theory formulations, explanation
formulations, terms), there is need for a specification 01 whftt the
physical consists in for each kind of object involved in the formula-
tion of physicalist theses. The purpose of this section is to provide
an Account of the physical bases required for the theses to be devel-
oped in tne next chapter. Further, we shall make explicit a set of
three presuppositions of such an account and defend them against ob-·
jections.
As a preliminary, we shall present and elaborate upon a distinc-
tion, first introduced by Quine 2 and clarified by Hellman and Thomp·,
son,3 between ideology and ontology. Quine writes as follows:
Given a theory, one philosophically interesting aspect of it
into which we can inquire is its ontology; what entities are
the variables of quantification to range over if the theory
is to hold true? Another no less important aspect into which
we can inquire is its ideology .•• : what ideas can be ~x­
pressed in it?4
And, again:
The ideology of a theory is a question of what the symbols
mean; the ontology of & theory is a question of what the as-
sertions say or imply that there is. The ontology of a theo-
ry may indeed be considered to be implicit in its ideology;
for the question of the range of the variables of quantifi-
cation may be viewed as a qu~stion of the full meaning of
2 See Quine (1951).
3 See Hellman and Thompson (1977).
4 Quine (1951), p. 14.
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the quantifiers.
In the foregoing paragraphs I have contrasted the ontology
of a theory with the ideology of a theory. But the contrast
carries over also into absolute terms; in absolute ontology
we ask what there really is, and in absolute ideology ~e ask
what ideas can legitimately be had, or what primitive ideas
are given to us as a basis for thinking.... I have described
the ideology of a theory vaguely as asking what ideas are
expressible in the language of the theory. Urgent questions
of detail arise over hJW to construe 'idea' .•• Both ideology
and ontology in their relativized aspects ...belong to what
is commonly called semantics.'
As can be seen, Quine's distinction is a 2x2 distinction; the first
dimension being ontology-ideology and the second dimension being abso-
lute-relative. In its absolute aspect ontology concerns what there
really is. Hore specifically, it concerns what ontological kinds of
things there really are; such ontological kinds include: physical,
mental, attribute, event, individual, ~bstract, etc. In matters of on-
toiogy, the important semantical relation is that of satisfaction of
ontologic~l kind predicates; everything has some ontological status or
other and some things may enjoy more than one such status (~.g., a
physical attribute). For the purposes of the physicalist program, we
atoe interested in (i) what the physical ontology really consists in,
(ii) what the ontology of natural science (i.e., nature) really con~
sists in, and (iii) what the relations between the ontology of all of
natural science and the physical ontology really are; hence, we shall
be concerned with ontology in its absolute aspect.
I Quine (1951), p. 15.
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Ontology in its relativised aspect need not be concerned explicitly
with what there really is but only with structures which make a theory
true under some interpretation. Quine's frequent excursions into Py-
thagoreanism are instances of exploration of the variety of minimal
ontology required for making a theory true: that nature consists of
pure sets is something that not even Quine should take seriously.
What Quine probably do.!s take seriously is the idea that that kind of
ontological speculation is the only one likely to deliver any useful
results, absolute onto.logy may be, on Quine's view, a fruitless enter-
prise. The assumption I)f our work is that, although there may be no
saying "absolutely" wh.st there is, there are meaningful intermediate
alternatives to that enterprise and the kind of inquiry that Quine en-
gages in (i.e., ontolo,gical reductions constrained only by preserva-
tion of truth under an interpretation). Physicalism is a doctrine
concerned with characterizing what there really is in nature; how to
construe the "really" is a matter we shall return to below.
Regarding ideology, there is a similar distinction between relative
and absolute. In its relative aspect, ideology concerns what ideas can
be expressed in the language of a theory: what do the symbols mean?,
which symbols are fundamental and which are derivitive? In its abso-
lute aspect, ideology concerns more general epistemic and cognitive
matterl. what ideas cI.n legitimately be had? which ideas are given as
• b••i. for thought and which are constructed out of them? The impor-
tant lemantic relation involved in matters of ideology is that of ex-
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pression by a predicate; hence, it is only attributes that enjoy ideo-
loqical status.' In the current project, we shall be concern~d only
with ideology in its relativized aspect. We shall be ~oncerned with
the specific languages ~mployed in science: what are the constituents
of those languages and what are their structures?, what attributes are
expressed by the predicates in those languages?, and how do the dif-
ferent languages relate to each other? In the discussion below, our
specific focus will be on identifying and relating the predicates and
other general terms employed in the development of the various theo-
ries found in science.
For ,'xpository purposes, we shall extend Quine I s distinction to in-
elude what we shall call "doctrine". In its relativized aspect, doc-
f
trine concerns what true sentences are expressed in a given language.
Further, we shall be concerned with what explanations and laws are ex-
pressed in a language, and these will both be included under the head-
ing of "doctrine".' In its absolute aspect, doctrine may be understood
to concern the ultimate and total truth about reality; since our chief
concern vis a vis doctrine will be with the structure of science, we
shall be exclu~ively concerned with doctrine in its relativized
aspect.
I See Hellman and Thompson (1977).
7 We distinguish shalply between truths, theories, explanations and
laws on thft one hand, and true sentences, theory formulations, ex-
planatiqn formulations and law sentences on the other. In matters of
doctrine, it i. only the latter that shall be considered.
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Given this tripartite distinction between ontology, ideology and
doctrine, we shall now turn tn the problem of characterizing the phys-
ical bases for ontology, ideology and doctrine that will play critical
roles in the formulation of physicalist theses concerning ontology,
objectivity and explanation. As we develop the characterization of the
bases, we shall distinguish the various c.:~ategories within each. 8 The
primary problem we shall encounter will be that of identifying the
bases in a "principledll way which does not trivialize the theses or
make them obviously false: the most telling criticism of physicalist
doctrine regarding its formulation that we shall encounter is that
there is no principled identification of the bases, and hence, the
theses are trivial because they can always be saved by ad hoc modifi-
cation of the bases. Our task, therefore, is to fend off this objec-
tion by showing how t~e bases can be specified in a principled way_
What then is • good strategy for achieving this goal? Host authors,
not always for the same reasons, have attempted to circumscribe the
physical bases by first isolating the physical ideology and doctrine,
and then giving a characterization of the physical ontology that is
derivitive. Although there may be alternative strategies,' we shall
employ the more standard strategy because (i) it looks like the three
• For example, within ontology, we distinguish classes, ~ttributes and
individuals.
, For example, to identify the phYlical ontology and then characterize
the physical ideology and doctrine in some derivitive way; or to
identify the b••es independently of each other. See Cornman (1971)
f~r an example of one such alternative strategy-
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bases must be interdependently characterized and (1i) it does not ap-
pear likely that one can get very far in the attempt to characterize
the physical ontology without relying heavily on what one takes to be
physics and its referential vocabulary. Thus, our approach will be to
attempt to provide a principled identification of the physical ideolo-
9Y and doctrine, and then to develop the physical ontology in terms of
them.
We shall begin by looking at a distinction, drawn first by Meehl
and Sell\... J, 11 between "physicali" and "physical2u terms as follows I
physicalll terms employed in a coherent and adequate descriptive
explanatory account of the spatia-temporal order.
physica12: te~s used in the formulation of principles which
,
suffice in principle for the explanation and pre-
diction of inorganic processes.
This distinction forms the basis for distlnguishing two different
types of phyHicalist proposal. Physicall was intended to capture the
full vocabulary of natural science; any term of natural science that
is applicable to some region of "the spacetime causal order" (i.e.,
nature) falls within the category of physicall. Hence, terms of phys-
ics, chemistry, biology, psychology and any other natural science are
all physicall. 1 ! The physical doctrine, then, would consist (roughly)
II See Meehl and Sellars (1956).
liOn even broader construals, any terms that are applicable to re-
gion. of 8p.c.t~e, whether they are scientific terms or not, are
phXlicall. See Cornman (1971), Davidson (1970), and HaJinas (1973)
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in the theories that are formulated in these terms and accepted as
true. Physicalism based upon this conception of the physical is a
pretty mild doctrine, although i~s defenders do not consider it trivi-
a1. 12 On our view, however, this brand of physicalism is much too
weAk; because everything appears to fall within the bases, it need not
introduce any requirements within the formal system of natural science
for the kind of structure that is needed to realize the goals of the
program. 13 The challenge that this weak physicalism presents is to de-
velop a narrower conception of the physical ideology, ontology and
doctrine which is cogent and which supports strong physicalist thes-
15. 14
for examples of this construal. Thus, there are at least two senses
of physicall: (a) terms applying to things located in spacetime;
(b) terms of natural science applicable to things in spacetime.
12 Given our earlier di8cussi~n of the two conc~ptions of natural sci-
ence (i.e., (i) it's all ph~rsics, (i1) there are divisiono between
physics and the rest), this form of physicalism is one that could
be expected from someone who believed that the branches of natural
science cannot be individuated in any principled way. The physi-
calism we are concerned with is one which accords "physics" ,.. pri-
viledged place in science; and, it is this priviledged status that
weak physicalists .vpear to cla~ cannot be made out in a cogent
way because there are no principled divisions betwen physics and
the rest of science.
II For example, explanatory relations between the phenomena and laws
Itudied in the special science. and the phenomena and laws studied
in some basic science.
14 I ••• , thes.s concerning the relations between the ideology, ontolo-
gy and doctrine of any part of science to the ideology, ontology
and doctrine of the "physical" part.
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Therefore, because our interest is in this stronger form of physi-
calism which is based upon a conception of science in which there are
distiqct branc~~s, one of which (i.e., physics) is to be accorded a
priviledged place with respect to ideology, doctrine and ontology, 15
we shall proceed in our efforts to identify the physical bases by at-
temptin~ to find a principle for distinguishing physics from other
branches of science. Once this has been accomplished, the bases for
ideology, doctrine and ontology will be fully developed.: s
As a first attempt at solving this problem, one might say that
physics is whatever it is that physicists do and the physical ideology
consists in whatever terms are typically used by physicists and are
found in physics texts when physical doctrine is being presented. The
,
physical ontology on this approach is whatever is the intended inter-
pretation of physical terms and doctrine I that is, in,:ended by the
physicists. This proposal amounts to "leaving it to the experts" to
II Physica12, as we shall see below, is a proposal that supports the
second conception of science in which there are principled divi-
sions.
11 We are here stru9g1ing with two deep and difficult issues in the
formulation of the physicalist doctrine: (1) how to give a princi-
pled identification of the physical bases which are required for
the formulation of significant physicalist theses and (2) how to do
this without landing in a vicious circularity in which physics is
characterized by the te~8 employed in the formulation of physical
theory and those te~s are characterized by being the terms that
occur in the theories of "physics." The 2hYsicall criterion breaks
the ~ircul.rity at the expense of the signIfIcance and strength of
tn", doctrine, lomething we do not want to do. Hence, we have re-
jected 2hllicall and are now moving on to find a criterion for
phy.1c.~hich breaks the circle and preserves the power of the doc~
trine.
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determine what physics and the physical ideology, ontology and doc-
trine are. 17 Unfortunately, such an approach is totally unacceptable
for reasons that we shall roughly characterize now and discuss more
fully below. For openers, this view totally dodges the critical prob-
lem of offering a principle for identifying what physics is 18 that is
at all relevant to the metaphysical and epistemological concerns of
the physicalist. The principle offered is completely vulnerable to the
objection that what counts as physics is based upon arbitrary adminis-
trative decisions or other forms of "socio-historical accident". For
example, who is identified as a "physicist" may be due to arbitrary
decisions having to do with how to organize and run a university.
Second, the principle leaves open whether it is current physics,
,
future physics, or some ideal physics that is to playa role in the
characterization of the bases. If it is current physics, then there
would appear to be no room for the growth of physics from the point of
view of any particular formulation of physicalism. Hence, current
physics must be true and hence it would appear that physicalism is ob-
viously false. l ' If it is some future physics that is intended, no
principle for identifying physics has been provided that constrains
the evolution of "physics" so that ad ~oc modifications of physics de-
11 See Hellman and Thompson (1975), Friedman (1975), and Boyd (unpub-
lished) for instances of this approach.
'I And, for who are the physicists.
I' Se. Smart (1978) for endorsement of the view that it is current
phylic8 that il pertinent.
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signed to save the physicalist doctrine can be ruled out; without some
such principle, the doctrine has seemed to some to be a trivial doc-
trine. 11 In a nutshell, the problem is that unless there is some an-
tecedently specifiable principle for identifying the physical bases,
physicalism cannot be formulated in a significant way. Given our cur-
rent strstegy, this comes down to requiring a principle for the prin-
cipled identification of physics. This, of course, was the conclusion
we reached above in discussing ehysicall. Now we have reached it from
the point of view of a certain class of objections that any formula-
tion of physicalism must deal with. The problem to be confronted is
not a small matter; a principled identification of the physical must
be developed which (i) can function to isolate the physical bases for
,
ideology, ontology and doctrine in a metaphysically and epistemologi-
cally relevant way and (i1) can accomodate the changes in uur concep-
tion of what the physical consists in a~ ~~r knowledge grows. 2t It is
this problem that we are trying to solve now as we search out a prin-
ciple for identifying physics. In this search, we conclude that iden-
20 See Chomsky (1968).
21 It is important lo distinguish between (1) a change in our concep·
tion of what physics or the physi~al is from (2) a change in phys-
ics; it is the latter that should be accomodated while the former
remains fixed. It is also possible, of course, that out conception
of what physics is may change; but, in formulating physicalist doc-
trine, it is only required that a fixed conception of the physical
that leaves room for change in what we take to be the extension of
'physical' be developed. Given this distinction, our problem at
thi. point il to try to develop a conception of what physics, and
thul the physical, is which remains fixed while physical theory
chang••• Dealing with potential changes' in such a conception is a
separate problem.
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tifying .physics with "what t,he physicists do" is a non-starter because
it is much too vaguely stated and because all suggested refinements
are vulnerable to objection.
Physica12 was an early attempt to characterize the theoretical vo·
cabulary of physics and chemistry in a way which leaves open the pos-
sibility of principled extensions of that vocabulary; physics and
chemistry are, according to this conception, the branches of science
concerned with the explanation of all inorganic processes. First, how-
ever, as a characterization of these branches of science, physica12
suffers from the defect of not giving an independent characterization
of what 'inorganic' means; hence, the major problems for the physical-
ist may have simply been pushed back a step. That is, if the question
for the physicalist is, "What is a correct conception of "the physi-
cal" and what correctly falls under that concept?", then, the question
seems to have been converted to, without any gain in clarity or solu-
tion, "What is a correct conception of "the inorganic" and what cor-
rectly falls under that concept?". Although we don't believe that this
question is unanswerable, we shall leave it to the proponents of ~­
ica12 to do the answering_
Second, physica12 is dissatisfying because it lumps together phys-
ics and chemistry; the physicalist who is according to physics a spe-
cial place in science should be seeking a ~baracteriz.tion only of
phylici in hi. attempt to isolate the bales for ontOlogy, ideology and
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doctrine. 22
A third objection23 is that there are certain developments in sci-
ence which coula prove highly embarrassing for proponents of ~­
ca12. Thus, if our empirical psychology evolves to the point that it
is clear and well established that certain highly complex ma~hines are
capable of "mental" activity (e.g., robots that can think), then it
appears that purely inorganic processes would exbibit properties that,
under nobody's construal of physics and chemistry, can be accounted
for by those disciplines. Thus, certain features of a class of inor-
genic objects would not be explicable within the confines of physics
and chemistry as they are usually conceived. Responding to this prob-
1em with the cl~ that physics and chemistry include psychology as a
result of the alleged possibility is exactly the kind of move the
physicalist must try to avoid, since it is preservation ~f the bounda-
ries between branches of science that gives the physicalist doctrine
its bite. A better response, therefore, is the rejection of physica12
a8 a characterization of basic science with the new understanding that
such categories as "organic" and "inorganic" are probably not going to
prove to be the metaphysically and epistemologically interesting ones
from the point of view of physicalist science. 24
22 Whether one see. this as a flaw will depend upon how fint grained
one. individuation of the Iciences il. On our view, classical re-
ducibility, for example, is not sufficient for inclusion of one
br.nch of Ici.nee (e.g., chemistry) within another (e.g., physics).
21 Tbi, objection was sU9gelted by Ned Block.
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A final objection to physica12 has been suggested by some comments
of Chomsky'slS and developed by Block as follows:
Briefly, it is conceivable that there are physical laws that
"come into play" in brains of a certain size and complexity,
but that nonetheless these laws are "translatable" into
physical language, and that, so translated, they are clearly
physical ~aws (though irreducible to other physica: laws).
Arguably, In this situation, physicalism could be true -
thouqh not according to the account just mentioned i.e.,
physica12 of physical property.2S
Bypassing the issues raised by a~peal to translation into a physi-
cal language, the suggestion here is that the notion of physical law
need not be restricted to phenomena of a certain negree of complexity
of organization, and especially, it need not be restricted to "inor-
ganic" phenomena. Re,ther, there is reason to speculate that which
physical laws ar' actually operating at a given stage of the universe
depends upon the degree of organization and complexity to \/hich it has
evolved; a~~, in brains of a certain size and complexity, physical
laws operate that do not operate at lower levels (e.g., inorganic)
levels of complexity. If this speculation is correct, then physica12
as a characterization of the physic~l is clearly defective. Of course,
the burden of the objector is twof~ldl to develop an alternative con-
.4 AI we shall see again below, it is important that the physicalist
program not be .addled with too many harsh violations of our intui-
tions about the differences between the mental and the physical; if
such traditional mental concepts and phenomena as qual!. and mental
content become located in the physical bases, something has gone
radically wrong with the "physicalist program."
21 Se. Chomsky (1968), p. 83.
21 S~. Block (1980), fn. 4.
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ception of the physical that holds up under scrutiny and to establish
the truth of the speculation just described given that alternative
conception. 27 This objection, in addition to undermining ~ica12,
reveals a general constraint on any characterization of the physical:
viz., that it be compatible with the idea t~at there are emergent
physical laws.
Given the objections just reviewed, physica12 appears to be an en-
tirely unacceptable account of the physical. However, let us note the
good points about the proposal: (1) it Juggests a principled identi-
fication of physics (and chemistry); (2) it is an attempt to isolate a
vocabulary that is narrower than the physicall vocabulary and hence
could serve as ~ basis for significant physicalist proposals; (3) it
attempts to provide a principle for controlling the admissible exten-
sions of physics and of the physica12 vocabulary, (4) hence, the
growth of physics is compatibl~ with a meaningful formulation of phys-
iealist doctrine; and (5) the principle provided, although defnctive,
does appear to be capable of being metaphysically and epistemological-
ly relevant to the physicalist program. 1:£e characterization of ~­
ica12 is capable of such relevance since (a) it makes appeal to the
notion of an inorganic process and (b) it makes appeal to the idea of
explaining all such processes. 'ir~t, metaphysical relevance comes
from isolating a class of processes which will play I central role in
27 The objector must do both because the objection depends upon an an-
tecedently understood conception of the physical.
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the ontological theses (e.g., all entities, processes, etc are built
up or depend upon the inorganic entities, processes etc); as we saw,
however, the current proposal was in certain respects defective in
this respect, althouqh on the right track. Second, epistemological
relevance comes from isolating a class of explanatory principles that
advert to the basic class of entities; such principles playa crucial
role in the theses concerning objectivity and explanation. That they
are principles concerning the basic processes is what links the onto-
logical and epistemological concerns of physicalism together. Physi-
cal2, despite its fatal flaw&, teaches us alot about how to proceed.
Another characterization of physics has been suggested by Quine in
• number of recept papers. i ' On his view, physics is the branch of
science whose goal it is to discover the minimum set of states such
that there is no difference in nature without some difference in those
basic states. Although this characterization is of interest, especial-
ly to the physicalist who holds to ontological determinetion au we
do,at and, although it may be a correct, albeit highly abstract, par-
tial characterization of what physics is, it is not detailed enough to
identify the subject matter of physics or the quastiona and kinds of
answers with which it is concerned. We shall be 6sruming that an ade-
quate characterization of any discipline must at least stipulate the
21 Se. Ouine (197Sa J 1978).
2. S•• below, Chapter 4.
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characteristic questions and answers of that discipline. 3D Thus, it is
not clear that Quine's characteri~ation successfully distinguishes
physics from a different science (e.g., psychology) which may have the
same feature of indiscernibility of any difference without a differ-
ence in one of its states.!1 Further, it should become clear as we
proceed that if the characterization of physics that w~ consider below
cannot be made cogent then neither can Quine's and for similar rea-
sons. So, let us turn to a consideration of a final proposal for what
physics is.
A third characterization of physics is as follows: physics i~ the
branch of science that applies to everything. For reasons that are by
now familiar, it won't do to cash this in as; physics is the branch of
science that provides a description of everything. An alternative ren-
dering is provided by the work of Hilary Putanm,32 in which he sug-
31 We are assuming a strong criterion of adequacy here in coniormity
with our general policy of beginning with strong criteria and weak-
ening them only if necessary; as a consequence, the mast interest-
ing results will he obtained.
31 See Goodman (1979) for expression of this claim. It is important to
keep in mind that it does not follow from the fact that, say, phys-
ics and psychology both provide a basis for the principle of indis-
cernibility, that physics and psychology constitute equivalent bas-
es for every purpose; in particular, they are not equivalent for
all ontologic~l or epistemological purposes. Further, Ned Block has
suggested that the alternative indiscernibility claims are not se-
rious competitors. Whereas the physicalist claim is "internal" to
our theory of rAture, the psychological indiscenibility thesis is
either "extern,.l" to our theory of nature or, if internal, obvious-
ly false. We shall discuss below (in chapters 4 and 5) some of the
issues raised by this suggestion.
32 See Putnam (1970).
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gests that physics is the branch of science concerned with identifying
a basic class of phys.ical magnitudes which are such that there are a
set of principles couched in terms of those magnitudes which are suf-
ficient for explaininc~ the composition, structure, dynamics and inter-
actions of all things with respect to those magnitudes. The distin-
guishing feature of this class of magnitudes and the associated
principles is that everything has the properties associated with those
magnitudes and everything satisfies the principles with respect to
those magnitudes. Physics just is the branch of science concerned with
identifying those ma~litudes and principles; it is their complete gen-
erality in this sense which distinguishes them from other properties
and principles.
Further, the principles are supposed to account for such featur~s
of all things as (i) the composition of all things in terms I)f the ba-
sic constituents, (ii) the dynamics of all systems in terms of the ba-
sic magnitudes (i.e., how do things evolve over time?), and (iii) the
interactions between things (including all causal interactions) with
respect to the basic magnitudes. Hence, physics has a set of questions
the answers to which are constrained by the requirement of full gener-
ality of the explaining principles and the properties adverted to by
those principles. Hence, any body of theory that provides answers to
the•• questions and that satisfies this conditior would count as phys-
ics.
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The ontological and epistemological relevance of this proposal
comes from its specific concern with such questions as (1) what are
the fundamental constituents of matter?, (2) what are the processes
that underlie all causation and all interaction?, (3) what parameters
are relevant to describing the dynamic unfolding of all systems in na-
ture and, hence, all change?
Th~ conception of the physical here is that something is physical
just in case it is among the basic constituents of all matter or among
the fundamental processes on which all causation and interaction de-
pends or among the basic magnitudes in terms of which the dynamics of
all systems can be characterized. Given this, there is as yet no com-
mitment to what particular terms or theories nor to what particular
,
entities, processes or magnitudes fall within the category of the
physical; hence, this characterization is quite compatible with the
growth of physics and with the possibility of ontologically emergent
physical phenomena. Further, since the principJe is relevant to the
physicalist program, if it is a cogent principle it provides a princi-
pled way of distinguishing physics from the rest of natural science.
Hence, if it is cogent, then it provides a basis for formulating sig-
nificant physicalist theses which are neither trivially true nor obvi-
ously false. So, if the principl~ is cogent, it is what we are looking
for.
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But, is it cogent? To answer this, a number of more specific ques-
tions arise: (1) Is physics anything which satisfies this principle?,
(2) Does the principle guarantee that there is one physics? Should
it?, (3) Does it lead to the conclusion that what is our physics might
not be physics in some other possible world? (i.~., is physics in our
world necessarily physics?), (4) Does it really provide a way of rul-
ing out ad hoc modifications of physics to save physicalism?, (5) Does
it not make physicalism trivially true?, (6) Is the principle subject
to change in ways that could be appealed to to save physicalism? In
what follows, we shall address these questions by considering a number
of objections to the proposed principle for identifying physics.
Physics is t~t branch of science that is concerned with studying
the fundamental constituents of all matter, the fundamental processes
and magnitudes in terms of which all interaction and dynamics can be
characterized; the constraint on the inquiry is that the principles
postulated and the attributes and entities po~ited must be completely
general. However, it would seem that this principle allows for a num-
ber of different physics to be possible. That is, there is no guaran-
tee that this principle picks out a unique body of knowledge about the
natural order. A variant objection is that this principle allows that
in our world physics may be one thing and in a different possible
world phylici may be lomethin; completely different. Although these
Ire ••p.rate objection., they can be dealt with in exactly the same
way. Thul, physics just ia anything which satisfies this principle,
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so that (1) there may be many physics in this world and (2) there may
be radically different physics in different possible worlds. Non-uni-
queness is not a problem for the physicalist as long as, relative to a
given physics, the total theory of nature (ours or some other) is
structured in accordance with physicalist principles. 33
A second objection is that this principle does not rule out certain
unacceptable conjunctions, say, between physical theory and Hegelian
metaphysics, in which the phySLCS does the work and the metaphysics is
just additional fluff. But, this objection fails for two reafions: (i)
the principle may be seen to rule out the unwanted addition on the
grounds that it is not relevant to the goals of physics as character-
ized and (ii) 9~neral scientific methodology would certainly come into
play in ruling out the additional stuff on simplicity grounds and the
like. In the background of the principle is the idea that it is only a
minimal such theory which suffices to achieve the goals of physics
that we count as physics.
A related and more important objection is that physics is a branch
of science which is a conglomeration of many different theories that
are of r.di~ally different degrees of generality and abstraction and
that audresl radically different questions (e.g., quantum mechanics,
••tronomy, optics, thermodynamics); thus, it is concluded that phys-
SI The physicalism we are concerned with is to be seen as an abstract
Itructural feature of scientific views and theories of nature;
there i. no good reason to believe that there is exactly one such
view or one such theory.
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ies, as it currently exists, does not satisfy the characterization we
have offered. Our brief reply to this objection is that (i) the objec-
tion is correct given the rough statement of our view and (ii) when we
speak of physics we shall mean a body of theory that constitutes an
i~ealization of a certain sort. Some theories that are currently in-
eluded under the heading of "physics" may be seen as not part of the
basic level of the ideal theory. Thus, within physics as it is cur-
rently conceived, there are different levels of organization, general-
ity, abstractness of phenomena and associated theory. When we speak of
"physics", Wf! shall be referring to the, ideally, basic theory.
Purther, it could be objected that ~ur conception of physics is
subject to ad hoc revision to save physicalism. We shall look at this
,
more closely below. For now, we note that again general scientific
practice should come into play to rule out ad hoc revisions of any
scientific concept, principle or theory. An ad hoc revision is barred
on the grounds of "ad hocnes,,"u; a non-ad hoc revision should be con-
sidered on the merits of the case. It is not clear to me that any
principle ever has built into it a means for protecting itself against
Abuse; abuse is ruled out on general grounds. If we can clear a prin-
ciple for identilyinq physics of the charges of unclarity and trivial-
ization, and it ~oe8 the work we want it to do, then we have done all
that we have to. That we might decide to revise it simply to protect
our doctrine is not something we need specifically promise not to do
in order to use the principle. Below we shall consider Chomsky's cit-
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ing of the case of electromagnetic theory which is supposed to be an
example of how maleable our conception of the physical is. In fact, it
was not a case of a change in our conception of the physical or of
what physics is, but rather it was an inbtance of a change in what
falls under those concepts. 34
Another objection is that, granted that the concept of what physics
is is okay, it is still possible to modify what we take to be physics,
consonantly with our concept of physics, in an ad ~oc way to save the
doctrine of physicalism. This is just what the case of electromagnetic
theory is supposed to show: physics may be just as the principle de-
scribes, but what falls under the heading "physics" is sUfficiently
maleable so as ~o save the doctrine. In short, the objection is that
we can count anything as a fundamental constituent, magnitude or pro-
cess just by deciding to include it among the constructs of what we
call "physics", The correct reply here is essentially the same as
above. ~ hoc modifications are ruled out by general principles of
scientific procedure; non-ad hoc revisions ought to be considered very
seriously. Surely, the physicalist must allow that what counts as
physics is an evolving part of our knowledge; what are the basic mag-
nitudel (etc) is a matter of continuing discovery. Allowing this does
not in any way commit us to holding that any modification we like is
acceptable if it is needed to save physicalism; it simply is not true
14 The above objection should not be confused with the next one, viz.,
that we can revile physics in an ad hoc way to protect the doc-
trine. - --
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that anything goes in science. 3s The problem is one of being able to
identify the ad hoc revisions in knowledge from the non-ad hoc ones;
this I am happy to announce is not my problem hette.
Pinally, let us consider the objection that runs as follows: the
conception of physics that is being offered is one which guarantees
the truth of physicalism. This objection must depend to some extent
upon what the theses of physicalism are, theses that have not been
presented yet. However, it shouldn't be too surprising to anyone that
the characterization of what physics is is closely related to some of
the theses of physicalism since the point of physicalism is lito accord
to physics its rightful (important) place in science". Having given
this much to the objector, however, the burden still is on him to show
that the theses offered below are trivialized by the characterization
of physics given here. We shall argue below that the objector cannot
carry this burden.
At this point, we shall move on the assumption that, at least a
pr~. facie case has been made for the defensibility of our character-
ization of what physics is. So, physics is the branch of science the
task of which is to identify and characterize the fundamental constit-
uents of all things and the fundamental processes and magnitudes un-
derlying all change and interaction. Which theory is it that answers
to this description? We do not know; but our best current guess is
II Or pbilolophy for that matter.
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that it is current physics (or some suitable elaboration of current
physics, given that portions of current physics are quite underdevel-
oped or are quite tentative). We take it as obvious that we can accept
current physics as the best approximation to the physics of nature
without giving up the ~ossibility of revising it tomorrow. Hence, our
best approximation of the actual physical bases for ideology, ontology
and doctrine is to be developed in terms of current physicsl it is
this belief that makes jU8tifie~ the current practice of most physi-
calists to look to current physics in characterizing the bases.
Given a formulation of physical theory, how do we proceed toward
giving a full characterization of the physical bases for ideology, on-
tology and doctrine?31
We shall begin with ideology; assuming that we can isolate a basic
stock of non-logical terms that are employed in formulating the theory
and which express the fundamental magnitudes, the problem becomes one
of specifying the definitional apparatus that can be legitmately em~
played in building complex predicates from members of the basic stock.
31 'Given a fo~ulltion' is supposed to leave room for the existence
of alternative formulations of the same theory in different vocabu-
laries and, as we allowed above, alternative physical theories.
The i ••ues of theoretical and empirical equivalence of theory for-
mulations are not directly pertinent to the problem of formulating
• physical basis, given such a formulation. In addition, we observe
that given a formulation of current physics, it may be unclear how
much i. empirically well established, how much constitutes tenta-
tive working hypothese., how much is heuristic, and how much is an
artifact of the representational system used (as opposed to being
strictly empirical and realistically interpretable).
- 120 •
It is quite beyond the scope of this project to actually extricate
from a formulation of physical theory some stock of basic predicates
and to rigorously charact~rize the full range of allowable linguistic
constructions built up from the basic stock; but, we shall indicate
the directions that this might go in. 3 ? In addition to the usual first
order logical apparatus, there a~e two additions, as our discussion in
Chapter 2 suggested, that should be considered: (1) higher order quan-
tification and (2) the introduction of infinitary languages. We know
of no principled reason for not allowing such enrichment of the logic-
a1 apparatus, and the capacity for reference to higher order and in-
finitary properties was seen to offer the physicalist some advantages
with respect to the expressive power of the formal system of sci-
enee. SI
Allowin~ that the logical apparatus may be so enriched, the physi-
cal ideology looks something like this, (i) there is a basic stock of
physical predicates and (11) there is a set of predicates built up
from the members of this basic set using the logical machinery decided
upon. The members of this set constitute the physical ideology and all
of the properties, states, etc expressed by members of the set are
(ideologically) physical properties, states, etc: that is, they are
the properties that the physical theory can advert to when describing
17 See Hellman and Thompson (1975) for discussion of some restrictions
upon admi••ible predicate••
a. Aa WI oblerved above (Chapter 2), ther. may be practical reasons
for not employing infinitary languages.
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and explaining aspects of nature. Whether the properties so expressed
exhaust all of the (ontologically) physical properties is an issue
that depends upon which logical apparatus is selected and what the
physical properties are. As suggested in Chapter 2, this issue turns
in part on considerations concerning the cardinality and definitional
power of the language employed.
Given this view of the physical ideology, how is the physical doc-
trine to be specified? Again, our specification can only be very
rough. all general and singular sentences formulable in the terms of
the physical ideology and that are true in nature make up the physical
doctrine. The class of sentences specified is certainly not assumed to
be finitely axio~atizable. In effect, it constitutes the full theory
of nature; and, it includes all lawlike as well as all contingent
truths concerning past, present and future states of nature. When we
eventually say that the physical truth determines the whole truth
about nature, it is this class of true sentences that we will be re-
ferring to 8S the physical truth. Physical explanation formulations
are drawn from this body of truths as well. 3 '
•• Below, we Ihall develop an apparatus for representing na~Hr. in
terms of • spacetime coordinate system; a characterization of the
cla.s of physical truth. can be developed more rigorously th~n we
hive done here ;iven that apparatus. See Quine (1975) and Friedman
(1975) for how to do this.
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Given the physical ideology and doctrine, there are at least two
strateqies for identifying the physical ontology: the first, which we
have already aiscussed, is to identify the physical ontology with the
class of things which satisfy or are expressed by one or ant,ther of
the te~8 in the physical ideology. The difficulties with this ap-
proach were seen to be plausibly insurmountable for finitary languages
and not definitively resolved for more enriched languages. As a conse-
quence, we shall not pause over it further •• '
The alternative approach is to employ the physical ideology, to
identify a basic class of physical entities, along with a variety of
constructive apparatus to develop a specification of the full physical
ontology; such .,development must include a treatment of individuals,
classes and attributes and, on our view, should be viewed as a speci-
fication of the "intended interpretation" of the language in which the
physical doctrine is formulated.
The task of actually giving a full development of the physical on-
tology is an extremely involved undertaking whi,ch we can here only
sketch in coarse detail; if nothing else is accomplished in this sec-
tion, the reader should begin to .ppreciat~ the complexity and philo-
41 Se. Hellman and Thompson (1975) and Boyd (unpublished) for discus-
lions of the problems with this way of identifying the physical on-
tology. Se. our discussion above (Chapter 2) for comments on lines
of reply invoking infinitary and higher order languages. Because
of the boundari.s let for the current project, it is not possible
to definitively resolve here the question of how the employment of
an enriched language impacts on the issues raised by the Replace-
.alent The.il.
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sophical delicacy involved in the performance of t~e task. No author
has, to my knowledge, given a full and adequate treatment of the prob-
lem; and, it is fairly clear that the literature does not contain so-
lutions to a variety of the more general problems that must be solved
before this task can be adequately dealt with. 41 With this said, we
shell now proceed to outlining the kinds of problems involved and to
giving a specification of the physical ontology which will serve our
purposes below. 42
We shall view the task as that of specifying a structure that is to
be identified with nthe intended interpretation of physics" (i.e., na-
ture); however, like any structure it may have numerous features that
go beyond those required for interpretation of a particular lan-
guage. 43 The task before us is to represent the physical features of
this structure. The issues raised are quite general ontological issues
concerning the nature of objects, events, states, properties, rela-
tiona, and the 'veriety of other ontological category that are perti-
nent to a full treatment of the problem of specifying "the furniture
of the world", Again, we are here interested in specifying only the
41 B.g., the problem of how to individuate properties, objects and
events.
42 Se. Causey (1977), Hellman and Thompson (1975, 1977), Fodol· (1975),
Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), and Quine (1975.) for treatments of
thi. problem.
41 Par example, attribute. that are realized by physical attributes
••y be ••pects of the structure here described without being 4S-
signed to any t.~ in the language of physical theory.
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"physical furniture" so to speak. This is crucial because it is a
constraint on specifying the physical bases that the theses of physi-
calism not be trivialized. If the theses are true, then there will be
a significant sense in which the structure here specified is to be
identified with all of nature (the so-called "natural order"); but,
this ought not be obtained by simply building everything into the bas-
es.
Our problem is to represent a structure that constitutes the physi-
cal ontology. In our exposition, we shall adopt a coordinate ontology a
that is, an ontology of spacetime points which exhausts all of na-
ture. 44 Each point in this space is uniquely specified by a quadruple
of real numbers., By a "region of nature" we shall mean any set of
spacetime points within the coordinate ontology. The adoption of a
specific coordinate framework is not assumed to be unique; alternative
frameworks are assumed to be isomorphic and, thus, mappable i~to each
other in ways that preserve the important features of the representa-
tion. Hence, our ontological theorizing takes place within a four di-
mensional space which we take to be exhaustive of all temporal and
spatial locations in nature; regions are taken to be four dimensionsl
portions of this space specifiable in terms of sets of points.
44 See Carnap (1967), Quine (1975b), Friedman (1975).
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Given such a coordinate ontology, the strategy for specifying the
physical ontology lncludes the following steps: (1) to determine the
ontological categories that must be dealt with (e.g., events, states,
properties, relations, objects, kinds); (2) to determine, for each
such category, how to deal with it (e.g., to answer such questions as
"what is an event?" and "how are events to be individuated?"); (3) to
determine, for each category, a "core class" 45 of physical instances;
and (4) to determine and use, for ~ach such category, a constructive
apparatus for specifying the full class of physical instances of the
category, given the core class. The actual execution of this strategy
would lead one along a path fraught with philosophical complexity and
the tedious demands of technical rigor. 46 For our immediate purposes,
I
we need not travel this path; howe~'er, the actual working out of the
physi ..;alist program w41uld require this.
In what follows. we shall develop informally a characterization of
the physical ontology in accordance with the strategy just mentioned.
To begin with, it appears that an adequate specification of the physi-
cal ontology must include a treatment of both individuals and attri-
bute~. Among the individuals, the following ontological categories
must47 be considered. objects, processes, events and states. Among the
41 E.g_, using the physical ideology, the core t:lass of physical prop-
!rties might be all of the properties expressed by the attribute
predicates in the physical vocabulary.
41 Se. Carnap (1967) and Goodman (1977) for the best examples of at-
tempts to implement such. strategy.
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attributes, properties and relations are included. Further, it has
been emphacized by both Quine and Hellman and Thompson that building a
set-theoretic hierarchy48 into the ontology of physics has its re-
wards. Whether or not the full set-theoretic hierarchy is desireable,
it does appear that a characterization of classes of objects in nature
(especially, natural kinds) is required. Thus, the following ontologi-
cal categories should be treated in a complete specification of the
physical ontology: objects, events, states, processes, properties, re-
lations and clasJes. The need for all of these categories is based
upon attempting to accomodate all of the standard ways of talking
about ontology within science. Given this prima facie list of catego-
ries, it is, of course, open to reduce the list as Quine frequently
shows us how to,do. 4 •
The strategy we shall employ is to follow, in essential respects,
Quine's recent treatment of ontological physicalism up to a point 50
and then depart radically. We shall deal with only a few of the onto-
logical categories of interest.
41 The grounds for includin9 a given category concern the purposes
that adverting to that category would serve. In specifying catego-
ries, we have tended to be overinclusive, perhaps.
41 A hierarchy that is based upon either pure sets (Quine) or individ-
ual, other than pure sets (Hel~an and Thompson) .
• , See Quine (19751) for an elegant example of this •
•• Roughly, the point at which he says that our physics need only be
committed to the existence of pure sets.
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The physical ontology on this view is developed as follows: first,
as initial ingredients we have (i) the ontology of spacetime points
and regions described above and (ii) the physical vocabulary distilled
from a scouting of contemporary physics; second, the vocabulary items
are taken to express magnitudes (with possibly infinite ranges of val-
ues) which include all of the "fundamental magnitudes"; third, the
members of this class of basic magnitudes are evaluated!! at every re-
gion of the spacetime ontology; fourth, given the basic attributes and
given a set of attrib~te forming operations 52 that take attributes and
generate complex attributes, a class of all attributes 53 constructible
from the basic class is generated; fifth, these attributes are like-
wise evaluated at every spacetime region. The result is a "complete"
distribution of 'all physical attributes over the entire spacetime on-
tology. On this view, the individuals are the regions themselves. Un-
11 Each value is taken to be a discrete physical attribute (property
or relation). And, it is the actual value (not a measured value)
that is pertinent here; there is no limitation based upon the pre-
cision of measuring instruments. Any real value within the range of
pe~issible values is an attribute. Finally, the cardinality con-
siderations discussad above are not pertinent here; the predicates
are employed only to identify the fundamental magnitudes, not every
one of th.~r values. This approach clearly separates the issue of
the defining power of the language of physical theory from the
specification of the physical ontology. There need not be a term
for each value of a magnitude although there must be an 6ttribute
for each value.
12 It is left open what operations are to be included in this set.
II It is a feature of our construal of the physical ontology that a
specific:ation of the basic attributes "determines" all the complex
attribute. in the b.sis. once all the basic physical attributes are
fixed, then so are all the complex physical attributes. See Kim
(1978) for dilcussion of this feature of the basis.
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like Quine, we unashamedly admit atttibutes into our ontology: the
class of such attributes consists of (i) all the fundamental physical
properties and relations and (ii) every attribute constructible from
the fundamental ones. 54
So, we have spacetime regions and attributes distributed over them.
To many, this will seem too modest an ontology: where, after all, are
the objects and events? It is at this point that we must conserve en-
ergy, our cla~, which we shall not here defend, is that, given this
characterization of the physical ontology, a more robust ontology can
be built up in its terms depending upon what view one takes concerning
what an object or an event is. Our motive for this way of proceeding
is that the mor~ detailed and intricate issues concerning specific on-
tological categories, although interesting and important for some pur-
poses, are not pertinent to ours, especially if the above claim (con-
cerning construction of objects and events) is correct. 55
54 In this, of course, we depart significantly from Quine who, when
reaching this point in the discussion, opts for reconstrual of
predicates to avoid quantification over states in favor of quanti-
fication over numbersl the "ontological debacle" he speaks of be-
gin. with this move (cf., Quine (1915.». We avoid it because it
appears that the purpose it serves (i.e., that of identifying the
mintmal ontological commitment a theory of physics need make) is
not our purpose, which is that of identifying the physical ontology
in some more substantial sense (i.e., "the real ontology of phys-
ics" that, for example, we take ourselves to be part of and embed-
ded in.)
II See Cartwright (1975) for a discussion of material objects; and,
see Quine (1975a) for sU9gestive discussion. As Quine points out,
issues concerning the notion of a "body" are not directly pertinent
to the problem of specifying the physical ontology. See Thomson
(1977), Kim (1976), and Davidson (1970) for discussion of events.
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For those who prefer to have set-theoretic structures close at
hand, our specification of the physical ontology is extended to in-
elude a set theoretic hierarchy built upon the individuals of the on-
tological system (i.e., regions of spacetime). Hence, as Quine puts
it, "we suffer no shortages" when it comes to our need for classes of
objects. 51 Further, note that the fusions of sets of regions are them-
selves regions; hence, any ontological purposes served by studying
fused objects can be quite adequately accomodated by our physical on-
tology. Given our construction, all attributes, classes and individu-
als that are required in physical science are included within the on-
tology here described; and, surely, this ontology exceeds all that is
required for physics.
This completes our presentation of the physical bases. Before turn-
ing to a discussion of the physicalist theses which advert to them, we
shall discuss a number of presuppositions of our account which have
been the target of various objections in the literature.
Our development of the physical bases depended upon, at least,
three critical assumptions which are correctly c~~strued as presuppo-
sitions of that development, and hence, of the theses also:
(PI) There are principled divisions among branches of science.
(P2) There are determinate physical bases to be developed.
See Clu.e"~ (1977) for discussion of kinds and of "structured
wholes".
II See Quine (1975.) and Hellman and Thompson (1975).
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(P3) Physics occupies a special place in science which justifies
developing the physical bases in terms of its ideology, on-
tology and doctrine.
For each of (Pl)-(P3), we shall discuss (i) its content, (ii) why it
is a presupposition of our account of the bases, and (iii) the major
objections that have been advanced against it.
Before proceeding to a discussion of these presuppositions, let us
note the importance of what we are now doing for the defense of the
physicalist program as we are developing it. The following is a char-
acteristic form of ar~Jment which is implicit in the critical discus-
sions of a number of writers on physicalism:
(A) The theses of physicalism depend for their content upon the
determinate and principled identification of the physical
bases.
(8) The determinate and principled identification of the physical
bases depends upon the truth of presupposition x.
(C) Presupposition x is false.
(D) Thus, there is no determinate and principled identification
of the physical bases.
(E) Thus, the theses lack content.
Since our approach in developing the theses assumes that (A) and (8)
are true, it is rather important to look closely at the most frequent-
ly attacked presuppositions and to defend against the arguments cited
against them. In this way, we shall close off a number of lines of ob-
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jection to the physicalist program. Our discussion of the three pre-
suppositions we have identified will also make clear why we hold that
(A) and (8) are true.
3.2 PRESUPPOSITION 1
What, then, is the content of (Pi)? It is, roughly, that the insti-
tution of science has a certain structurel it is partitioned into more
than one part and the basis for the
partitioning is some principle (or set of principles) of metaphysical
and epistemological significance to the physicalist program. As we
shall see, for physicalist purposes of the kind that we are concerned
with, it is only required that there be such a division between phys-
ics and the res_ of science. Recall that our strategy for identifying
the physical bases only assumed that we could isolate physics. Al-
though this is all that is needed, it is possible that the prinei-
ple(s) that we use to distinguish physics from the rest may suggest
ways of making further divisions.
Which principle is operative in effecting this partitioning must
eventually be clarified in a full discussion and defense of the physi-
calist programj above, we introduced one such principle in our devel-
opment of the bases. Below, we shall explore a number of further such
principles to, at least, open the path for further work on this ques-
tion. At • minimum, an appropriate principle must have some bearing on
(i) the subject matter of science and (~i) issues concerning the na-
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ture of explanation, in order for them to be pertinent to the physi-
calist program. A central problem here is the more general one of how
to individuate research programs and patterns of explanation in sci-
ence.
So, (P1) states that science is partitioned according to metaphysi-
cally and epistemologically significant principles. What kind of
claim is this? First, it is not a purely descriptive claim about the
current divisions made among branches of science; thus, it is compati-
ble with (PI) that current science is not carved up along the bounda-
ries indicated by what are the optimal principles. However, although
current divisions don't necessarily reflect the physicalistically rel-
evant divisions, they can plausibly be viewed as good first approxima-
tions. It is an important research question to discern what are the
best ways of cutting up science; it is a question that the physicalist
must take seriously as part of his program. The issue is, ultimately,
whether science does carve up in physicalistically interesting ways or
not; and, the prospects of the proqram hang crucially on how this is-
sue is resolved. As we shall see, the arguments of the skeptics that
no relevant principles exist are inconclusive and there are numerous
pl.u.ibl~ candidate principles that deserve exploration I whether sci-
ence carves up in the way that physicalism requires is a currently
open ilsue. The inquiry should begin with a study of existing divi-
lion. and head toward a clarification of the way. that science divides
or ought to divide up. It is, also, quite consonant with our position
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that there are many correct ways to partition science; what we require
is that one of those ways accords well with the goals and needs of the
physicalist program. There may, of course, be very different purposes
that lead to different divisions. ~ physicalistic conception of sci~
~ motivated by the goals suggested in Chapter 1 depends for its de-
velopment upon the identification of a principle that partitions sci-
ence in ways pertinent to the physicalistic program; alternative
conceptions of science might call for different kinds of partitionings
and, hence, different principles.
Why is (P1) a presupposition? Recall what our strategy for identi-
fication of the physical bases was: first, we identified physics,
where by 'physiGs' we meant a branch of science that was included
within natural science, that satisfied certain conditions and that was
narrower than all of natural science; second, we extracted from phys-
ics so construed a core ideology; third, we suggested how the full
physical ideology might be constructed out of the core ideology;
fourth, we suggested ho~ the full physical doctrine might be speci-
fied; and fifth, we suggested how the core ontology might be specified
in terms of the core ideology and how the full ontology might be con-
structed out of the core ontology. This strategy led to a characteri-
zation of the physical bases in terms of which significant physicalist
tb•••• are to be fo~ulated. Further, the strategy was based upon a
chat'lcterization of physics which was metaphysically and epistemologi-
cally relevant to the program. It 18 rather explicitly assumed in all
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•this that physics is an, in principle, distinct branch of science; a
branch that is distinct for physicalistically relevant reasons. 57
Besides explicit assumption, however, there are other reasons for
holding that (PI) is a presupposition of physicalist theses. In par-
ticular, let us reflect upon the consequences of rejecting (Pi).
There are two related ways in which things go radically wrong for
physicalism if (PI) is denied, ways which correspond to two different
ways of denying (PI). First, it might be claimed that there simply are
no divisions of science into distinct branches and that every part of
science is just a part of one undifferentiated total science (i.e.,
"physics"), Second, it might be claimed that there are divisions into
branches of science, but the principles that form the basis for the
divisions are metaphysically and epistemologically irrelevant to the
physicalist program. 58
If one rejects (Pl) for the first reason, then the untoward conse-
quence for physicalism is that it looks to be unavoidable that the
theses of physicalism are trivially true because every term of science
falls within the basis for ideology, every truth of science falls
57 By 'physicalistically relevant' we mean relevant to the ontological
and epistemological motivations behind the physicalist program. We
emphasize the notion of physicalistic relevance because, as will be
seen, objections have emphasized the arbitrariness vis a vis physi-
calism of boundaries between branches of science. -
51 For example, the divisions among branches of science are the exclu-
sive products of socio-historical factors that have no further sig-
nificance.
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within the basis for doctrine, and every entity posited or
constructible within science falls within the basis for ontology. The
physicalist program, therefore, would be quite pointless and of abso-
lutely no interest. 5 ' Strictly speaking, we have just shown thftt (Pl)
is not a logical presupposition of the theses a to show that, it must
be shown that the denial of (P1) entails the denial of the theses.
But, we take it that the force of calling (Pl) a presupposition is
still pretty ~,trong if its denial leads to trivialization of the thes-
ea. Hence, we shell continue to refer to (PI) as a presupposition.
If one rejects (PI) for the second reason (i.e., that the principle
of division is irrelevant to physicalist concerns), then a few differ-
ent bad possibi\ities present themselves: (i) the boundaries among
disciplines, being sensitive to irrelevant factors, do not reflect the
physicalist bias; as a consequence, the theses simply will not be ex-
presling the ontrlogical and epistemological claims they purport to
express; (i1) the boundaries, being irrelevant to physicalist con-
cern., may be easily reshaped for either irrelevant purposes or for ad
~ defense of the program. The first point is that the content of the
th•••• would appear to depend, not upon facts about nature and sci-
enCI, but upon irrelevant factors (e.g., socio-historical factors)
and, hence, it ~ould not be what the physicalist intends. The second
point i. that the boundaries between physics and other branches of
I' This ia the first prong of 'Chomsky's fork'i i.e., either physic.1-
1•• i. true but trivial or .ignificant but falle. See below in our
dilcul.ion, of ('2) tor the second prong.
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science may be too fluid for the theRes to have significant empirical
content. Thus, we conclude that these considerations, although not
sufficient to establish that (Pl) is a logical presupposit~on, are
sufficient to show that if the physicalist wants to be expressing a
significant doctrine concerning ontology, objectivity and explanation,
a doctrine whose fate is not sensitive to i.rrelevant factors, then he
had better hold on to (Pl).
Remarkably, not all ph~sicalists see it this way. Quine, in partic-
ular, appears to hold two views which, if we are right about (P1) be-
ing a presupposition of the theses, are incompatible: viz •. (1) that
physicalism is a significant and true doctrine and (2) that (Pi) is
false (i.e., that natural science is the same as physics). We shall
~
now explore Quine's views here to show that he can't have it both
ways.11
To do this, we ahall make an excursion into the Quine-Chomsky de-
bate regarding the so-called "indeterminacy of translation".6! In his
II The argument just cited, that the denial of (Pi) in favor of no di~
visions in natural science entails the trivialization of physical-
ist theses, is sufficient to show this. It is of interest, however,
to see how this issue arises in the context of Quine's· defense of
another of his favored doctrines, "the indeterminacy of transla-
tion".
11 There have been many non-equivalent formulations of the indetermi-
nacy thesis, and, the discussion has been quite muddled in both
Quine and his critics. Only recently has it been appreciated that
Quine has had several things in mind (cf., Friedman (1975) for a
lucid attempt to sort out Quine's views), and only recently has
Quine sorted things out in print (cf., Quine (1979) and his review
of Goodman in Quine (1978». It is now quite clear that it is his
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early reply to Chomsky,62 Quine attempts to argue that his thesis of
indeterminacy is, contra Chomsky, distinct from the thesis of the un-
derdetermination of theory by evidence; he claims that "it is parallel
but additional". The argument is, roughly, that relative to "the to-
tality of truths about nature" translation is not determined (i.e.,
there are alternative incompatible possibilities of translation each
compatible with the totality of such truths).S3 He concludes from this
that translation is indeterminate and, hence, that there is no fact of
the matter concerning translation as distinct from legitimate scien-
tific theories which, although underdetermined by evidence, are deter-
mined by the totality of truth~ about nature. As stated, Quine's ar-
gument is quite open to Chomsky's sharp replyl4 that nothing has been
said which show!& that "translation theory" is not included among the
totality of truths about nature; and, if it were so included, then it
would be trivially determined by the totality of such truths. Thus,
the only remaining indeterminacy is that which holds for all theory
relative to all possible evidence: an obviously true claim on Chom-
physicalism that is his pr~ary reason for believing in the indet-
erminacy thesis; it is his physicalism that gives that thesis sig-
nificant content that is clearly different from the underdetermina-
tion thesis.I. See Quine (196gb).
13 This contrasts with the underdetermination thesis since the bases
for determination in the two cases are different. Thus, the basis
for the underdetermination thesis is the totality of possible evi-
dane" • subset of the totality of truths.
I. See Chomlky (1975), p. 183.
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sky's view. This is quite riqht! Quine misstated the physicalistts
case.
The problem with Quine's argument lies in his appeal to the totali-
ty of truths about nature as the relevant basis of determination in-
volved in his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. With such a
balis, being dete~ined by that basis is trivially true of all ~f its
members and true of nothing else; the orily interesting issues concern
what to include in the basis. Further determination by it has no SjLg-
nificance, as Chomsky rightly claims. To formulate a significant doc-
trine of physicalist determination in terms of which interesting
charges of indeterminacy can be made (charges which differ from the
underdete~in.tionof theory by evidence), the basis for determination
must be narrower than the totality of all truths about nature. Thus,
if Quine's argument is reformulated in terms of lithe totality of phys-
leal truths about nature", where this totality is a class na rower
than all of the truths about nature, then it is not vulnerable to
Chomsky'. reply. However, in order to do this, something very much
like (P1), which allows for the separation of physical from other
truth., mUlt be accepted. Thus, Quine must either give up making any
lignificant physicalist d.te~ination cla~sll or he must give up his
denial of (P1).
---_.....-......-
II And, tnu., he mUlt give up hi. contention that there i8 an indeter-
minacy th.,i. diltinct from the the.ia of the underdetermination of
thtQry by evidence.
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In summary, Quine's attempt to argue for indeterminacy from a posi-
tion that is both physicalist and a denial of (PI) fails. What is re-
quired in an argument for intltlterminacy is the assumption that the
physical truths can be distinguished from the rest of the truths of
nature, including the truths of translation. 56 We conclude that, as
physicalists, if we wish to formulate non-trivial theses that are dis-
tinct from standard epistemological theses (e.g., the underdetermina-
tion of theory by evidence), then we must suppose that the physical
basis for truth c~n be isolated from other truths of science; and
this, given our strategy, presupposes that there are principled divi-
sions among branches ot science.
As was mentiqned in Chapter 1, there are a number of views regard-
ing the structure of science: (i) physics is the only branch of sci-
ence, all else is a branch of physics or is eliminable in favor of a
branch of physics, (i') "physics" is the only branch of science, but
"physics" include~ chemistry, biology, psychology, linguistics, etc
(i.e., 'physics' means all of natural science), (i1) there are divi-
sians among physics and other branches but each is autonomous relative
I' Thus, the indeterminacy claim is that translation is indetermihate
relative to the totality of physical truths, where that totality is
construed more narrowly than the totality of truths about nature.
And, this way of putting things does distinguish that thesis from
the thesis of the u,nderdetermination of theory by evidence. As we
ahall see, it is open to Chomsky to reply that nothing has been
s.id to show either that such a class of truths can be identified
in I principled way (i.e., that (PI) is true) or that translation
i. in tact indeterminate relative to such a class if specified. But
the•• are different matters from those considered now.
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to the others (i.e., no structural relations need exist between
branches), (iii) there are divisions among the branches and physics is
basic with regard to ontology and epistemic matters and the others re-
late to each other in sundry ways, (iv) there are divisions and phys-
ics is the basic science in a strict hierarchy ordered by some set of
ontological and epistemological principles. For the purpose of estab-
lishing (PI) as a presupposition, we need not take a stand on which of
(ii)-(iv) we favor. s , What is needed is to reject (i) and (i l ), as we
have just done; and, for the purposes of the argument presented, the
differences between them are immaterial. Hence, we conclude that, for
physicalism to be a significant doctrine, principled divisions between
physics and other branches of science must exist.
We now turn to a discussion of the objections that have been ad-
vaneed against (PI). None of these objections have been adequately
discussed in the literature either by physicalists or their opponents;
since the prospects of the program depend crucially on fending off
these objections, it is curious that physicalists have chosen to re-
main silent for the moat part regarding them.'8
., Naturally, (1i) is not in the spirit of the program.
II Such ardent physicalists .s Quine, Field, Friedman, Hellman and
Tho.plon, Boyd and Fodor have not discussed these objections and
have proceeded •• if they did not exist; perhapi 'they see, what we
think i8 true, that there are ways of defeating the objections.
- 141 •
Critics of physicalism have, in effect, advanced a two part assault
on (Pl) that is based upon a positive and a negative thesis. The posi-
tive thesis is that the apparent divisions among branches of science
are the product of socia-historical factors that are irrelevant to the
ontoloqical and epistemological concerns of the physicalist program.
From this thesis, it has been thought to follow that even if there are
divisions among branches of science, they are based upon irrelevant
principles and they are vulnerable to irrelevant and arbitrary shifts.
Hence, insofar as the theses of physicalism depend upon (PI), they
lack the ontological and epistemological content that the physicalist
supposes they have. Not just any principled divisions will do; (PI)
requires that the operative principles have the right ontological and
,
epistemologic~l significance. To buttress the attack, the negative
thesis is that there are no ontologically and epistemologically inter-
esting principles for distinguishing branches of science: all alleged
principles of this type are defective. Hence, there couldn't be prin-
cipled divisions of the kind required and (Pi), even if true, could
not be pertinent to the isolation of physicalist bases that play a
role in significant physicalist theses.
In response to this attack, first, we shall show that the positive
the,is, even if true, does not entail the alleged consequences; and
second, we shall claim that the negative thesis is essentially
unargued for, that there are reasons to believe that the divisions
among branches may be relevant to physicalist concerns and that there
are plausible candidate principles for characterizing such divisions.
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The positive thesis, that the structure of science (i.e., the divi-
sions among and relations between branches) is the product of arbi-
trary socio-historical forces which concern human interest, the dynam-
ics of group interaction, and institutional structures that happen to
exist at a given time, haa been advanced by a diversity of figures.
The following are typical expressions of this view:
[ .•• lfar many purposes, a simple division of Science into
branches is very useful, but we have found no sufficient
reason for assigning deep significance to this classifica-
tion. We conclude that Science is an enormous area of human
research which is united by a common method. Its divisions
are for convenience in describing results and do not repre-
sent a fundamental feature of Science."
The division of science into areas rests exclusively on dif-
ferences in research procedures and direction of interest;
~~ not regard it !! ! matter of princi~le. On the ~~
tra~, all ~he branches of science !!! in pr-nciele of ~
and the same nature, they are branches of the unltary sel-
ene. I phYiICs." - - -- --
The province that is actually regarded today as belonging to
each science is very largely the result of historical acci-
dent; ••• Such considerations clearly justify the view that
science is a single whole and that the divisions between its
branches are largely conventional and devoid of ulterior
significance."1
The i.sues raised by the positive thesis are: (1) is it true? and
(ii) if it is true, does it entail that the divisions among branches
of science are arbitrary with respect to the physicalist program? To
begin with, it i. hard to deny that the above mentioned factors play
It See Kemeney (1959), p. 182.
71 S•• Hempel (1949), p. 382.
71 S•• Cambell (1953), p. 13-14.
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an influential role in determining what scientists do, how they are
identified, and what lines of development are opened or closed in sci-
ence. So we shall allow that the positive thesis is true.
It is, in fact, a truism that the divisions in science, like every
other product of human thought and action, are the result of psycho-
logical, social, political,'historical and genetic factors: i.e.,
every such human product is a result of an interaction betwen genes,
individual constitution and the social and physical environments. It
should be obvious that this claim entails nothing about how well the
content of intellectual products accords with reality. At issue, in
part, is what role the "world" plays and what role reason plays in the
shaping of our ~hou9ht. Thus, two different readings of the positive
thesis are: (1) that social (etc) forces shape science to some extent
and (2) that only such factors shape science (i.e., reality and reason
play no role). Our contention is that on neither reading does the po-
sitive thesis secure a victory over (Pl). We shall accept (1) as a
truism, but argue that it has no interesting consequences for the im-
port of divisions in science. Further, we shall suggest that the ex-
istence of contributions from reality and reason lead to the rejection
of (2) and to an understanding of how divisions in science might be
non-arbitrary vis ! vis the physicalist program.
It simply does not follow from the positive thesis that the struc-
ture of science need be, or in fact is, a "socio-historical accident"
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with no ontological or epistemological significance. It is a non-se-
quitur to conclude, from the claim that socia-historical factors (par-
tially or totally) influence the course and structure of science, that
the structure of science is arbitrary from the point of physicalist
concerns. Of course, such a claim doesn't exactly ensure that the
evolving structure of science is relevant to physicalist concerns ei-
there Additional argumentation is clearly required for both sides of
the dispute. '2
For our part, we shall suggest two lines of argument designed to
make plausible the idea that, despite the impact of socio-historical
factors, the existing divisions among branches of science could have
80me of the ontofogical and epistemological significance required by
the physicalist program. Then, in our discussion of the negative the-
sis, we shall review some principles that could be operative in making
divisions with such significance. In doing this, we shall be taking
some steps in the direction of showing how science could be ideally
organized in line with the physicalist program and showing that the
existing organization approxtmates this ideal.
The first argument for the cla~ that, despite the impact of socia-
historical factors, the ~xistin9 divisions in science could have phy-
sic.listie significance runs as follows. although it is true that
'2 For the proponent of the positive thesis simply to add the premise
that, if such factors playa role in science, then the reSUlting
Itructure must be arbitrary would make the argument valid at the
expense of begging all the questions at issue.
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quite arbitrary (from the point of view of the physicalist program)
factors influence the conduct and structure of science, that conduct
and structure do not result exclusively from such factors: scientists
sometimes seek the truth and sometimes they do so in intellectually
responsible ways. There are pressures from within science to proceed
(at times) in ways that are orthogonol to social or individual inter-
ests and political or religious institutions. '3 There are also pres-
sures to constrain thought by principles of rationality and method
that do not obviously line up with socie-historical factors; and there
are within science research questions concerning what are the ways to
individuate and relate programs of research and branches of science. 74
It appears that the proponents of the positive thesis view science
IS a "first-order" enterprise with little or no self-reflective capac-
ities; the point of our reply is that this is a false conception of
science and that the self-reflective capacities found in the institu-
tions of science are a serious factor in the determination of how sci-
ence is structured. It appears to us that one of the important goals
'3 Consider, for example, the actions of Freud and Galileo; two think-
ers who, though influenced by existing institutions, did not suc-
cumb to them <at least, in the privacy of their own studies).
74 The programs of physicalism and the unity of science are examples
of attempts to identify such meaningful divisions in science as
well as to formulate relations between the parts so divided. Thus,
the current project is an attempt to contribute to the course of
science as well as to capture existing trends in current practice;
as such, it is a force of a non-arbitrary kind vis a vis the struc-
ture of Icience. such pressures are not obviously In the service
of arbitrary social and historical forces.
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of science is to dete~ine where important boundaries in both nature
and knowledge about nature reside. Despite the impact of arbitrary
forces on institutional divisions, it is difficult to take seriously
the idea that none of the divisions in science are significant; and,
we are sU9gesting that thir is the result of scientific activity it-
self. At the minimum, the objector must allow that divisions among
branches of science are imperfect reflections of significant princi-
plea and not just the reflection of arbitrary factors.?5
A second reply, in response to the positive thesis and associated
argument, runs as follows: if, as science evolves, it becomes increas-
ingly more successful in providing explanations and predictions of
natural phenomen" then there is some reason to believe that the divi-
sions within branches of science (e.g., the identified natural kinds)
and the divisions among branches of science reflect important metaphy-
sical and epistemological facts.'s That is, success within a given do-
'1 It appears that only the most trenchent relativist of one form or
another could hold onto the positive thesis in its stated form;
perhaps, such thinkers would hold on because either they over-em-
phacize the power of arbitrary factors (it seems that to chaulk up
scientific change and activity to arbitrary feetors entirely here
is to overplay ones hand considerably), or they hold a vaguely for-
mulated view about relative reality and the relativity of knowledge
which allows no constraints by rationality or the "world". Either
form of relativism is untenable on our view. We are, however, sym-
pathetic to the idea that the structure of our representation of
nature i. d.t.~ined by our own cognitive activity; this is pretty
much our point that within the activity of science there are cogni-
tive forces counter to the socio-historical ones.
,. The debt to Boyd 1. obvious here although it is not clear that he
hal or would employ the success argument with regard to the divi-
lionl between branches. See Boyd (forthcoming).
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main suggests that what is included within that domain hangs together
in certain ways that phenomena from that domain and phenomena from
some other would not. The success of the various branches of science
suggests that they are focusing upon features of reality that do not
represent an arbitrary grouping; the failures within a branch would
quite naturally suggest that the right domain and groupings of phenom-
ena within that domain had not been identified. Further, success in a
domain suggests that good questions are being asked and effective
strategies for answering them have been found; again, failure would
suggest the opposite_ What we are suggesting is that success within a
branch of science is an indicator that the branch has found a coherent
subject matter, that it has a certain amount of theoretical integrity,
that it has hit 'upon significant truths about its subject matter, and
it has been asking the right questions about its subject matter; fail-
ure sU9gests the opposite. By 'subject matter' is meant the individu-
als within a domain, their attributes, and the regularities exhibited
by them. Thus, success indicates that the right questions are being
asked about the right things and the right attributes of things. This
suggests three possible principles of division for demarcating the
boundariel between branches. (i) what the individuals in different do-
mains are and how they are related in terms of, say, Gomplexity of or-
ganization, (ii) what the attributes in different domains are and how
they are related (e.g_, degree of generality or abstractness), and
(iii) what the questions asked and patterns of response are in the
different domaina. We shall look at such principles below.
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What the above argument is supposed to show is that, again, even if
locio-bistorical factors influence the structure of science, it
doesnlt follow that that structure is merely an arbitrary one or one
that is exclusively determined by such factors. Science also follows
paths ~ success. Hence, to the extent that science is successful, an
account of that success might be offered in terms of the ontological
and epistemological facts concerning its structure; if the structure
were purely an arbitrary one such an account would not likely be pos-
sible. We are not suggesting that the (full or partial) success of
leienee entails that the structure of science is significant; we are
suggesting that a certain kind of structure could account for such
success, and that, in the spirit of an inference to the best explana-
,
tion, the actual success of science leads to the view that its current
structure il to some extent non-arbitrary. Notice that we have not
said what principle of the possible ones mentioned is relevant here.
This is only an argument for the possible non-arbitrariness of the
structure, an account of the details of such structure is still
owed."
There are two objections to this line of argument that we shall
consider. First, it will surely be pointed out by the defender of the
positive thesis that this type of argument cannot be applied just any-
where. In this cas., it could be claimed that, although the form of
" So far we have suggested two sources of non-arbitrary factors in
Iciencel (i) Icienti.t. and (11) the world, insofar as reference to
it plays. part in an account of the success of science.
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argument does apply to natural kinds in science, it is not approriate
to apply it to larger divisions (e.g., branches of science): there is
a significant lack of similarity in the two cases. If the natural kind
terms are the ones that occur in the law-statements, then such terms
can be taken to pick out a natural kind if the law-statements that
they occur in are substantially verified. The predictive and explana-
tory success of the law-statements suggest their truth, and their
truth suggests the existence of natural kinds associated with terms
that occur within them. However, the success of a branch of science is
a much more hazy idea; why, it might be argued, couldn1t the success
of a branch only be an artifact based upon the individual successes of
laws qrouped together, however arbitrarily? For example, put the laws
of mechanics and the laws of biology together; such a grouping will,
undoubtedly, have a number of explanatory and predictive successes.
But is that grounds for inferring to any interesting integrity of the
grouping? The answer is "no" of course.?1 But, we didn't claim that
the argument wa. demonstrative or that any grouping of successful
principles constituted a branch of science. However, the objection
doe. raise the question of whether we have correctly applied this form
of argument. What are the marks of a case in which it applies? What
does the success o~ a branch of science consist in?
,. Aa we ob••rved above, this kind of conglomeration may be what the
current branch of science called "physics" is; our discussion and
cl.~. are to be construed in terms of an idealization of physics
taken I •• partitular body of theory characterized by the principle
we diacu•••d earlier when phylics wa. identified.
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Before attempting to respond to this challenge, let us look at the
second reply to the success argument, since it raises similar issues.
The defender of the positive thesis will point out that exi~ting in-
stitutional divisions among branches of science are obviously arbi-
trary from the physicalist's point of view: electrical engineering de-
partments, for example, include computer science, brain physiology and
the study of electrical phenomena in general; earth science depart-
ments include geology, paleontology, meteorology, and geophysics; and,
a brief scouting of the humanities, physics and philosophy suggests
that disciplines are grouped together quite arbitrarily. How, in the
face of these facts, could we contend that the divisions among branch-
es reflect non-arbitrary factors? It miqht be further pointed out that
,
changes in the groupings are obviously sensitive to quite arbitrary
factors; boundaries in academic institutions generally, and in science
in particular, are not clearly delineated so much in terms of subje~t
matter or questions asked or methods employed as they are delineated
in te~. of political and economic factors. Such considerations
strongly suggest that, whatever account of success is offered, it had
better not lean heavily on the idea that divi.ions among branches are
metaphysically or epistemologically significant.
So, to lummarize the point of the objections, the success argument
ha. unclear conditions of applicability and the facts of the existing
situation in Icience suggest that, whatever the conditions are, they
don't obtain in the ca•• of the existing stru~ture of science. Is the
aucc... argument defensible in the face of these replies?
- 151 -
With regard to applying the success argument, things are at some-
what of an impasse awaiting the more adequate understanding of what
"success" consists in, what the structure of the argument is and what
the conditions of its use are. In considering the contrived example of
mechanics-biology, we were Lmmediately able to recognize the non-ap-
plicability of the success argument; but, our recognition depended
upon knowing how to distinguish mechanics from biology. The existence
of such divisions is precisely what is at issue, and thus, it would
appear that we were beqging the question by assuming knowledge of how
to make them. Our capacity to make such divisions may only reflect our
knowledqe of current groupings; but, it is the alleged arbitrariness
of these groupings that the success argument is introduced to dispell.
,
Thus, the success argument can be of no help in establishing the non-
arbitrariness of existinq groupings if its application has unclear
conditions or if its application depends upon having knowledge of the
very principled divisions that it is supposed to establish.
The second objection to the success argument WdS that, whatever the
conditions of correct application, they don't obtain in the case of
existing science because the divisions there are patently arbitrary:
thuI, on this view, existing science is both successful and arbitrari-
1y organized into branches. This, of course, beg. the question at is·
aue. However, it do•• point out that, ~ best, existing divisions only
.pprox~.te a principled organization of the 8ciences, and, it, along
with the previous objection, effectively rubs in the futility of ap-
- 152 -
pealing to the success argument as a means of showing that existing
divisions even approximate physicalistically significant ones. This is
because, in the absence of knowledge of the principled divisions, the
sorting out of applicable from non-applicable cases for the success
argument cannot proceed.
In reply, we must abandon the success argument and fall back on our
earlier position that it is p'rt of the ongoing research program of
science, and of physicalism in particular, to isolate branches of sci-
ence that are based upon ontologically and epistemologically signifi-
cant (and yet to be clarified) principles." It ia within the frame-
work of specific principles that divisions among sciences and
revisions of sucp divisions are non-arbitrary; our claim is that it is
a part of the physicalist program in science to develop such princi-
ples. With such principles in hand, it will be clear in what ways ex-
isting divisionti do or do no~ ~pro~imate the physicalistically ideal
ones that are required for development of the physical bases. Such
principles could play • methodological role in science in delibera-
tions concerning revision of boundaries in science; and, they could
'how how the success argument, if it is clarified, should be applied
(i .• , how In account of the succe•• Jf science might be given in terms
of its structural divisions). This, of course, ia of no use to our
current problem which i. that of identifying the relevant principles
,. 'or example, principle. concerning levels of organization, abstrac-
tion or generality.
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and establishing the existence of significant divisions. A burden
clearly exists for the physicalist to carry, aLthough thp ~lausibility
of denying (Pi) has equally clearly ~ot been established ~ th~ propo-
nents of the positive thesis.
Thus, our view is that it is a part of the physicalist program to
delineate the structure of science at a certain level of generality
and, hence, to delineate principles that distinguish branches of sci-
enee in a physicalistically relevant way_ The physicalist project,
therefore, is to some extent a bootstrapping one. That is, the physi-
calist program must involve development of the principles that divide
branches in relevant ways; the opponent, as W~ shall now see, suggests
that such princ~les are not there to be found. Whether or not he suc-
ceeds in this, we conclude that his positive thesis does not lead to
the skeptical conclusions that it was thought to. I '
The negative thesis advanced by lhe opponent of (Pi) was that there
are no metaphysically and ep:.stemologically relevant prlnciples for
distinguishing branches of science; hence, there could not be any
principled divisin~s of the right kind for physicalism. If such a
cla~ is true, then, r~9ardless of the merit of the positive thesis
just discussed, (fl) would be defeated and with it the entire physi-
II Another way of seeing this is that, even if divisions setve heuris-
tic purposes .1 Kemeney and Hempel suggest, that doeti not mean that
there is no ontological or epistemic significanco of the divisions.
Such utility rai,•• questions that, a. we suggested above, could be
anlwered in terms of such significance.
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calist pro9r~.
We shall consider one line of argument in support of the negative
thesis and then consider some variants. The quotation that best in-
stantiates the basic idea of the argument is to be found in Chomsky as
follows I
It is an interesting question whether the functioning and
evolution of human mentality can be accomodated within the
framework of physical explanation, as presently conceived,
or whether there are new principles now unknown, that must
be invoked, perhaps principles that emerge only at higher
levels of organizatfon than can now be submitted to physical
investigation. We can, however, be fairly sure that there
will be a physical explanation for the phenomena in ques-
tion, if they can be explained at all, for an uninterestjng
te~inological reason, namely that the concept of 'physical
explanation' will no doubt be extended to incorporate what-
ever is discovered in this domain, exactly as it was extend-
ed to accompdate gravitational and electromagnetic force,
massless particle~, and numerous other entities and process-
es that would have offended the common sense of earlier gen-
erations. But it seems clear that this issue need not delay
the study of the topics that are now open to investigation,
and it seems futile to speculate about matters so remote
from present understanding•• '
Now, in order to see the relevance of this passage to our problem, it
must be assumed that its point is to show that there are no principles
for constraining the evolution of the divisions between physics and
other '~r.nche. of science and, hence, of our concept of the physical.
That ii, we shall take the point of this passage to be that of pur-
porting to I~OW that what counts as phy~ic8 and what counts as "the
phyaical" i. open to unconstrained revision. 12 The argument for this
I' S•• Cha.lky (1968), p. 83-4.
II Chomlky ••ema to be lugge.tin; that what counts a8 physical is only
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consists in suggesting examples of how physics has been revised in the
past; for example, the suggestion is that there was no operative prin-
ciple for incorporating electromagnetic theory (EM) into physics other
than a principle which states that the failure of the attempts to re-
duce it to mechanics is sufficient for inclusion. The conclusion seems
to be that, since physics is an evolving branch of science, there is
no firm conception of what physics is; and hence, anything could be
included within physics by arbitrary fiat. If this were true, then
(Pl) would, at best, concern current divisions which are completely
maleable (as evidenced by the EM case): what was once thought to be a
separate and reducible branch of science was "shifted down" into phys-
iea as a result of repeated failure of reduction attempts and the ar-
bitrary decisions of scientists. The morals are supposed to be: (1)
the divisions among branches are not and could not be constrainedl3 by
significant principles and (2) the theses of physicalism are trivial
• terminological matter of no substantive interest. If, as Chomsky
sometimes sU9gests, 'physics' and 'the physical' are really terms
designating all of natural science, then the point he makes in the
cited passage may well be correct; but, as we have emphacized, that
construal of 'physics' and 'the physical' is not the one intended
by the physicalist. We shall understand all issues raised by the
negative thesis as bearing on the attempt to individuate physics
and other branches as proper parts of natural science. See Chomsky
(1980) for explicit discussion of the broader construal of 'phys-
ics' .
I. The claim here is stronger than the claim that existing divisions
are vulnerable to socio-historical factors (i.e., the positive the-
sis). Here there is no mention of such factors, but rather, the
cla~ is that we are free to shift boundaries in science as we will
(i.e., there are no principles for constraining such shifts.)
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as a result. 84
We have two replies to thisa first, a look at the example cited re-
veals that the attempts at reduction were quite strenuous. 8S The deci-
sion to shift the boundaries so as to include EM theory within basic
physics was not whimsical or arbitrary, but rather the outcome of nu-
merous efforts and considerable methodological debate. The claim that
this shift is indicative of the arbitrary revisability of the bounda-
ries within science is pretty much of an overstatement: a patently ar-
bitrary shift, which this is not, would be needed to make the intended
case. An adequate understanding of the methodolJgical situation
raised by the kind of conflict that the EM case exemplifies would be
valuable. To mY,knowledgl noone has worked this out in very much de-
tail to gain such understanding; and, in its absence, it is difficult
to understand the appeal of the Chomskian interpretation. 11 We do not
Ie. that the example goes very far in showing either that the specific
case of E" theory counts as an arbitrary shift or that the divisions
in science are completely and arbitrarily maleable as Chomsky suggests
(i.e., that there are no viable principles for individuating the
branches of science).
14 Por example, the the.is that there is a physical explanation for
each phenomenon is trivially guaranteed by the ~rbitrariness of the
boundari•• (alsuming that there is an explanatiol; at all).
I' For. general overview of the varioue attempts, see ;lhittaker
(1951) chapters 8 and 9.
II s•• below, Chapter 5, for discussion of such methodological situ-
ation••
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Second, we urge the distinction employed above between the concept
of physics and specific physical theories that fall under that con-
cept. The opponent of (Pl) must, in effect, be denying the existence
of such a distinction, since once it is made it is possible to see how
physics could be an evolving science while the concept of the physical
remains fixed and useful in drawing ~rincipled boundaries between
branches of science and in constraining the development of physical
theories. Presumably, if such a distinction can be made out and the
concept of physics delineated, then we would see why the EM case is
not an instance of arbitrary revision of the boundaries of science,
but rather, an instance of revison of physical theory.
It might be objected here that the Chomskian objection does not,
lose its force with the introduction of this distinction since, if
physical theory is completely maleable and subject to any change, then
a revison of that theory to incorporate any other theory could occur;
hence, the principled boundaries bet~een branches would be meaningless
and the physicalist theses would still lack content. But, as we ob-
served above, the EM cnse is not a clear instance of arbitrary revi-
sion of physical theory (as opposed to a revision that corrects a
false version of physical theory); and second, the conditions of that
revision of th~ory are not completely understood in terms of what fac-
tors were operative in and relevant to the decision. Hence, no demon-
Itration of the general arbitrariness of revison of physical theory
hal been given. Our con~ention is that, in the presence of a clear
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conception of the nature of physics, the boundaries between sciences
will be clear and revisions of "physical" theory will be constrained
in significant ways. As a result, the content of physicalist theses
will be guaranteed and a clearer conception of the empirical content
of the theses will be attained. Thus, we conclude that the Chomskian
appeal to the EM case is quite inconclusive and does not motivate be-
lief in the non-existence of any principles for distinguishing physics
from other branches of science; rather, it begs that question.
The strategic situation is currently this: in our development of
the bases we appealed to the distinction between the concept of phys-
ics and physical theories; such a distinction allows that physics is
an evolving branph of knowledge without denying that physics is dis-
tinct from other branches of science in a principled way. And, our
above characterization of physics is a specific case of the more gen-
eral appeal to principles for individuating branches of science which
would underwrite (P1). Given such a principle for identifying phys-
ics, the evolution of physics can be viewed neither as arbitrary from
the point of view of the physicalist program nor as simply ensuring
the truth of physicalism in a trivial way_ Our burden is to produce
and defend such principles; our opponent's burden is to produce argu-
ments either to the effect that no such principles are possible (i.e.,
the negative thesis) or, at least, to the effect that all specific
proposed principles are defective in some way (e.g. by being question
begging). If our opponent succeeds, then (Pl) is defeated and no
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principled identification of the physical bases exists; hence, the
theses are vacuous or trivial. If we succeed, then (PI) is vindicated,
principled identification of the physical bases is possible and thus
the theses will have significant content. So far, we have concluded
that the Chomskian appeal to the EM case does not substantiate the op-
ponent's claim that no such principles are possible.
A second argument for the negative thesis runs as follows: any at-
tempt to formulate a principle for identifying physics (or, the physi-
cQl) is defective because it inevitably contains a term (e.g_, 'mat-
ter', 'inorganic') which raises exactly the same problems that the
principle is supposed to solve with regard to the term 'physical';
hence, any such~rinciple is question-begging and of no value. This
objection clearly locates the burden of the physicalist: to develop a
non-Question-begging characterization of physics. Our strategy for
carrying this burden will be to look at some principles (including the
one employed above) to assess their chances of surviving the current
objection and of eventually being developed into an acceptable form
for distinguishing branches of science. The only way we can see of de-
fending against the negative thesis and any argument designed to sup-
port it is to actually develop a viable principle; this, in our view,
ia • key task in the ongoing development of the physicalist program
within Icience. In allowing this much, we have conceded nothing to the
position of the opponent. who have typically begged all the questions.
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On the basis of our discussion so far, we conclude that the fea-
tures that any adequate principle for distinguishing branches of sci-
ence must have area (i) it divides up science in physicalistically
relevant ways, (ii) it constrains the growth of science in principled
ways, (iii) it leads to non-trivial physicalist theses, (iv) it does
not have any question-begging terms, and (v) it has reasonable pros·
peets for being developed. There are, at least, three kinds of prin-
ciple that we shall consider: ontological, explanatory and determina-
tionist. That is, science may be seen as dividing into separate parts
on the basis of (i) differences and relations between the subject mat-
ters of different branches, (ii) differences and r~lations between ex-
planations offered in the different branches, and (iii) semantical re-
,
lations holding between theories in the different branches.
Among the ontological principles, the following three hold out
promises first, Oppenheim and Putnam'7 suggested in their landmark pa-
per a hierarchy of individuals based upon mereological relations which
rigidly demarcated the subject matters of the various branches of sci-
enee. The idea was that each branch contains individuals which were
"parts" out of which the individuals at the next higher level were
composed; no individual, on this view, is a member of some domain if
it contains as parts individuals that are members of the same or a
"higher" domain. Putnam and Oppenheim took this picture to be a re-
flection of the "Democritean Tendency" in science; and, clearly on
., See Oppenheim and Putnam (1958).
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this view, physics occupies a special place relative to all other sci-
eneel: viz., it contains in its domain individuals that do not have
parts drawn from any other domain but that are parts of the individu-
a1. in all other domains. Despite the various criticisms that this
view has been subject to," it is an instance of a principle that
could have succeeded (i.e., although its prospects are in fact quite
poor, it does not have any principled defects such that it is a vacu·
ou. principle or such that it must fail). Our purpose in this section
will not be to develop specific proposals as much as it will be to es-
tablish that there are principles that could serve the required pur-
pose and that there are some principles with a future. The proposal
just considered is an instance of the first but not the second motive.
A related principle has been suggested by Boyd and Shoemaker" with
regard to attributesl roughly, the view is that attributes are to be
individuated in terms of their causal powers and that the physical at-
tributes are the ones out of whose causal powers all other attributes
are realized. As an approach to the individuation of attributes, this
view fails. However, if the notion of a causal power can be made pre-
cise, and if the composition of causal powers can be developed, then
the principle may have lome promise as I principle for ordering the
attributes which comprise the subject matters of the various branches
.1 s•• Clusey (1977) for discussion of the flaws with this proposal
and for an alternative development of the core ideal.
It S•• Boyd (unpublished) and Shoemaker (1979).
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of science.
With regard to both of the principles just mentioned, it might be
objected that the notions of "part" and "causal power" are open-ended
in a trivializing way: that is, it will always be possible to include
within the "physical parts" or the "physical causal powers" an indi-
vidual or power which does not comfortably fit into any existing
framework; there is nothing in either of the principles to prevent ad
hoc modification of the physical basis. This is the claim that we pre-
viously defended against by claiming that this "problem" is nothing
peculiar to the iS8ues at hand, but is rather an instance of the gen-
eral problem of how to distinguish ad ~ changes of a theory from
more le9it~ate phanges. We will assume that, if this is the only
problem that a propoled principle faces, there is nothing defective
about the principle itself, since the problem is a quite general one.
What the critic must show is that there is some special way in which
fo~ulations of physicalist principles for demarcating branches of
Icience are question-begging; this is what we claim he cannot do in
the general cas•• "
.1 As we Ih~ll lee below, there is • general problem that does appear
to be in.u~ountable but which il not that ad hoc modification of
the b•••• i. po••ible; rather, it i. that wIthrn-the parameters of
allowable revisions, intuitively non-physical entities may be in-
cluded in the physical b•••••
• , S•• Fodor (1975).
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A third principle that has been proposed by Fodor' 1 is the view
that branches of science can be individuated in terms of the degree of
generality of their subject matter. This view locates physics as the
most general branch of science and other branches as less inclusive,
all natural phenomena fall within the domain of physics, while the do~
mains of all other special sciences coustitute a proper subset of the
domain of physics. Unfortunately, such a principle is unsatisfying for
two reasons, first, even if it is correct, it does not identify physi-
calistically relevant features of the domains of different branches
(e.g_, features of the phenomena or features of the patterns of expla-
nation beyond generality). And second, it is not sufficient for iden-
tifying physics uniquely as the basic science: if it is just generali-
I
ty that is at issue then it is not obvious that psychology is not
completely general in science in addition to physics. 92 Our view is
that by appeal to the details of the subject matter and patterns of
explanation'S in distinguishing branches of science, a more detailed
understanding of the basis of the 'generality of physics' will be
gained, and, .s a consequence, physics will be clearly distinguished
from plychology in the structure of science. Further, the physicalis-
tic relevance of the divisions will be clearly exhibited. We do not
view Fodor's sU9gestion wrong so much as not as useful in the develop-
ment of the physicalist program as more detailed alternatives.
,. Se. Goodman (1979) for this suggestion.
,. 'erhapl construed in te~. of the questions asked and the con-
Itraint. placed upon answers to those questions.
- 164 •
The final ontological principle we shall consider suggests that the
sciences are to be individuated in terms of some measure of the degree
of abstractness of the phenomena studied; although Chomsky sometimes
talks in these te~s, it is not clear how the idea is to be developed.
One construal might be in terms of abstractness relative to the ~­
cal basis, a construal that would comport well with the physicalist
program. The burden of such a view is to make clear what determines
degree. of abstractness. The possibility discussed earlier (i.e.,
levels of complexity of individuals or attributes) could serve such a
purpose; but, perhaps, a general notion of "realization" of one attri-
bute by another could better serve to characterize the dimension of
abstractness without being committed to exactly one way in which at-
tribute. are realized (e.g., part-whole composition or the composition
of causal powers). On such a view, the domain of physics would provide
• general ba.i. for the realization of all other attributes studied in
Icience; other branches ~i9ht also be ordered in terms of the realiza-
tion of the attributes studied at successively "higher" levels (e.g.,
psychology might be considered more abstract than the neurosciences on
luch groundl).'4
14 It should become increasingly clear as we proceed that there may be
considerable distance between the actual divisions in science and
an idealized let of divisions rigorously baled upon some clearly
articulated principle; to the extent that thel'e is such distance,
the discu••ion here and the physicalist program generally should be
con.trued no~atiY.ly (relative to • commitment to the basic moti-
vat!onl of the physicalist program). Our point earlier concerning
the pOlitive th.lis wa. that there is considerable "descriptive"
accuracy in certain propoled pr1ncipl.. for individuating the lei-
eftc•• , d••pit. the laCK of independence from socio·historical fac-
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To summarize; one plan for individuating the branches of science is
in terms of their subject matters (either the individuals or the at-
tributes studied). There are no obvious grounds for ruling out this
enterprise as defective in some principled way; it is not even implau-
sible that, as science evolves, it wi.ll resolve itself into branches
that do differ in terms of their subject matters in some principled
way (e.g., generality, abstractness, degree of complexity). That this
is possible is sufficient to undercut the skeptics negative claim (no
such principle is possible). Whether science actually resolves itself
in some such way is open to further research and is an integral part
of the physicalist program. That such a resolution is subject to arbi-
trary, physicalist whim seems implausible as long as science is con-
, .ducted in a way that proh1bits ad hoc modification of its structure.
A second class of principles for individuating branches of science
concerns explanation; as we saw above, physica12 was an attempt along
these lines which we rejected. Alternatively, it has been suggested,
especially in the classical reduction literature,'S that physics was
to be distinguished from other branches of science because it was com-
tori. We think this is especially true of the principle just dis-
cussed. an idealized ordering of branches of science based upon the
degree. of abstractness of the attributes studied is clearly, but
~perf.ctly, approximated in existing divisions in science. Such an
ordering serves well the purpose of developing the physicalist b4S~
•• and th•••• ; and, we shall propose below (Chapter 4) that such an
ordering be refined •• the program of physicalism is worked out in
lei.nee.
,. Se. ,.i91 (1963), Hempel (194~), Nagel (1961), and Carnap (1969).
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pletely general vis! vis explanation (i.e., physical explanation
subsumed all explanation.) As we have seen," this vision was premised
upon a defective notion of what explanation is and, th~refore, is not
acceptable al it was fo~ulated. Quine and Davidson," apparently hav-
1ng an equally unacceptable view of what explanation is, have suggest-
ed that physics is completely general vis ! vis explanation in the
sense that physical explanation is the only real explanation there is&
all other apparent forms of explan~tion are developed as placeholders
in the areas of our ignorance of what is "really" going on or they are
developed for purely heuriBtic reasons. The idea is that they will
all be eventually replaced in our ultimate physical theory."
Despite the d~ficiencies of these appro~ches, it is still plausible
that branches of science might be individuated in terms of the pat-
terns or kinds of explanation offered; what is required is a good
theory of explanation. The so-called "q\.&estion approach" to explana-
tion offers a potentially profitable yet not fully explored avenue of
" See Chapter 2.
" See Quine (unpublished) and Davidson (1970).
,t Again, we do not find this approach acceptable because of its inad-
equate a.sumptionl about the nature of explanation. Very roughly,
our di.ati.faction with this approach il based upon the following.
(i) it •••ume. that derivation ia sufficient for explanation and
offer no under8tandin; of how explanation works, (ii) it involves
poorly defined or non-existent conceptions of how to individuate
kinds of explanation, and (iii) this view, being eliminative, ap-
parently propo~•• to discard perfectly good patterns of explana-
tion,
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research. i ' With such a theory in hand, physics and other branches
might then be distinguished in terms of the questions ask~d and the
constraints put on answers to those questions. The state of develop·
ment of this approach is quite immature, out there are no known rea-
sons to believe that it is defective in the ways that the D-N model of
explanation 1s and it is worthy of serious attention. Despite the
promisory note here, the idea that no such principle is possible is
clearly premature, if not quite mistaken.
The principle that we suggested above for identifying physics is an
instance of a combination of the various ontological principles and
the question approach to explanation; thus, it is an attempt to dis-
tinquish physics from the rest of science in terms of both itw subject,
matter and its patterns of explanation. As noted, there is no r~ason
to view this principle as involving any question-begging vocabulary or
as not having prospects for future development and use. It is, thus, a
potentially sound and plausible principle for individuating physics
from other branches of science; and, it suggests a general strategy
for identifying all branches (i.e., in terms of both ontology and ex-
planation). Our view is that the strong claim of the skeptic ap~,ars
to be false, despite the fact th~t our principle is under-developed.
" See Bromberger (1966).
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We note, finally, that Quine and Hellman and Thompson have proposed
versions of a determination principle as the distinguishing mark of
physics I viz, it is the job of physics to identify the minimum cata-
logue of states such that nothing happens in nature without some
change in those states. lOO Although we have considerable sympathy for
this view, it does not appear that it, like the principle of the gen-
erality of physics, can serve adequately for uniquely distinguishing
physics from other branches of science (e.g., psychology), since there
is no guarantee that other branches might not fit this characteriza-
tion while not counting as physics. lOl Although such a principle is a
necessary component of any full characterization of the role of phys-
ics in science, it does not appear to be sufficient: it leaves out the
ontological and explanatory primacy of physics which are its distin-
guishing marks.
It might be objected that the claim that ontology and explanation
are sufficient for individuating physics and other branches is also
subject to the same problem of not being sufficient. What rules out a
phenomenalist ontological basis or a phenomenalist explanatory basis?
lao This formulation is Quine's as expressed in Quine (1978). See also
Hellman and Thompson (1975) for discussion of an alternative for-
mulation.
101 See Goodman (1979) for concise statement of the objection here. In
ahort, the principle above might be equally well satisfied by a
mentalistic basis where the underlying cla~ ib that every differ-
ence we find in nature depends upon differences in our conceptual-
ization of nature. We shall not, in the current project, explore
how serious such • proposal is and whether it is truly a competi-
tor to the physicalist principle proposed by Quine.
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We defer discussion of this question until we consider the third pre-
supposition of the theses. We note, however, that it is not our view
that phenomenalist programs concerned with ontological or explanatory
reductions are impossibl~ or of no conceivable value; what determines
the "direction of reduction" will ultimately depend upon one's inter-
ests and other co~mitments. On the other hand, we do not hold that
physicalist and phenomenalist programs in science serve the same goals
or express the same metaphysical views I these differences should be
manifested in the principles employed in dividing up science within
the framework of a given program. It is not clear that the ontological
and explanatory goals served by the two programs could be the same.
Thus, the objection that there is no principle that is adequate for
distinguishing pnysics from psychology is not clearly correct. if the
ontological and epistemic differences between the two kinds of program
are expressed by a principle of division, it should suffice to isolate
the basic science from all others. What we have been arguing is that
the principles of generality of subject matter and of determination
are not detailed enough to accomplish this end.
This completes our brief discussion of the candidate principles for
discerning the boundaries bet~een physics and the other branches of
leienee, the view we have taken is that, although physics is an evolv-
ing branch of knowledge, it is not a branch with arbitrary boundaries.
The development of an explicit formulation of principles which demar-
cate the boundaries between branches of science '~S an ongoing enter-
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prise within science and philosophy; and, there are no currently known
reasons for believing that such principles won't be developed or that
science won't resolve itself into a set of branches which conform to
epistemically and metaphysically relevant principles. To this point,
we conclude that neither the positive thesis nor the negative thesis
is sufficient to underwrito a rejection of (PI); thus, the physicalist
need not feel threatened by the contention that there are no physical-
istically relevant principled divisions in science.
What we have argued so far is that there are no good reasons to
doubt that the ontology and theories of science could be (and probably
are to some extent) partitioned and ordered by principles which dis-
tinguish more and less ontologically and epistemically basic parts.
I
Thus, there is no reason to doubt that sense can be made of a most ba-
sic .science which can play the role required by the physicalist pro-
gram. Further, we have contended that what gets in~luded within the
basic science is not a simple matter of arbitrary revision of bounda-
rieal to make it into the basis for either ontology, ideology or doc-
trine, something must be compatible wi~h the (yet to be fully devel-
oped) principles that order the different parts of science and which
distinguish physics from the rest. This we have contended is not a
limpl. matter of terminology or of convention or of heuristic conven-
i.nee, but rather, it is a matter of theory construction on a par with
all other theory construction in science.
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However, an alternative reading of Chomsky's discussion of these
matters cited above suggests a difficulty with (Pl) that our response
to the positive and negative theses is not effective against. The dif-
ficulty may be formulated IS follows:
The sense in which our conception of the physical is evolv-
ing is based upon the idea that, at higher levels of organi-
zation and complexity, new phenomena and principles concern-
ing them "emerge"; and, if the antecedent physical
principles concerned with less complex phenomena prove not
to be sufficient for accounting for the emergent phenomena,
then, in order to preserve the basicness of physics such
phenomena and principles must be conceived of as physical.
But, if this happens, although the revision need not be seen
as arbitrary or a matter of terminology or convention, it
leaves open the possibility that phenomena and principles
originally conceived of as "mental" (i.e., paradigmatically
non-physical phenomena and principles) must be reconceived
as part of the physical bases. This, by all accounts, under-
mines a central motivation of the physicalist program.
Thus, according'to this objection, even if it is allow~d that revi-
si~ns of the basic science are not arbitrary, it is not ruled out that
non-arbitrary revisions of the basis might lead to inclusion of obvi-
ously mental phenomena and principles, thus defeating a central onto-
logical motivation of the program.
This objection is a serious one to which the physicalist program,
.s W~ have conceived of it so far, is vulnerable. We shall defer fur-
tber discussion until we have completed our presentation of the entire
physicalist doctrine. In Chapter 5, we shall consid~r ~v~~ible avenues
of reply that have promise for saving the program from the kind of
le1f destruction envisioned by the Chomskian objection.
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3.3 PRESUPPOSITION 2
We turn now to a discussion of the second presupposi~ion: i.e.,
that there are determinate bases to be developed. By 'determinate' we
mean that there i. a fact of the matter regardin~ each thing as to
whether or not it is included in the
physi:al bases. So, (P2) means that for each of the three bases that
were developed, there is a fact of the matter for each thing as to
whether or not it is included in that basis (i.e., ontology, ideology,
or doctrine).
(P2) is a presupposition because the bases must be determinate if
the theses of physicalism are to have content; that is, if there is no
fact of the matter as to whether or not objects are included in the
bases then there is no fact of the matter as to what the theses are
expressing and there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not
they are true or false. At this point, we are assuming that we have a
general characterization of what physics is without a specific version
of physical theory yet in hand; this strategic move allowed us above
to avoid the objection that physicalist theses were significant but
obviously fal••• lla The issue now iSI given a characterization of what
physics iI, is there reason to believe that determinate bases for on-
tology, ideology and doctrine are possible? If not, then the signifi~
cane. of the thesea i. seriously challenged (i.e., the theses appear
"a A.luming the in.d~qu.cy of current physics.
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to lack determinate content and truth value).
So, given a characterization of physics which puts principled lim-
its on how physics might evolve, 103 we must now explore the prospects
for finding determinate bases within these constraints. First, it is
a general problem we face to establish the determinateness of the bas-
es without sacrificing the plausibility of the theses (i.e., spare
them from the objection that they are significant but obviously
false); we can make no rash moves in attempting to defend (P2). Sec-
ond. we shall see that there exist a number of objections that must be
contended with,
1. That the existence of possible worlds other than our own, each
with • radically different physics from the physics of the ac-
,
tual world, creates insu~ountable problems for the isolation
of the "physical" bases.
2. That given our general characterization of physics there is no
guarantee of a unique physical theory that satisfies it.
3. That given a fomulation of a physical theory there is no deter-
minate and unique identification of the empirical (as opposed
to the purely formal or heuristic) vocabulary of the language
it il formulated in.
loa Such. characterization stems the initial tide of objections that
phYlicllilm ia insignificant because the boundaries of physics are
completely mal,able,
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4. That given a formulation of a physical theory and a specifica-
tion of the empirical vocabulary of the language of physics,
there is no unique or determinate ohtology that satisfies the
theory.
5. That certain fo~s of physical theory (e.g., quantum mechanics)
undermine the claim of determinateness of the bases.
In what follows we shall survey these objections to see if (P2) can be
saved.
Assuming our characterization of what physics is, it might be ob-
jected to (P2) that physica in our world could be radically different
from the "physics" in some other possible world; hence, to develop the
physical bases in terms of our physics is either to be guilty of arbi-,
trary parochialism or to have failed to have given an adequate account
of the physical bases. The issue raised here is whether or not to in-
elude in the bases the attributes, individuals, terms, etc adverted to
or eruployed in the other possible physics. The defender of (P2) can
respond adequately to this line of objection by claiming that physi-
calism ii, to some extent, a doctrine that gets developed in a paro-
chial manner: it is concerned with one world at a time (in the present
caae, our own). As a general doctrine, physicalism might claim that,
!~ each world, the metaphysics and scientific knowledge in that world
are structured according to the physicalist theses; but, what counts
a. physics in the different worlds might vary. In short, we can take
phflicalilm .s a view about the structure of ontology and knowledge
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without saying what the entities, terms, etc in the bases are. Rela-
tive to a given physics (in this world or some other), the development
of the content of the bases takes place, no matter that there are oth-
er possible physics. We have paused over this objection because, al-
though it is innocuous, it is similar to more serious objections to
follow. 104
The second objection to (P2) is based upon the idea that there may
be more than one actual physics l05 that satisfies the characterization
of what physics is and which meets all empirical and methodological
tests. 10I There are two possibilities to consider he~el first, al-
though there are different fo~ulations of physical tneory, they are
formulations of the same theory (i.e., there is only one physics, but,
1.4 The modalities here are important to keep track of. In talking
about other worlds we should distinguish them from possible but
not actual stutes of our world which are sometimes represented in
a possible worlds semantics. Physicalism is quite concerned with
possible states of nature; hence, the bases developed in a given
world should include all the possible states of that world. This
is not the same as requiring that all possib.ie "physical" states
of all possible worlds be included ~n the bases. The point here is
that, unlike Quine and his followers, we see nothing wrong with
talk about possible states of this world (states that might never
in fact be actual); and, this talk must be distinguished from talk
about other possible worlds, which may be quite correctly objected
to. If it ii, then much of the confusion just mentioned would be
eliminated as well as would the objection based upon "tl1e physics"
of other possible worlds. On the other h~nd, if talk of possible
worlds other than our own is acceptable, then, probably, a model
theoretic representation of all possible worlds and of all the
possible states of each such world could succeed in making all the
requilite distinctions via a judicious use of an accessibility re-
lation in the model structure. In this case, the reply in the text
to the objection based upon multiple possible worlds should suf-
fic. and the situation should be clearly representable in the
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there are alternative fo~ulations of it). Second, the different
fo~ulations are really formulations of different theories that are
empirically equivalent; within this second possibility, there are two
further possibilities: either the two theories are compatible with
each other or they are not.
If the situation is one in which there are two formulations of one
theory, then there is no problem with relativising one's development
of physicalist bases and theses to a given formulation I there may be
different characterizations of the bases, but the differences will
only be notational (i.e., there will be one set of bases described in
different notations). The point for our purposes is that "merely" no-
tational differences do not make any difference to the physicalist,
program. There is no way to undermine (P2) in this case since the ex-
istence of alternative characterizations of the b~ses does not under-
mine the dete~inateness of the bases char&~Lerized. If alleged nota-
tional diffe~ences did make a significant difference to the program,
that would be grounds for believing that the differences were not just
structure.
1" I.e., physics of the actual world.
'I' An alternative framing of this objection is given in Putnam
(1979). There he considers the existence of "non-equivalent re-
ductions of physics to itself" (e.g., particle and field formula-
tions). His us. of the te~ 'reduction' obscures whether he is
concerned with formulations of physical theory, with the ontology
of physical theory or both; thus, it is not entirely clear whether
hi. objection is • version of the one we are currently considering
or the fourth one. In any event, he is concerned with non-unique-
ne•• of either physical theory or physical ontology.
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notational. For example, since notational differences appear to con-
stitute a difference in ideology, the basis for ideology appears to be
affected directly. However, if such apparent ideological differences
do not have any ontoloqical or epistemological consequences,10? then
the notational differences plausibly do not count as significant ideo-
logical differences. 10.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the case is not one of alternative
formulations of the same theory, but one of formulations of alterna-
tive theories; and suppose that the two theories are empirically
equivalent (i.e., compatible with all possible evidence and methodolo-
qical considerations). That is, we have formulations of two theories,
each of which s.tisfies the general characterization of what physics,
is and which are such that there are no evidential or methodological
grounds for choosing between them, does this present a serious chal-
lenge to (P2)?119 The idea behind an objection to (P2) based upon this
117 For example, the same attributes are expressed by different terms
and 'he same explanations can be formulated in different terms.
1 •• The issues here are more complex than we have space to explore:
when a cal. of theoretical equivalence of the type described holds
is not clearly defined or easy to establish. We are content to
relativize a development of physicalism to any member of a class
of formulations of the same theory, since, by assumption, the dif-
ferences between members of such a class are merely notational and
not of any metaphysical or epistemic importance. See Quine
(197Sb), Glymour(1971), and Horwich (1982) for discussions of the-
oretical equivalence.
'0' The situation described here il one which Quine (in Quine (1975»
••ems to have doubts about, 81 we understand him, he hypothesizes
that any luch situation il an instance of the first else consid~
.red (i.e., notational variants). If Quine is right, that does not
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possibility miqht rltn as follows: even though we ha'/e g.iven & princi-
pled characterization of what physics is, we have pinned down neither
• unique physical theory nor the physical bases, and, since there are
no considerations that could, the bases are indeterminate. IIO
The two possibilities that such a case can exhibit are (i) the two
theories are logically compatible and (ii) the two theories are l.ogic"
ally incompatible. In either case, the argument to th. denial of (P2)
is a non-sequitur; the fact that a characterization of physics does
not uniquely determine a physical theory with which to develop the
bases does not entail that there are no determinate bases in terms of
which the theses can be formulated. Our explanation of this varies
slightly in the two cases, and we shall consider them separately.,
If the two theories are compatible, then we might view them as two
differe.;,t ways of "cutting up the pie" I each of which counting as an
empirically correct physics; and we can take them both as tru~- If
this il possible, then as physicalists, we would require that ~ach
physics provides grounds for developing physical bases and physicalist
daMage the physicalist pOlition if our response to the first case
stands. We shall take no stand on the correctness of Quine's
clatm, but will consider a possible line of reply for the physi-
calilt if Quine il wrong.
111 To buttress the argument, it might be cla~hed that if there are
two such theories then tl,ere are indefinitely many. We shall not
conlider this in our discussion below. The notion of theoretical
equivalence is Itill badly in need of further development; as a
r••ult, the individuation of theories, qiven a class of theory
fo~ulationl, i. an unclear business.
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theses. Thus, we would have two true but very different physical
theories, each of which provides the bases for a physicalist picture
of nature and scientific knowledge; we would have as a result two dif-
ferent "total theories of nature"111 each based upon one of the alter-
native physics here hypothesized and each structured by physicalist
theses. In this case, there is no raason to believe that (P2) is
threatened, since relative to a given physics, pending the outcome of
other objections to be considered shortly, the bases will be unique
and determinate.
Wh.~ if the theories are logically incompatible?112 Either there is
• fact of the matter as to which (if either) is true or there is not.
If there is, then, even if it is forever beyond our ken to tell which,,
there will be no problem with determinateness of the physicalist bases
(pending the outcome of other objections) since, relative to whichever
is the true on~, the bases will be unique and determinate. 113 What if
there i8 no fact of the matter as to which is the true physics?
III Smart (1978) sU9gests that this is not true; his thought is that
much of the IIhigher level" theory in science might be invariant
relative to different formulations of fundamental physics. How-
ever, even if Smart is right, our claim is not aff~cted as long as
rela,!ve to each true formulation of basic physics physicalist
the••s are satisfied.
112 This is the case that Quine has his doubts about.
'13 Putnem ha. argued vigorously in recent years a9ainst such a form
of U"etaphysical realism". We are sympatbetic to Putnam's position
although, here, we take no stand on it, we are considering the
eonlequlnc.s of ••Iuming that certain possibilities obtaj.n rather
than whether or not they do or do not obtain.
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First, pending the outcome of othe~ objections and relative to one or
the other of the two theories, the physicalist bases will be unique
and dete~inate. Second, in this case, the indeterminateness of the
bases apparently depends on the question of whether it is possible to
have alternative theories which (i) both count as physics, (ii) are
empirically and m~thodological1y correct relative to all poasible evi-
dence and all considerations bearing on tru~h (or, rational accep-
tance), (iii) are logically incompatible and (iv) ar~ such that there
is no fact of the matter as to wt,ich is true. If such a situation is
possible, alt&ough it appears that we have a case of indeterminateness
of physical theory, it is not clear that the physicalist need feel
threatened.
Our reply is that, in such a situation, we can develop our total
theory of nature and our physicalism on the basis of one or the other
but not both of these theories. such a choice may be one of th6
points within the development of science at which a (real) convention-
al choice is called for. The issues raised by this pOftsibility con-
cerning realism, conventionalism and truth are significant; but, it is
not cle&r that any of this poses any difficulty for (P2) or physical-
ilm generallyl physica~.i8m is a doctrine about matters "internal" to
scientific knowledge and its ontology. The issues raised here, though
important, fall outside of the structure of science. Within the indi-
cated conventional choice, the physicalist bases are to b~ dev, ,~ped
and the the.es are to apply, whether it il a real choice and how we g~
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about mak 19 it, if it is, are antecedent to the development of a s~i-
ence structu~ed by physicalist principles. The problem posed by the
alleged possibility is one w~ich exists in science whether we are
physicalists or not; onc~ it is resolved by conventional choice, the
physicalist program proceeds without difficulty. It is essential to
our view of the physicalist program that it no~ be maintained that all
questions of determination be resolved by appeal to a physical basis.
Physicalism is, rather, to be construed as a doctrin~ concerning cer-
tain (but not all) features of the structure of scientific knowledge
and concernih9 the structute of the natural order that science is
about. The de\1elopment of such structures falls "within" a number of
choices that must be made on non-physica~ist grounds. 114
~o summarize to this point: the first class of objections against
(P2) (i.e., those objections premised on the possibility of alterna-
tive formulations of ~hysics given a general characterization of what
physics is) do not seriously threaten (P2)i in each ~ase, we saw that
it wei ~ossible to relativize the development of phisicalism to a giv-
en f,trmulation, although there were differ~~t interpretations of what
1t4 The reader is reminded that the motivations of the physi~,list
proqram as we conceive of it arge1r concern the gains tlla~ would
result from achieving a body of kn~'~ledge structured in a certain
way_ And, altnough pursuit of the program requires l""at the theses
playa normative role in the development of sci~nce (roughly, they
quide scientific pr~aress toward the development of ~nowledge with
• ~hysic.list structur~), it is I substantial error to view phy~i­
ca111t doctrine as t~.e key to resolving all philosophical and
methodological questions, this places I demand on the doctrine
that neither it, nor any other, can bear.
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was going on in the various cases considered. We now turn to a second
class of objections each member of which assumes that (i) there is a
general characterization of what physics is and (ii) there is a given
formulation of physics that will be us~d for the development of the
physical bases: these objections are to the effect that, even given a
single formulation of physical theory, there are sources of indetermi-
nateness that undermine (P2).
The first such objection is that, given a theory formulation, there
is no determinate way of sorting the terms in the language of the
theory into those which have referential import and those which do
not. The idea is that theory formulations embody mathematical or other
apparatus which ~erve functions in the theory other than that of de-
noting objects, classes or attributes. For example, the theory may
contain machinery whose job it is to facilitate deductions of one kind
or ~nother; or, the mathematics that are employed in the theory may
bring with it trappingG that are not relevant to the subject matter of
the theory (e.g., solutions to equations th~t can have n~ physical in-
terpr6tation). These claims by themselves are not sufficient for un-
de~ining (P2), however; the objector must cla1m in addition that it
ia not in general possible to sort out the two classes of terms. A
full discussion of the issues raised here is beyond the scope of the
current project; hence, we shall pause briefly over two points before
moving on.
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First, one way of reading this issue is as an instance of one
source of referential indeterminacy that Quine has argued for: i.e.,
indeterminacy of reference resulting from the indeterminacy of what
the referential apparatus of a language is. Whatever apparatus is
identified is relative to a manual of translation of which there are
many that are equally acceptable. We do not propose to talk now about
the indeterminacy theses. liS Our strategy, in the current context, is
to "acquiesce" in the semantics of the mathematical language adopted
to the extent that the terms are identified; and then, the problem is
one of finding physical interpretations for those terms (or, for as
many of those which have such interpretations). That there are many
ways of parsing a language, if true, is (as in the last class of ob-
jections) not anything which the physicalist need claim is resolved on
physicalist grounds; the isolation of the bases and the development of
the program in science only presupposes some resolution or other. llS
Second, the above mentioned strategy points to the fact that it is
a part of the physicalist program to use whatever m~ans are possible
for sorting terms of a formulation into those with empirical import
and those without: this is a major component of the theoretical and
111 See Chapter s.
III As we shall see below, our strategy here of sorting out the sourc·
el of inaeterminacy, which are "prior" to the formulation of the
doctrine of physicalism and which are not resolvable on physical-
ist grounds, does not mean that there are no significant determi-
nation cla~1 that the physicalist can make, there are several
claims of determination relative to physicalist bases, once they
are identified, that are important in science.
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experimental enterprise in physics. It is an activity internal to the
conduct of science to determine which elements of the theoretical vo-
cabulary have empirical import and which ones do not; the possibility
that there are always alternative ways of construing the referential
aspects of a language and no fact of the matter concerning which is
correct is, first, an undemonstrated claim and second, even if true,
not a serious threat to the physicalist progl'am. If there are alterna-
tives, then choices must be made; and, it is relative to those choices
that the physicalist bases and theses are to be developed. At worst,
therefore, we are now in a position of not hauing identified which of
many possible construals of the physicalist ideology will play a role
in the actual development of the bases: more work is called for.
The next objection to (P2) runs as follows: assuming that we have a
formulation of physical theory and that we have identified the terms
of the theory with referential import (i.e., terms that pick out indi-
viduals, classes or attributes), there is no fact of the matter re-
garding what it is that they pick out; hence, even if we can make a
case for the determinateness of the bases for ideology ann doctrine,
the b••is for ontology is not determinate. Again, the issues here
l.ad UI far afield; and, it would be inappropriate to r6vi~w now the
v.~iou. discus.ionl that bear on this argument. Hence, we shall limit
ours.lves to a fe~ comments which suggest a way of reducing its
force,SI?
117 S•• Putnam ~1979), Quine (1975a), Field (1974), Hellman (1978)
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Our view will b,' familiar: for the physicalist program in science
it is okay to relalivize a formulation of physicalism to some selec-
tion of an interpretation of the langudge of our physical theory. Rel-
ative to that selection the bases will be determinate: a determinate-
ness by fiat! From "within" the physicalist program and science
conducted relative to that selection, there is no problem of determi-
nateness even if there are deeper issues about how our science u:eally
attaches to the world", if it does so at all. Within science, we will
be able to tell a good story about reference to and knowledge of na-
ture, despite the gloomy possibility raised here that there is no f~ct
of the matter about what we are talking about. This case, like those
considered earlier, is a case in which we have numerous alternatives
and no clear grounds for choosing among them: the suggestion is that
there is an element of relativity that is unavoidable but not destruc-
tive of ttle program. We relativise to some conception of what the ob-
jects of our inquiry are. Of course, if there are ways around the in-
determinacy cited here so much the better.
The idea that there is a point beyond which our choices are not ob-
jectively determined il one which must be taken seriously. From tne
point of view of the current project, it is important to distinguish
two types of such indeterminacy: (i) within the program, indeterminacy
relative to the physical basis which is prohibited by the theses of
the program for claims within Icience and (i1) outside of the program,
and, ••pecially, Goodman (1977, 1978).
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indeterminacy relative to all ration41 considerations which is thus
unavoidable and which must be resolved so that the program (as well as
all other rational pursuit) may get off the ground; it is within the
context of such resolutions that the physicalist program is formulated
and pursued. This claim is only a problem for the monopolistic physi-
calist who wishes all knowledge to be related to and determined by the
physical bases; ours, clearly, is a more modest physicalism concerned
with the structure of knowledge and of reality as conceived from with-
in science. III
One last remark: the issues raised here about (P2) which we have
responded to wit~l a certain amount of relativism and conventionalism
should not be confused with the issues raised by physicalists about,
the indeterminacy of reference. Field an~ Friedman have contended that
there are reasons for believing that Quine's various theses of indet-
erminaeyt't have not been adequately established; similarly, they are
III Goodman's important exercises In alternative ontological specifi-
cations, given a theory and the referential apppratu~ of the lan-
guage in which the theory is formulated, are a r"eminder of the ex-
istence of the issues unJerlying the present discussion; they
signal the diffirulties involved for someone who wishes to isola~e
one interpretation .a "special" above all others. In his recent
reflections upon the significance of the Skolem-Lowenheim theorem,
Putnam hal 4110 challenged the cogency of an intended interpreta-
tion for our theorie. of the "world". In our stratew for meeting
the objection above, we have bank!d on being able to distinguish
the is.ues a. considered from witt•. in a given theory and associated
interpretation and the ilsues a. considered from outside. This
elistinction i. not the lame •• Carn.p'. distinction between inter-
nal and external questions about a theory and ontology, see Crlrnap
(1967b). However, earlier Carn.pian writings distin~ish between
"..et,pllysteal" and "empirical" realism, see Carnap (1967).
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in dispute with Putnam on the same point. What is interesting is that
Putnam and Quine are not clearly in agreement on the moral to be drawn
from the existence of indeterminacy: Quine rejects semantical phenom-
ena as not real while retaining physicalism, Putnam seems to acknowl-
edge the reality of semantical phenomena but rejects physicalism as a
general doctrine. We take all of these issues to be concerned with the
prospects of the physicalist program within science: there the physi-
calist must be assuming that the bases are determinate (to within the
relativity we sugges~) and the issues concern whether or not physical-
ist science can tell a story in which semantical phenomena are "deter-
mined by the physical facts". The objections against (P2) we have been
considering concern an indeterlninateness of the ontology of physics.
,
Since, for the physicalist, the ontology of physics constitutes a ba-
sis (within science) in t~rms of which determinacy and indeterminacy
claims are made, the indeterminateness here is not of the physicalist
variety. Resolution of this indetorminateness is required by the
physicalist doctrine, although there is no reason to require that the
resolution be made on physicalist grounds. As long as it is made some
way or other the physicalist program can proceed. We shall not now
discuss the grounds that may be relevant to making such resolu-
tions. 1ZI
11' I.e., indetenminacy of reference, translation, and mentalistic
plychology. See Field (1975), Friedman (1975) and Chapter 5 below.
III Putnam'. concerns about retrospective reference assignments and
the need for a full theory of h~.n rationality are all in the
context of arguing, not that the physical buses are indeterminate,
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Another objection to (P2) that we shall mention may be quite seri-
OUS; but, we are in no position to assess its merits. Tne argument is,
roughly, that even if we can settle upon a formulation of physics and
an identification of the referential terms and their intended inter-
pretation, there is a source of indeterminacy of ontology and doctrine
which originates from t h , very nature of certain kinds of thecry
(e.g., quantum mechanics). The argument is that th~re is no fact of
the matter about what the physical facts are (or, as some would have
it, any facts) when there is no actual observat~on taking place; and,
even if there is an observation takin~ place, the facts are statisti-
cal factJ. Given this indeterminateness of the physical facts and
truths, what is left of (P2)? Such a line of argument could be quite
,
fatal to the strategy th~.~ we employ in assuming 3n evaluation of
physical terms and sentences at every region of spacetim~. If there is
no fact of the matter concerning the past, present or futur~ (not tfl
mention possible) states of a region of nature unless an ~bservation
is taking place, then there is no fact of the matter about the truth
but that it is utopian to suppose that the physical bases (or
physicalists) are up to the task of determining semantical facts
(within science) as required by thu program. This issuo is one
which concerns the truth of the theses and not their lack of con-
tent because the bases are indeterminate. See Putnam (1975). Sim-
ilarly, Boyd's argument for realism must be viewed as an account
from within science of how we are to account for the success of
Icienee. it presupposes a resolution of any indeterminacy of the
facts science can appeal to in telling the story of its own sue·
cel•• See Boyd (forthcoming). This is surely the resolution that
philosophers concerned with certain deeper philosophical problems
do not ,llum.; but, to make such resolutions is the only way to
proceed with science (physicalist or not).
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value of sentences describing unobserved regions. ~ut, (P2) requires
that there be a fact of the matter for every region regarding its
physical state and regarding whether it satisfies sentences in the
language of physical theory regardless of whether an observation is
taking place at that region. The prob',em is surely doubly serious for
counte.'factual assertions and possible but not actual states of na-
ture. We shall leave it as an open issue wnether or not there is any-
thing in this objection for the physicalist to be worr\~j about.
3.4 PRESUPPOSITION 3
We turn now to (P3), the claim that there is justification for ap-
pealing to a characterization of physi~s in developing the bases for
physicalism. The point of identifying (P3) as a presupposition
is to underscore the fact that our strategy for developing the bases
is a motivated one not subject to serious objection. That is, if (P3)
we:re false, then our det1elopmellt of the bases would not be motivated
from the point of view of developing the physicalist program. The is-
sues here are of, at least, two types: the first concerns the proprie-
ty of appealing to physics in developing the bases for physicalist
theses rather than adopting an alternative strategy (e.g., is there
80methinq wrong with appealiny to physics?, does this approach trivi-
alize the theses or does it commit us to untenable forms of conven-
tionalism or essentialism about the nature of physics?). This kind of
i.sue ~onc.rn. the propriety of the strategy rather than its prospects
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for yielding a successful program; it raises the question of whether
there is something fundamentally wrong with our approach. The second
kind of issue concerns the motivations behind the p~ogram as a whole
(e.g., what's the point of developing a set of theses concerning bases
that have been developed from physics?, why should theses concerning a
set of bases developed from physics be of any interest at all?).
Again, (P3) is not strictly a logical presupposition of the theses;
but, if they are to be contentful and motivated, then our strategy had
better be justifiable in those terms (i.e., it leads to the develop-
ment of bases that are components of contentful and motivated theses).
We shall now explore a number of objections that have been, in effect,
directed against (P3).
I
The first objection to (P3) con~erns the propriety of our strategy:
the cla~ is that appealing to physics in characterizing the bases
trivializes the theses. Earlier, we considered and rejected this
cla~i we add only that if the poin~ of the program is in part to "ac-
cord to physics itl rightful place in science" and the way to do this
il to formulate theses that relate the rest of science to physics and
its ontology, then there was little choice in deciding upon a strat-
egy. The issue of trivialization aris~, in connection with how we
characterized physics; that our charact~rization does not trivialize
the the.es is true because (i) the generality of physics does not
guarantee the ontological theses, (i1) the claun of supervenience was
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not built into our characterization (contra Quine), (iii) theses about
vertical explanation in science do not follow from the characteriza~
tion of physics in terms of physical explanation of all matter, inter-
action and dynamics; and (iv) our characterization of physics isolates
it as a proper part of all natural science, thereby making possible
significant relations between it and other branches of natural science
(i.e., we rejected the identification of physics with all of natural
science).
The second objection runs as follows: the strategy adopted depends
critically upon accepting a definition of what physics is; ~iven this
defin~tion, many of the standard objections to physi~ailsm have been
swept aslde (e.~., objections concerning principled divisions in sci-
ence, scientific growth, indeterminacy of the bases). But, the strat-
egy is defective since it depends upon what is either an arbitrary
conventional stipulation of what physics is or, dlternatively, an es-
sentialist thesis concerning the nature of physics I neither of these
alternatives is acceptable. Without entering into the many issues
railed here, we shall respond to the objection by derying the premise
that our strategy depends upon a conventional or essentialist claim
concerning what physics is; whethe~ or not these positions are really
unacceptable is something we shall bypass. Rather, our view is that
in our strategy we adopted a theory of physics and science as we cur-
rently conceive of them, this theory is subject to revision if good
9rounda are provided for such revision. But, our picture of physics is
• 192 •
not an arbitrary cpnvention nor is it based upon any pernicious form
of essentialism.
We conclude that the first two objections do not pose any serious
threat to (P3); thus, our strategy is neither a trivializing one nor
one which is committed to unacceptable theses about the nature of
physics. Our approach is based upon the idea that physicalism, being a
doctrine that concerns the structure of science, can and should ex-
ploit any theory of scie~~ce .nd physics that, to the best of current
knowledge, reflects the way they are. The nature of such theories
raises issues that fall outside of the current project, but there is
no reason to believe that such theories must lead to trivialization of
physicalist thes,s or that they must be committed tc conventionalism
or essentialism.
The next objection that we shall consider does not bear upon the
internal acceptability of our strategy, but rather concerns the
grounds for adopting the strategy at all. There are two ways of look-
ing at this, (i) why adopt this Htrategy as opposed to some other? and
(11) what is the point of adopting any such strategy at all? Whereas
the first construal appears to give some credence to the development
of the program, the second appears to doubt the value of embarking
upon such a project at all. Our reply to the first is rather brief:
viz" there are no currently known alternatives which have a chance of
working (i.e., of providing a characterization of the physical bas"s).
w••h.l1 now move on to the second construal.
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We choose to pause over this line of objection because a number of
quite notable thinkers (e.g., Goodman, Chomsky) have made claims that
are easily construed as challenging the point of any enterprise that
would attempt to relate the phenomena, terms and theories of the spe-
cial sciencas to bases that are developed in terms of physics. Since
this type of iJsue goes directly to the heart of the physicalist pro-
granl, we shall take some time to respond directly.
To paraphrase some remarks made by Chomsky:121 so what if psycholo-
91 doesn't reduce to physica, physics doesn't reduce to psychology ei-
thert If what is meant is that the failure of Itreduction" does not
constitute any serious loss (perhaps because the various branches of
science are sUPRosed to be autonomous in some sense), then the remark
is seriously mistaken. Our discussion in Chapter 1 showed that there
are a number o~ important gains to be had as a consequence of estab-
lishing certain relations between branche~ of science; it is simply
not true that there are no important gains to be had i~ the physical-
1lt program were to be successful. Further, the autonomy of the sci-
enees is hardly a th••is that can be assumea without argument, and it
is pretty clear that such autonomy yields fewer cognitive and non-cog-
litive gains than the alternative physicalist program we are discuss-
111 See Chomsky (1980), p. 20. Because he was treating physicalist is-
.u.s in te~1 of an identification of physics with al~ of natural
science, we shall be taking some liberties in our constr'J~l of his
comments there. Perhaps, Chomsky would not make the saine kind of
re.arks relative to the kind of physicalism we are attempting to
clevelop.
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ing here.
Alternatively, if what is meant is that the program for reducing
psychology to physics is no more and no less of a failure than the
program for reducing physics to psychology, 122 and hence, there are no
interesting morals to be drawn regarding either science as a conse~
quence of the failure of reduction, then the point is much too
quick. 123
First, if the remark is to be construed this way, then it rests on
the doubtful assumption that the physicalist program is failing as
abysmally as the program for reduction of physics to psychology: it
is obvious that the two programs are not failing to the same degree,
t
in the same ways or for the same reasons. 121 Second, since the point
1~2 See Goodman (1978) and Putnam (1979) for explicit statement of
this claim.
123 The use of 'reduction' and its cognates is here intended to be
quite general covering a wide range of relations between branch~s,
not just "classical reduction", Similarly, the program of "reduc-
ing physics to psychology" is used quite vaguely here to include a
wide range of such programs, not just the program for phenomenal-
ist reduction as developed by either Goodman or Carnap.
124 The vast literature in recent years concerning "reductionism" in
science reveals a number of (at least partial) individual success-
es (e.g., in physics, chemistry, biology). The failures generally
are not total in the sense that, although very strong reductive
relations are seen not to be plausible, weaker, but nonetheless
significant, relations are seriously entertained instead. This is
not clearly true of phenomenalist reductions or other kinds of
psychologistic reductions. Goodman has urged the exploration of
varioul types of reductive relations in both types of program.
mOlt of the response is into the physicalist, not the psychologi-
cal, reductive programs. This may be merely a reflection of the
temper of the times, but, it may also be a reflection of a differ-
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of the two programs is probably quite different, then the failures
have quite different significance. Hence, for example, the failure of
phenomenalism might signify the demise of a certain epistemological
goal (e.g., foundationalism) whereas the failure of physicalism might
signify th~ failure to attain certain ontological goals (e.g., monism)
or epistemological goals (e.g., unity of science with respect to ex-
planation and determination). Depending Jpon one's outlook, one or
the other of these :ailures might be more important; indeed, the
"quest for certainty" has not been a very important goal for most phi-
losophers in tile past thirty years, whereas the quest for a science
with maximal explanatory power has always been a goal of philosophers
and scientist's alike. The point is that Chomsky's remark overlooks
the fact that the two programs have radically different motivations
and that the motivations of physicalism are widespread motivations
within philosophy and science while the motivations of phenomenalism
and related programs are not. To discover the failure of the reduci-
bility of psychology to physics is to discover sad news that could
lead to a revision of our psychology or our physics or our conception
of the structure of science; to discover the failure of phencmenalism
would have little effect on us now, although it is gr~nted that there
was a time when it was sad news. 125
ent assessment of the merits and prospects of the two programs.
121 Our concerns at this point are not with the prospects of the suc-
ce'l or failure of the program, but only with the propriety of our
Itrategy. Later, we shall briefly consider the empirical situation
with regard to the program. writttrs differ enormously on this is ...
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The final objection that we shall consider is that there is "no
preferred direction of reduction in science"; hence, to formulate
physicalism in terms of relations to bases developed from physics is
an arbitrary, monopolistic move. There is little to argue about here
since to say th&t there is no preferred direction of reduction is not
to say that there aren't a number of very interesting directions, one
of which is reduction to physical bases. Further, however, as suggest-
ed above, some directions are more interesting tllan others; and, it
was the burden of Chapter 1 to suggest that physicalist reduction is
about as important a direction of reduction as there is in science.
Under no construal should we be taken as claiming that physicalist re-
duction is the only direction of any possible interest; we do hold,
however, that if' one is interested in ontology and explanation, then
such reduction is to be preferred over the known alternatives. So, the
charge that physicalism is an arbitrary, monopolistic program is not
quite right; the strongest position we need take is that physicalist
reduction is potentially of great ~portancel this we can say without
ruling out other forms of reduction. But, other forms of reduction
have the burden of establishing their ontological and epistemic rele-
vance if they wish to compete with physicalism (for which such rele-
vance is aff\rmed by existing practices in science); it is this that
the alternativel have not done. The alternative programs (e.g., phe~
nomen.118m and other forms of psychological reduction) have different
lue with the views ranging from "it's obviously failing" (Goodman)
to "it'. obviou81y succeeding" (Boyd).
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goals from physicalism. Hence, there is a sense in which physical~sm
does have a monopoly; but, this monopoly is due to a lack of real com-
petitors rather than an act of legislation by physicalists.
In summary, then, there are no reasons for believing that (P3) is
false; hence, th~re is no reason to believe that the bases are arbi-
trary rr pointless. This concludes our dis'~ussion of the physical bas-
es and the presuppositions of the physicalist theses; in the next
chapter we turn to a development of specific theses that will jointly
satisfy the criteria of adequacy set forth in Chapter 1.
- 198 -
4. THE THESES OF PHYSICALISM
The goal of this chapter is to develop a set of theses which give
adequate expression to the physicalist concerns ah~ut ontology, objec-
tivity, a~d explanation within natural science: theses which accord to
the physical bases, as we have developed them above, a special place
relative to the ontologies and doctrines of the other branches of sci-
enee. Although the theses we shall put forward are connected l,istori-
cally with the classical theses of definitional and derivational re-
duction, we want to emphacize the differences. In particular, since
our standard of adequacy requires that the theses must have the prop·
erty that if the program based upon them is successful, then the goals
of physicalism must be satisfied, we shall take to heart the various
I
results of Chapter 2. For example, we reject the claim that ontologi-
cal theses can be expre3sed in "the formal mode". On the other hand,
purely ontological versions of physicalism cannot meet the explanatory
goals of the program. And, although we reject classical reductionism,
we hold that "reductive" theses are required for adequate formulation
of physicalist ontological and explanatory theses. Hence, an adequate
version of the doctrine must consist of linguistic, non-linguistic and
reductive theses. Further, in light of the various failures of past
fo~ulation., th~ level of abstraction of the theses must be such that
they expresl physicalist concerns while allowing for variability among
branch•• of science.' Finally, we note that although the theses are
1 See Fodor (1975, 1978) for discuBs!on of how psychology, though de-
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taken to apply to all of natural science, they are not taken to ex-
haust the important relations that hold between the various branches
of science. We turn, now, to a consideration of the physicalist thes-
eSt as we proceed, we shall check for the adequacy of the formulations
as well as their vulnerability to various objections.
4.1 THESES CONCERNING ONTOLOGY
A formulation of the physicalist ontological position must give ex-
pression to the idea that the physical ontology is basic within the
natural order. To make this idea more precise, it is necessary to say
what is meant by lithe natural order" and to say what being "basic
within the natural order" means. We shall discuss the former below2 in
• I
the sectlon concerned with the scope of the theses. Preliminary to
clarifying the latter, we observe that, as noted above, it is neces-
sary to treat the various ontological categories separately in a full
development of the physicalist position. However, we shall not do this
in this project for reasons of space. Rather, we shall focus our at-
tention upon attribute:s (i.e., properties, relations), about which we
make the following assumptions. First, we reject completely an "exten-
sional" approach to the individuation of attributes; a full develop-
ment of the reasons for this would take us too far afield, but, rough-
1y, our view is that "intensional distinctions" are of critical
partin9 from other sciences in many respects, might still be incor-
porated into a physicalist framework for science.
2 See Ch.pter 5.
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importance in science: an account of science which does not recognize
such distinctions cannot provide an adequate account of scientific ex-
planati~~ and understanding. 3 Second, we take it as obvious that ther~
are non-physical as well as physical attributes; and, we reject as ob-
viously false a physicalist position that holds that every attribute
is a physical attribute. Third, we reject as false the view that,
while denying identity of attributes, asserts "token identity of at-
tributes".4 This view founders either because it leads one to the view
that there are "property particulars" or that somehow it is possible
for properties to be distinct but their instantiations to be identi-
cal: none of this is particularly cogent on close inspection. Our view
is that, if the individuation of attributes is such that some attri-
,
bute A is not identical to some attribute 8, then it is not possible
for any instance of A (whatever an instance might be) to be identical
to any instance of B. We assume this without f"lrther argument. 5
3 The view that an extensional treatment of attributes supplemented by
thcs ~"iew that we can "conceive" of such attributes in different
ways, at reflected by the employment of different ideologies, has a
serious flaw. Bither alternative conceptualizations are taken to be
base~ upon features of the (extensionally construed) attributes or
they are not. If not, then we appear to be committed to viewing our
con~~ptu.lization8 .s arbitrarily related to what they are conceptu-
.li~a~ions of. If they are based on features of the attributes, then
either ~e are landed in a serious regress or we are ultimately com-
mitted to non-extensionally construed attributes.
4 The relation between "type" and "takerl" identity claims is sometimes
obscured by various theories of the nature of events and properties;
lee Kim (1979) and Swinburne (1982) for relatively lucid discustion
of the relevant distinctions and relations between identity claims
for events and such claims for properties. We are exclusively con-
cerned with properties in this discussion.
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The problem set by these assumptions is to develop a view that is
compatible with them and which expresses a significant sense in which
the physical ontology is basic within the natural order. Having given
up the obviously stl'ong, but obviously false, views of type and token
identity, we must search for alternatives that are compatible with the
assumptions, adequate by our criteria and not obviously defective.
The physical basis for ontology developed above looked somewhat as
follows: (i) we assumed a spacetime coordinate system within which
spacetime regions could be precisely individuated (i.e., a region R is
identical to a region S just in case Rand S contained the same space-
time points, (ii) we assumed a basic class of physical attributes
which ( :n be evaluated at each spacetime region; (iii) we assum~d that,
• specification of these basic attributes was sufficient for determin-
ing all complex or higher order physical attributes that can be built
up from the basic attributes; (iv) hence, the actually instantiated
physical ontology is specifiable by the distribution of the basic
physical attributes over every reqion of spacetime; and (v) different
possibilities for the actually instantiated physical ontology are
specifiable in terms of alternatives from the actual distribution of
such attributes. We left unsolved the problem of how to extend this
development to a full development of the physical ontology which in M
elude. a treatment of all onto,logical categories (e.g. I states,
I See Swinburne (1982) for discussion. Also, altt.ough we tiony identity
th•••• for attrlbutes, we allow fOI· the posfJj.l)ili ty o~ type or token
identity theses f~r other ontoloqicel cQt~gori~s.
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events, objects, etc). For our present purposes, the physical ontolc-
gy of attributes as roughly outlined will suffice.
In what follows, we shall develop the physicalist ontological posi-
tion by specifying a set of relations which elements in the ontologies
of the special sciences must bear to the elements in the physical on-
tology. To be adequate, the theses must specify relations which, if
they are satisfied, are sufficient for realizing the ontological goals
of the program and which are compatible with our assumptions. We shall
restrict our discussion to attributes that are members of the ontolo-
9ie8 of the special sciences. s
In considering the ontology of the other parts of science, we as-
sume that, as i~ the case of physics, the ontologies of the special
sciences can be developed in tenms of basic and complex or hi9her or-
der attributes; further, all such attributes are assumed to be instan-
tiated, if at all, in regions of spacetime. Thus, as with the physical
ontology, every basic attribute in the ontology of a given special
science can be evaluated at each spacetime region; and, such an evalu-
etion determines which other complex or higher-order attributes are
instantiated in which regions. Further, as with the physical ontology,
we distinguish the actually instantiated ontology of a given special
science from the possible alternatives (i.e., alternative distribu-
• Thul, the physicalilm considered here is not completely general re-
garding all attributes; se. below (Chapter 5) for discussion of the
.cope of the theses.
- 203 -
tions of attributes over regions of spacetime.)7
Now, given the attributes in the physical basis and the attributes
in the ontology of the special sciences, the physicalist ontological
thesis is that, associated with each attribute that is actually (or
possibly) instantiated in some region of spacetime, there is a physi-
cal attribute that is actually (or possibly) insLantiated in that re-
gion. As stated, this is a rather trivial, vague and uninteresting
claim. Here co-occurrence in the same region does not provide mue,',
bite to the idea that the physical ontology is basic. And, although
the generality of the physic~list ontology does provide some bite to
the physicalist claiM, it is minimal. What, then, is the nature of
the association between physical and non-physical attributes such that
the fo~er is basic?
There are two features of the association that are important: (a)
the physical attribute is a sufficient condition for the non-physical
attribute and (b) the physical attribute is not merely contingently
associated with the non-physical attribute. Thus, the ontological the-
sis of physicalism that we propose is;
? The ontology of a science includes all attributes subsumed under the
theories of that science, whether or not the attributes are actually
instantiated. Thus, consideration of possible, but not actual,
stat•• of nature does not involve augmenting the ontology of a sci-
ence; it only means considering which members are actually instanti-
ated and which are not.
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(Tl) For each non-physical attribute in the ontology of the spe-
cial sciences and for each region of spacetime, if an attri-
bute is (actually or possibly) instantiated in a region of
spacetime, then there exists a physical attribute which is a
nomological sufficient condition for that non-physical at-
tribute and which is instantiated in that region.
This thesis captures both the direction of the determination of the
non-physical by the physical as well as the appropriate modal force of
that determination. The direction is secured by the requirement that
the physical attribute be a sufficient condition for the non-physical
attribute; the converse need not in general hold. And, the determina-
tion must be at least nomological' to avoid, what is surely not in the
,
spirit of the program, the possibility that a physical attribute could
be a sufficient condition for incompatible non-physical attributes.
A consequence of (Tl) is that, for ~ach attribute in the ontology
of the special sciences there is a class of attributes in the ontology
of physics such that each member is a nomological sufficient condition
• rodor hal sU9gested that this much modal force (i.e., nomological1-
ty) may be too much and that the requirement should be something
weaker although it is not clear how to express intermediate amounts
of modal force between contingent and nomological. In Davidson
(1970) there is a mention of "degrees of lawlikeness" which is not
clarified; and Fodor speaks about a regularity having counterfactual
force without its being nomological. The issue turns on what nomolo-
gicality consists in, an issue that no one has adequately addressed
and that we do not propose to take on here. We shall issue the fol-
lowing caveat on the condition appealed to in (Tl)a if an intermedi-
ate degree of modal force between contingency and nomologicality can
be identified, it may be a serious candidate for replacing the con~
dition of nomologicality employed.
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for the non-physical attribute in question. Further, this thesis en-
tail!i the "supervenience" of the non-physical on the physical (i.e.,
two regions alike in all physical respects must be alike in all non-
physical respects). The formulation is an especially strong claim in
that the physical nomological sufficient condi.ions for non-physical
attributes are to be located in the same region as those non-physical
attributes.'
We note, further, that (Tl) expresses an "ontological" thesis which
involves no identifications of the non-physical attributes with pnysi-
cal attributes; only the regions in which they occur are to be identi-
fied. Rather, (Tl) attempts to capture the idea that the physical at-
tributes determine what non-physical attributes occur; this is, we,
take it, the first step toward clarifying the idea that physical phe-
nomen. "realize" non-physical phenomena in nature. Below, in our dis-
cussion of the explanatory theses, we shall add to this development by
intrcducing the notion of a "realization theory": a kind of theory
which purports to explain in virtue of what physical attributes real-
ize non-physical attributes. Althouqh, the ontological thesis put for-
ward eschews identification of attributes, it is to be kept in mind
that it is compatible with this position that there might be identifi-
cations involving other ontological categories (~.g., events, states);
, This could spell trouble if the physical conditions of realization
for a given non-physical attribute occur in a different region from
the realized attribute (e.g., the case of "broad", as opposed to
"narrow", mental states).
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such identifications depend crucially on what one takes an event or a
state to be. Finally, although a nomological relation is required be-
tween given physical and non-physical attributes, this does not guar-
antee that for each such association there will be a law-statement ex-
pressing that relation in the relevant physical and non-physical
vocabularies. Of course, identification of such relations is an impor-
tent goal of science nonetheless.
Thus, the physicalist ontological thes~s is a reductive, non-lin-
quistic claim to the effect that for each non-physical attribute actu~
ally (or possibly) instantiated in some region, there is a physical
attribute instantiated in that region which is a nomological suffi-
cient condition for it. Hence, for each non-physical attribute, there
,
is a class of attributes in the physical basis which consist of all
and only the physical nomological sufficient conditions which co-occur
in the same region as the given attribute. The requirements of nomolo-
gicality of the association and of the attributes being located in the
same region when they are instantiated put stringent constraints on
the mapping from the class of non-physical attributes into the base
class of physical attributes. As we shall see shortly, these con-
straints will be objected to on the 9r~unds that (1) they are (none-
theless) too weak to detJrmine a unique mapping and (2) they are too
~trong to be plausible. In any event, these constraints do give con-
tent to the idea that the physical ontology is basic within the natu-
ral order. The actual development of an ontological system structured
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in accordance with this thesis is a quite arduous task which is just
barely off the ground; a principal reason for this is that "inter-
branch sciences" (e_g_, neuropsychology) in which the task of identif-
ying the associations between physical and non-physical attributes are
~ature in most cases. Further, of course, the treatment of other on-
tological categories must also be incorporated into a full development
of ontology for science. Ra\.~el· than pursue this task, which is quite
dependent upon future advances in both philosophy and science, we
shall turn to • discussion of the objections to our brand of ontologi-
cal physicalism.
If our discussion in the last chapter was right, then the theses of
physicalism are not vulnerable to the objection that they are trivial-
ly true, obviously false or indeterminate because the bases are defec-
tive in some way. But, given that the bases are acceptable, there is a
second wave of objections that must be dealt with: (1) another tr:lvi-
ality objection, (2) a claia. that the theses are "utopian" in ChaJiaC-
ter, and (3) another indeterminacy objection. II
During our presentation of the ontological thesis, we mentioned
that, by itself, the claim, that to every non-physical attribute l.n-
stantiated in a region there was associated a physical attribute in-
11 An objection that would almost certainly be raised by Quine and
other~ of his inclination is that our whole approach to developing
th~ pi'ylicalist program il excessively "intensionalist"a we have
freelf helped ourselves to property, nomologicality and related no-
tions.
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stantiated in that region, was trivial: there will always be such
associations given the generality of physics with respect to regions
of spacetime and given that every instantiation of a non-physical at-
tribute is located. Hence, such a view cannot capture the essence of
the physicalist position. And, of course, we do not think that it
does; we went on to put constraints upon the nature of the associa-
tien.
These constraints are quite adequate for fending off the objection
that physicalist ontological reduction is triviala· 1 any such reduc-
tion must map attributes into physical attributes that are instantiat-
ed in the same region and it must have counterfactual import. How-
ever, we may have fended off this objection at a very high price: the
thesis, although not being trivial, appears to be "utopian". And fur-
ther, despite the imposition of these constraints, the thesis may be,
nevertheless, indete~inate in the sense that the constraints do not
determine a unique mapping and there is no fact of the matter concern-
ing which of conflicting mappings is right. We shall now consider
these objections in turn.
11 There are formulations of the physicalist ontolog~cal position
(e.g., Davidson (1970), Fodor (1975» which appear to require some-
thing like contingent associations only. Th~se formulations are
trivially true given the Gosumptions of the generality of physics
and the locatability of the non-physical in spacetime regions.
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The idea that physicalism is a utopian program has been expressed
in one way or other by a number of prominent thinkers. 12 The exact
meaning of the epithet "utopian" is not very clearly discussed how-
ever; the general idea is that at the present time it looks as if the
successful completion of the program will be forever beyond our
reach. 13 The reasons for this gloomy forecast are equally undeveloped:
(1) the program doesn't appear to be working out, (2) it is unreason-
ably demanding, (3) it calls for "ideal theories", and (4) it may be
out of our reach because of our cognitive limitation~ or because of
other epistemic difficulties. The issue is whether it is at all rea-
sonable to expect that the program will be successful; or, alterna-
tive1f, whether there are principled or practical reasons for believ-
,
ing that the program cannot be successful. Thft ~roponents of this
objection hold that there are such reasons and conclude that physical-
ism, as we conceive it, ought not be taken seriously as a research
proqram in science. Or, as Goodman and Putnam put it, the program
ought not b~ taken any more seriously than the phenomenalist program
the preceded it. 14
II See Putnam (1978, 197~), Quine (1979), Goodman (1978), and CHomsky
(1975, 1980).
11 Or, at least, it will be beyond our reach for the immediate future.
300 years appears to be a favorite number, although it is not clear
why.
14 In Chapter 5, we shall address the question of whether a strong
analogy between the physicalist and phenomenalist program exists.
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With re9ard to (Tl), the utopianism objection claims that the gen-
eral discovery of physicalistically correct mappings (i.e., mappings
which satisfy the constraints) from the ontologies of the special sci-
ences into the physical ontological basis is a utopian dream. To as-
sess this claim it would have to be determined exactly what 'utopian'
does mean here, whether or not the thesis is utopian in the intended
sense, and, most importantly, whether or not being utopian is a seri-
OUS defect for the physicalist program. In the absence of clear dis-
cussions, by the proponents of this objection, of both what being uta-
pian is and what are the arguments for the charge that physicalist
theses such as (Tl) are utopian, our strategy will be to focus un
whether or not being utopian is really a serious defect of the pro-
,
gram. That is, for t~e purposes of our discussion, we shall take it
that being utopian means that we can reasonably expect th3t the total-
ly successful completion of the working out at the physicalist program
in science is unlikely; and we shall grant that (Tl) is utopian in
this lense. Our contention will be that this is not a serious flaw of
the physicalist doctrine. We shall develop this point only after we
have discussed all of the physicalist theses, since each can be ob-
jected to on the same ground. and our reply in each case will be the
same.
The next objection to the ontological thesis that we shall be con-
lid.ring is that it is subject to a certain kind of indeterminacy.
Unlike the last objection which despaired of our ever discovering any
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mappings between physical and non-physical attributes that were com-
patible with the constraints, the present objection argues that, even
if mappings are discovered, there are too many such mappings and no
objective grounds for choosing among them. Hence, for any given map-
ping there is no fact of the matter as to whether it is the physical-
istically correct one. (Tl) is thus defective because it calls for
mappings, from attributes in the ontologies of the special sciences
in~o attributes in the physical basis, which are not uniquely deter-
mined by the constraints and for which there are no objective, physi-
calist grounds for choosing one as the "correct" mapping. Thus, the
mappings that (Tl) calls for do not satisfy the demands of the physi-
calist program itself (i.e., the demand that relations in science be
physicalisticalfy determined.)
The principal steps in the argument above are as follows:
1. It is assumed that the physical ontological basis is fixed as
is the non-physical ontology to be reduced.
2. It is argued th~t relative to the constraints there is non-uni-
queness of r~duction of the one ontology to the other.
3. It is argued that this non-uniqueness is indicative of physi-
calist indeterminacy of redu~tion (i.e., there are alternative,
incompatible reductions and no objective physical grounds for
choosing among them).
4. Such indete~inacy is grounds for rejection of the physicalist
....pping. and the thesis which calls for them as unacceptable
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In assessing this argument, we shall claim that even if step 2,
that there is general non-uniqueness of physicalist ontological reduc·
tion, is correct, it does not follow that such non-uniqueness is
grounds for rejecting (Tl) as not acceptable by physicalist standards.
The first step in the current objection is the assumption that the
physical bases are de~erminately specified; of course, those who were
not persuaded by our discussion in Chapter 3 will not accept this as-
sumption. However, for the purpose of clearly distinguishing different
types of objection, the assumption should be made for the space of the
argument. On the other hand, if we are successful in fending off the
,
current objection, the critic can retreat to the objection based upon
denying the determinacy of the basis. 11 Further, the present argument
assumes that the ontology to be reduced is likewise determinate. Thus
the problem facing the physicalist is the construction of a reductive
mapping between the two ontologies which satisfies the constraints 1 ?
15 The issues raised by this objection will be familiar to those who
have followed the debates concerning Quine's indeterminacy thesis.
The situation here for the physicalist thesis and the reductive re-
lation that it postulates is alleged to be quite comparable to the
situation that Quine sees translation, reference attributions, and
psychological theorizing as being in. That is, physicalist ~educ­
tion of one ontology to another is seen by proponents of the cur-
rent objection as being another instance of the general physicalist
"indeterminacy" of intentional and semantical phenomena. See Putnam
(1979) for discussion of this kind of objection to physicalism.
I' See Putnam (1979) for precisely this strategic move.
17 Recall that the constraints are that the mapping take non-physical
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and which does not ha~e equally acceptable, but incompatible, alterna-
tives for which there are no g~ounds for rejection.
The second step in the argument is the claim that there is, in gen-
eral, non-uniqueness of physicalist ontological reduction: i.e., that
given the two ontologies and given the constraints there is more than
one mapping from the ontology to be reduced into the physical basis
which satisfy all the constraints and which are not jointly acceptable
because they are logically incompatible with each other. ~he argu-
ments which bear on this claim have been discussed in numerous
places 1 ' and will not be reviewed here. We shall assume that, if it is
at all possible to construct a mapping which satisfies the con-
straints, then there will always be alternative mappings which are in-
t
compatible with each other but which all satisfy the constraints. A1-
though some may believe that this is too large a concession, our view
is that, as we shall now argue, the truth of this claim is by no means
fatal to the physicalist program in science.
The reason that non-uniqueness is not fatal to (T1) is that, as de-
scribed, i~ is an embarrassment of riches. Theory construction within
F.lysicalist science has, in the situation described, a choice to make
between one set of sets of nomological sufficient conditions for the
attribute. into nomological sufficient conditions that are instan-
tiated in the same region as the reductJ attribute when it is in-
Itantiated.
II See Carnap (1967), Goodman (1977), Quine (1968), Putnam (1975,
1979), and Field (1974).
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attributes in the ontologies of the special sciences and other such
sets: each of the alternatives serves the physicalist equally well in
realizing the ontological goals of the program. Once a choice has been
made between the various alternatives, a physicalist representation of
nature is ~tructured in the way that the physicalist requires. That
there are alternative representations of nature that would serve those
requirements equally well is not a difficulty for physicalism as lon2
!! it is not required ~ the ~calist that there be physicalist
grounds for breaking the ties between the alternative reductions. The
issue becomes that of how it is possible that the physicalist can con-
sistently allow such physicalist underdetermination of the choice be-
tween ontological reductions and still be a physicalist about natural
science.
To get at this issue, let us consider an alternative way of stating
our contention; viz., as long as physicalist demands are satisfied
within a representation of nature, it does not matter to the physical~
1st program in science that, viewed from outside of that representa-
tion, there are alternative ontological reductions that could have
been adopted for the purposes of constructing such representations.
What this means is that, as long as physicalism does not purport to
resolve all underdetermined issues that arise in the activity of theo-
ry con.truction in science, it need not feel threatened by the exis-
tence of the general non-uniqueness of ontological reduction. How-
ever, this leads us back to what is at the bottom of the objector's
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claim!\: both (1) 'the spec;.fi I~ ontologie! 1 reduction~ that are .formu-
lated .In science and (2) th~ thes i" ('1'1), being a part of natural sci-
~nce, do n,)t satisfy the physicalist's own demands on what C'ounts as
acceptable natural science. Thus, even if W~ turn cur focus away from
t~e non· uniqueness of ontolog~c~l reductiuns by choosing one of the
Inany eCiually ac"eptabl~ ones, \1Ie still appeal· to have elements of the
ontology of 118tural sc ience (i. e., th3 reduc tive re1ationa be tween
specific attributds) and an element of the formal system of science
(i.e., (T1» that are not in compliance with physicalist doctrine.
There a~e tw~ ~uite distinct issues here, the first bearing on the
reductive relations between attributes and the second bearing on the
status of the physic~list thesis. In the case of the relations (e.g.,
the relation that u physical attribute bears to a non-physical attri-
bute that it is a nomologic.al sufficient conditiora fo,;·), it might be
asked "What physical facts determine that relation?" or, given (Tl),
"What physical relation is to be associated with the relation x-is-a-
nomological-sufficient-condition-for-y such that this relation is true
of specific attributes?" If these questions have no anewer, it would
be contended that there is a relation in the physicalist system which
does not satisfy (Tl); and, hence, either it is not an acceptable re-
lation in science or (Tl) is false.
The only reply to this line of reasoning for the physicalist is to
contend that, consonant with the claim above that in the case of non-
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uniqueness we pick one ontological reduction for the purpose of con-
structing a physicalist representation of nature, the relation between
a physical attribute and the non-physical attribute that it is a nomo-
logical suffi~ient condition for is a basic relation in the system:
there are no additional physical attributes that constitute a nomolo-
gical sufficient condition for that relation.
Now, to soften this blow and to deflect the charge that this is
just an ad hoc sparing of (Tl) of embarassment, we offer the following
considerations. First, it is to be clearly kept in mind that it is an
inevitable fact of all theory construction, physicalist or not, that
certain choices arise that are a matter of convention and that it is
completely unrealistic for the physicalist to claim that, under all
,
circumstances, physicalist grounds exist ttl determine such choices.
Thus, in acknowledgement of this fact, we have allowed that ontologi-
cal reduction generally constitutes one such point of conventional
choice and that, if there are any acceptable physicalist reductions,
there are many_ Hence, for the purposes of physicalist theory con-
struction, one must choose from among the alternatives. Given all of
this, it seems foolish to turn around and require that the given onto-
logical reduction be physicalistically determined by other physical
relations within the system. The only alternative to such a require-
ment is to make the reductive relation not within the scope of the
physicalist thesis that requires such determination; and, in the pres-
ent case, the only way to do that is to make such relations basic
within the system.
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Second, we shall introduce below l ' ~he notion of a "realization
theory" which is a kind of theory that attempts to de-mystify the re-
lations 'that holu between an attribute and its nomological sufficient
conditions: thus, although they are basic within the system, such re-
lations need not be mysterious.
Third, the relation x-is-a-nomological-sufficient-condition-for-y
is like many other relations in science that are not part of the sub-
ject matter of science, but rather, are employed when representing and
making claims about the subject matter of science. Other examples
might include properties and relations of the logical system (e.g.,
the consequence relation) that is employed in science and properties
and relations h~vin9 to do with explanation (e.g., x-is-an-explana-
tion-of-y). Since the doctrine of physicalism 1s supposed to be con-
c~rned with the subject matter of science, it does not necessarily ap·
ply to properties and relations that are introduced fo, the purposes
of studying that subject matter. We say 'not necessarily' because such
properties and relations would be part of the subject matter of sci-
ence if scientific theory construction and its products were the ob-
jects of scientific study.
rourth, therefore, the relation between a physical attribute and
the non-physical attribute that it is a nomological sufficient condi-
tion for i. in compliance with (Tl) insofar as it is viewed as basic
" In the section concerning the ~xplanatory theses.
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within the system. But, the general relation,
x-is-a-nomological-suffici~nt-condition-for-y,might be best viewed as
not itself part of the subject matter of science and, hence, not with-
in the scope of (Tl).20
To this point, we have considered a strategy for replying to the
charge that there is general non-uniqueness of ontological reduction
which entails that (Tl) requires mappings that are underdetermined by
physicalist considerations: we replied that, if there are many accep-
table mappings, it is open to the physicalist to pick one for the pur-
poses of scientific theory construction and that, relative to that
choice, the physicalist doctrine is satisfied. This led us to the ob-
servation that, given such a choice, there appear to be relations in
science (i.e., relations between a specific physical attribute and the
attribute that it is a nomological sufficient conditions for) that are
not determined by other physical relations. We replied that such rela-
tiona must be viewed as basic within the physicalist system and we of-
fered some reasons why this is not an ad hoc maneuver to save (Tl).
20 Unless, of course, that relation can be seen as being determined by
physical relations within the system. As I understand it, the pro-
ject of naturalized epistemology has as one of its burdens the
"physicalization" of all the concepts employed in the process and
the products of scientific activity; this is so, at least insofar
as one remains a physicalist while engaging in the project of natu-
ralized epistemology. The point we are suggesting here and shall
develop later i. that one need not pursue that project if one is
going to be a physicalist. Indeed, if one is going to be a physi-
calist, one had better be wary of a project that carries the burden
just mentioned.
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Now, the outstanding issue that has yet to be addressed directly is
whether or not the activity of scientific theory construction is with-
in the domain of scientific inquiry. If it ts, then it would appear
that all that we have said up to this point goes by the boards since,
the very choices that we have been discussing are, in general, proba-
bly not resolvable on physicalist grounds and would be required to be
resolved on such grounds within physicalist science. As we shall see,
the physicalist cannot blithely relegate such activities to a point
beyond the perimeter of natural science since it is a favored conten-
tion of most physicalists that physicalist theses are a part of empir-
ical natural science; and, the theses being a part of natural science
is tantamount to science becoming a part of its own subject matter.
The specific objection that we are left with may be formulated as
follows. if (Tl) is a part of natural science, then the construction
of ontological mappings in accordance with (T1) is part of the subject
matter of natural science and, hence, must itself be in accordance
with (Ti). But, if the construction of such mappings is not uniquely
determined by physicalist considerations (i.e., if there are no sets
of physical nomological sufficient conditions for such mappings that
would serve to identify the unique physicalistically correct mapping),
then (Tl) is not satisfied by such mappings and, as we shall contend
below, (Tl) il itself in violation of other physicalist demands (i.e.,
the demands made by thelis (T3». So, if (Tl) is part of natural sci-
ence, then either it il false of certain relations in natural science
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and itself subject to physicalist indeterminacy ~ within physicalist
science there are physicalist grounds for fixing unique ontological
reductions ana the truth of (Tl). We shall leave off with our discus-
sion of this objection for the time being and move on to a considera-
tion of the other theses of physicalism. In Chapter 5, where we dis-
cuss the metatheses of physicalism (and specifically, the claim that
the theses are em~irical theses of natural science), we shall propose
a resolution of the current difficulty for the physicalist doctrine.
4.2 THESIS CONCERNING OBJECTIVITY
We now turn to a discussion of the physicalist motivations with re-
gard to objectivity and of the kinds of thesis that will most
adeqautely express those motivations. First, we shall review the
conception of objectivity that we shall be working with; second, we
shall discuss the demands that shall be placed upon our formulation of
the relevant physicalist theses; third, we shall suggest how to formu-
late theses that will serve the physicalist's purposes; and, finally,
we shall consider a variety of objections to the theses.
Although the topic of a fair amount of philosophical discussion,
the concept of objectivity is not one that can be easily a~d precisely
tied down; our discussion will be aimed at clarifying some of the cen-
tral ideas without attempting a rigorous characterization. First, ob-
jectivity is ordi)larily taken to be a property that attaches to
"truth", "knowledge", and "facts"; that is, it is taken to be a fea-
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ture of the world as well as of our knowledge of the world. As physi-
calists, we shall be concerned to capture both employments of the con-
cept, since we are holding to the idea that there is no general equiv-
alence to be had between theses about knowledge and theses about the
objects of knowledge.
There appear to be two key ideas relating to the notion of objec-
tive truth or knowledge: the cirst is that of intersubjective test-
ability, upon which great emphasis has been placed. The idea is rough-
ly tl.at objective knowledge must be knowledge for which more than one
knower (e.g., the scientific community) can have relevant evidence!
shared evidence leads to shared knowledge. The second key idea is that
of "knowledge that is independent of the knowing subject"; that is,
knowledge that is not dependent upon the variable interests or pro-
clivities of cognizers. The issues here .un quite deep, since there
.ay be an ~ortant sense in which all knowledge depends upon features
of knowing subjects (e.g., upon the systems of representation employed
in cognition). Our aim here is not to tackle such issues, but rather
to get at an idea central to the physicalist's conception of objectiv-
ity; if that idea cannot stand up under scrutiny, so ""'ch the worse
for the physicalist's conception of objectivity. At a r.inimum, the no-
tion of independence here alluded to is intended to rule out obvious
individual differe~~~~ upon which certain claims may depend (e.g.,
specific personal q0818 in making ~laiml to knowledge).
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For example, Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is
a claim concerning the non-objective status of claims about transla-
tion from one language to another ("there is no fact of the matter").
Even if such cla~lns are objective in the sense of being supported by
evidence available intersubjectively, they are not (according to
QUine) objective in the sense of being independent of the knowing sub-
jecta different translators with different interests or~proclivities
will translate differently. Such sensitivity to individual differences
is a feature of translation but not of physics according to Quine; the
reason for this requires a third idea concerninq the notion ~f objec-
tivity: the idea of there being an objective matter of fact underlying
a cla~ to knowledge.
Translation5 do not count as objective knowledge because they are
sensitive to individual differences betv~en translators: they are not
independent of the knowing subject. What distinguishes those claims
which are independent of the knowinq subject from those which are not?
Answer; one concerns matters of fact while the other does not. Hence,
physics, being concerned with matters of fact is not sensitive to dif-
ference. among investigators, while translation, being not so con-
cernea, is so sensitive. The following questions, of course, arise;
what counts as a matter of fact? and how can we tell when knowledge
concerns matters of fact?
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To summarize: insofar as objectivity is a feature of claims to
knowledge (or truth), there are two features of interest; the first is
the intersubjective testability of the claim, and the second is inde-
pendence of the claim with respect to intersubjectively variable fac-
tors (i.e., the truth value of the claim does not vary with subjective
differences). Focusing on just this second feature, it is there being
a fact of the matter with which a claim is concerned that underlies
its independence from subjective factors. As a consequence, two ques-
tions arise concerning objectivity: (1) within nature, what counts as
an objective matter of fact? and (2) within our system of knowledge,
what are the marks of an objective truth? (i.e., within our system of
knowledge, how are the claims with a factual basis to be discerned
from those that'lack such a basis?).
The appropriate physicalist strategy for answering these questions
is to relate certain domains (e.g., non-physical linguistlc or non-
linguistic entities) to the physicalist bases. In particular, the
physicalist theses concerning objectivity will characterize relations
which must hold (1) between non-physical phenomena and physical phe-
nomen. in order for the former to count as an objective matter of fact
and (2) between non-physical truths and physical truths in order for
the former to count as objectively true or false. If both of these
theses are formulable and defensible, they should constitute an ex-
pression of the physicalist view that the physical ontology and doc-
trine provide b•••• for scientific objectivity.
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We turn first to the formulation of a thesis concerning objective
matters of fact. The physicalist view is that the objective matters of
fact are the physical facts and facts that are determined ~ the phys-
ical facts: the problem of formulation comes down to making precise
the physicalist dictum that the physica! facts determine all the facts
of nature.
The core idea behind this dictum is that there is a world of fact,
independent of our cognitions, which has a certain structure (i.e., it
is structured by relations to a physical basis); if a purported fact
can be shown not to bear such relations, then that is sufficient
grounds for the physicalist to reject it as not an objective matter of
fact. Th~s, the thesis provides a criterion for objectivity, the most,
notable application of which is to be found in Quine's writings on the
indeterminacy of translation and related indeterminacy claims; we
shall look closely at this application of the physicalist thesis con-
cerning objectivity below. 2t
The pictu~~ of the world here characterized displays a world of
fact, independent of cognition and structured by relations to a physi-
cal blSis, which is available as an object of study for science and
which captures the metaphysical intuitions characteristic of a physi-
calist outlook. Objective facts are such because, being completely de-
termined by the physical basis, they are not sensitive to the differ-
2S Se. Chapter 5.
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ences between knowing subjects (i.e., the objective facts are
independent of cognition). As we shall see, it is Quine's contantion
that translation, mentalistic the~ries of mind and semantic theories
are not concerned with objective facts in this sense. Science, being
concerned exclusively with getting at the facts about nature, is, on
the physicalist view, concerned with getting at the objective facts as
characterized above. Thus, science ought not to be concerned with
translation, mentalistic theories of mind and semantic theories, if
Quine is correct.
It would be most inappropriate not to take any notice of the issues
concerning "facts" and the distinction, upon which the above discus-
sion depends, between fact and non-fact (fiction?). The issues here,
are quite difficult and quite general, and we shall only try to de-
fleet them. With respect to the question of the :.se of "fact talk" at
all, we endorse the view that such talk is completely dispensible in
favor of more contentful locutions. Below we shall describe our strat-
egy for this. As is by now clear, our intensional bias will be unsa-
tisfactory to Quine and his ilk; perhaps there is some gain, even in
their eyes, in dispensing with facts in favor of properties.
With respect to the distinction between fact and non-fact, we are
sympathetic to the idea that all conception of fact is dependent up~n
features of the conceivers. the nature of representation and differ-
enee. between representation41 systems are quite pertinent to the na-
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ture of cognitions and the differences between cognitions of "the
world". However, our project is not that of developing a monopolistic
system; it is the more restricted one of developing a system which we
believe is implicit in much of the actual conduct of science and for
which there are r~asons to think that it ought to be so implicit.
Thus, it is from within the physicalist view of nature and science
that the conception of objectivity described above takes the form we
have been considering. i.e., it is the physicalist view that there is
an independent world of fact structured by relations to a physical ba-
sis. 22 The question of whether this view as opposed to some other is
the best for science is one which we shall argue for an affirmative
answer. But none of this requires that we deny any of the observations
,
concerning how a completely untainted notion of fact is not viable.
Prom within a given way of conceivinq of knowledge and the world, dis~
tinctions between objectivity and subjectivity can be clearly deli-
neated, even if that way of conceiving, like all others, involves pa-
rochial features of cognition and systems of representation. And, this
11 true, even if the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity
that is so developed is itself limited in its scope and not applicable
to all knowledge. As Goodman might put it, there is no one way of
conceiving of the world, and hence no one way that the world is. Some
II It 11 compatible with this that, al Putnam and Goodman have been at
pains to point out, the physicalist's conception itself may not,
and probably is not, "objective" in this sense. Thus, the issue of
whether the physic.lilt'. viewl _bout nature and scientific knowl-
e4;e apply to themselves arises again.
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ways of conceiving mj9ht be better for specific purposes than others,
which is what we contend i~ the case for the physicalist way with re-
spect to scientific purposes. Again, within the physicalist outlook,
there is a clear distinction between the world of fact and the nature
of cognition; it is this picture which, we claim, best serves science
8S science is currently conceived and practiced.
So, if the objective facts are those that are determined by the
physical facts, how is this to be expressed in a precise way? This
question raises three more: viz., how are we to characterize the phys-
ical facts?, how are we to characterize the non-physical facts?, and
how are we to characterize the relation of determination which the
former bears to the latter?,
To characterize the physical facts, we shall need the notion of a
possible sta~~ of nature as follows I given our specification of the
physical ontology,23 a possible state of nature is a complete distri-
bution of physical attributes over the regions of the spacetime con-
tinuum which is compatible with the laws of nature; the class of all
such distributions is the class of all possible states of nature. We
shall represent this class with a class of models, each member of
which is • structure in which the individuals are the spacetime re-
gionl and in which a complete distribution of attributes over those
23 I.e., ••pacetime continuum in which sets of point. are taken as
regions of the continuum, and a set of physical attributes consist-
ing of fundamental attributes and complex and higher ord6r attri-
butes built up from the fundamental ones.
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reqions is specified. This class represents all the possible physical
states of nature and, thus, all the possible distributions of physical
fact. 24
To cash in the notion of the non-physical facts, our strategy is
similar: consider the class of all non-physical attributes and the
spacetime continuum as before; then, a complete distribution of these
attributes over the regions of the continuum which is compatible with
the laws of nature is a possible non-physical state of nature; the
class of all such distributions is the class of possible non-physical
states of nature. As before, we shall represent these possiblities in
terms of a class of models in each member of which the individuals are
the regions of spacetime and a possible distribution of non-physical
attributes is specified. This class of models represents all of the
possible distributions of non-physical fact.
Given these two classes of models and given that the domains of the
models in each is the same (i.e., the regions of the spacetime contin-
uum), we can specify a class of models each member of which has the
regions as individuals and a complete distribution of both physical
and non-physical attributes specifiedz this class represents all of
the possible pairings of physical states of nature with non-physical
states of nature. And, given this class of models, we can now charac-
24 The general idea behind our strategy is suggested by the work of
Hellman and Thompson (1975), although we have departed considera-
bly.
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terize the notion of determination pertinent to the physicalist
intuition that the physical facts determine all the facts of nature.
In so doing, we shall indicate what subclass 0: the class just de-
scribed represents, on the physicalist view, the possible states of
nature (i.e., the class of possible distributions of physical and
non-physical attributes over the regions of spacetime.)
Informally, the relation of determination is expressed by the idea
that once the physical facts are "fixed" so are all of the non-physi-
cal facts. That is:
(T2) For any complete specification of the physical facts, there
is exactly one correct specification of the non-physical
facts.
In te~s of the class of models just specified, if A and B are models
in that class and if A and B agree in the dist~1bution of the physical
attributes over regions of spacetime, then A and B must also agree in
the distribution of non-physical attributes over those regions. This
requirement picks out a proper sub-class of the class of models which
consist of all possible pairings of distributions of physical and
non-physical attributes. Specifically, it picks out the class of mod-
els which constitute all possible physical states of nature and which
••sociates with each distinct physical state of nature exactly one
non-phylical state of nature. A more formal characterization of th~
relation of Q.t.~in.tion which structures this class of models will
not be given her., although there do not appear to be any special dif-
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ficulties involved in providing one. 2S
To summarize: on the physicalist view, an objective matter of fact
is one which is dete~ined by physical facts; we have represented the
possible states of nature which exhaust the possibilities regarding
objective matters of fact in terms of a class of models each member of
which pairs distributions of physical and non-physical attributes in
such a way that the class is structured by a relation of determination
(i.e., members A and B cannot agree in the physical facts but differ
in the non-physical facts). So, any alleged attribute for which it is
contended that under identical physical conditions it might or might
not be realized is not an objectively real attribute of things. Such
an attribute will not be among those included in the class of non-
,
physical attributes employed in the model-theoretic construction de-
scribed above; hence, it will not be included among the attributes
studied in science. 21
21 Whether there is only one proper sub-class which satisfies the re-
quirement of dete~ination or more is not important at this point.
The current requirement is just that the structure of the natural
order a. conceived by physicalists is partly captured in terms of
the relation of determination. Below we shall discuss explanatory
considerations which may lead to isolation of a single class and we
shall discuss further the issues involved in isolating a unique
cl.s. of model. for lei.nce. Now, we are just concerned with what
the requirements are for capturing the notion of objectivity.
z, Thi., of course, i. exactly the Quinean position regarding the at-
tribute. Itudied in I ••antics, mentalistic psychology, and linguis-
tic••
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We note quickly that the above described characterization of deter-
mination of the non-physiclll facts by the physical facts fits well
with our discussion of the ontological thesis, (Tl). There the claim
was that for every (possible or actual) instantiation of a non-physi-
cal attribute there exists an instantiation of a physical attribute
which is such that (i) the occurrence of that physical attribute is
nomologically sufficient for the occurrence of the non-physical attri-
bute and (11) the two attributes co-occur in the same regions of
spacettme. (T2) is a logical consequence of (Tl) although the two
theses provide different kinds of insight into physicalist thought.
Further, (T2) entails the supervenience of the non-physical upon the
physical as well as its logical equivalent, the so-ca'led "indiscerni-
bility of physical identicals U (i.e., no difference without a physical
difference U ).27
The second thesis regarding objectivity concerns the formal system
of ecience, rather than the object of study in science. The question
to be addressed is. what are the marks, within the formal system of
science, of objective k~owledge? That is, which are the statements
which have a basis in fact for their truth value, statements which are
either objectively true or false because of the way the world is, not
21 The recent discus. ions on supervenience has revealed a number of
ambiguities and differences in formulation of a family of related
cl'~I' the theses (Tl) and (T2) represent the strongest claims
from among that family. See Kim (1978, 1981, 1982a), Haugland
(1982), Horgan (1981), Hellman and Thompson (1975), Friedman
(1975), and Healy (1978).
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because of the way that cognizers are?
Above we characterized a class of models which represent the range
of possible objective facts of nature; this class is to be viewed as
the class of intended models for the formal system of science, and
hence, it provides an interpretation for the language of that system.
Given this interpretation and given the determination of fact charac-
teristic of this class of models, we are concerned with the question
of what structure is "induced" into the formal system as a conse-
quence? Such structure may be sufficient to function as a criterion of
objective truth, and hence, provide a measure of which claims to truth
value are claims about which there is an objective matter of fact
(i.e., claims which are objectively true or false).z8
In recent years the doctrine that the physical truth determines all
the truth about nature has been favored by many physicalists. 2 ' Fur-
ther, it has generally been agreed that classical physicalist reduc-
tionism is too strong a thesis and that, however the thesis of truth
determination is to be cashed in, it must be compatible with the fal-
aehood of classical reductionism. To my knowledge, Quine has never of-
fered a precise rendering of truth determination, although it is clear
21 One of the virtues of classical physicalist reductionism was that
it provided such a criterion. derivability from the physical truths
was considered sufficient for being an objective truth, derivabili-
ty of the negation of a sentence sufficient for being an objective
falsehood.
2. For example, Quine (1969b), Friedman (1975), Hellman and Thompson
(1975), Haugland (1982), and Horgan (1981).
- 233 -
that he is not in any way committed to the strong reductionist thesis.
However, as we have seen in Chapter 2, both Hellman and Thompson and
Friedman have suggested precise formulations of truth determination
that are weaker than classical derivational reduction. For the pur-
poses of the current project, we shall offer only an informal charac-
terization of truth determination in science; the reader is referred
to the physicalist literature for more technical developments.
We shall assume that a given class of languages, L, for science is
fixed and that the class of models, H, described above provides an in-
terpretation for those languages; the thesis of truth determination in
science is as follows I
(T3) Within the class of models, H, if members ml and m2 of that
I
class agree with respect to the physical truths, then they
agree with respect to the truths formulable in all other
languages in L.
this thesis is very similar in formulation to that offered by Hellman
and Thompson; the crucial difference is that they give a technical
rendering of this claim in terms of the notion of elementarily equiva-
lent models, whereas we have not limited ourselves in that way. The
reason for this is that it is not clear at the present time whether
such. restriction is acceptable, given our full blown acceptance of
attributes and given the modal force of the claim intended to be ex·
prel.ed.
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How does (T3) serve the motivations of the program regarding objec-
tivity? A sentence, s, formulable in some language Li, has a claim to
objective status only if its truth value is fixed once the physical
truths are fixed. Thus, for s to be objective, it cannot be possible
that, given a specification of the physical truths, either s or its
denial could be true (i.e., there could not be models in H which,
though agreeing on all the physical truths, do not agree on the truth
value assigned to 5). As a criterion of objectivity, (T3) purports to
capture the idea that it is the mind independent physical facts about
the world that determines the truth value of s rather than subjective
features of cognizing persons in the world. Thus, a clear distinction
between objective truths and judgements sensitive to idiosyncratic
,
subjective features can be made.
The paradigmatic employment of this principle as ~ criterion of ob-
jectivity is found in Quine's attacks on the scientific status of
translation, reference and mentalistic psychology where he attempts to
marshall arguments designed to show that relative to the physical
truths, "truths" formulable in the language of translation theory,
mentalistic psychology and referential semantics are not truth deter-
mined by the physical basis for doctrine. Rather, they are sensitive
to variable and arbitrary features of the knowing subjects. We shall
return to a discussion of the issues here in Chapter 5 when we consid-
er the methodological role of physicalist theses in science.
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In passing, we note a second thesis concerning objectivity which
Hellman and Thompson have proposed and which we see as an important
component in a total development of physicalist doctrine. This second
thesis is that of the determination of reference:
(T4) For the class of languages L, and for the class of models H,
if members ml and m2 of H agree with respect to the refe-
rents of terms in the physical language, then they agree
with respect to the referents of terms in all other languag·
es of L.
This thesis captures informally the idea that all the term~ in the
language of science are implicitly defined by the physical bases. 3D As
a criterion of obj.ctivity, (T4) requires that terms for which an ex-
tension is not dete~ined by the fixing of extensions for all the
physical te~s will not be accorded objective status in science, since
what they are true of is not determined by the mi~J independent physi-
cal facts.
In a comparison of the present version of physicalism with classi-
cal reductionism, it emerges that, with respect to adequately captur-
inq the physicalist views about objectivity, both succeed. That is,
both implicit and explicit defin1bility capture the i~ea of objective
dete~in.tion of reference and both truth determination and derivibil-
ity capture the idea of objective dete~ination of truth. However, for
the.e purposes both oxplicit definibility and derivab11ity are more
" Sc. Hellman and Thompson (1975), p. 559 for discussion.
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than is required; the weaker theses suffice for concerns about objec-
tivity. Given the severe scepticism regarding the stronger theses in
recent years, this is good news for physicalists. However, as we have
repeatedly emphacized, the physicalist program has more far reaching
motivations than just concerns with objectivity; concerns about expl~­
nation are quite central to the program. As we pointed out in Chapter
2, such concerns are not adequately addressed by the determin~r;on
theses and must be handled in some other way. In the final section of
this chapter, we she:l turn to theses concerning explanation to ex-
plore how the explanatory motives of the program might be adequately
expressed without flying in the face of known difficulties regarding
classical reductionism. Before turning to this ta~k, however, we shall
first discuss same objections to the theses regarding objectivity.
There are six ~bjections to the theses just developed that we shall
consider:
(1) The notion of objectivity upon which the theses are based is a de-
fective one: there is no rea1m of pure fact that can be aeparated out
from the c~ntributions of the knowing subject. Hence, there are no
facts (or truths) that can stand independent of subjective factors and
determined by the physical facts (truths) exclusively.
REPLY, The claim of the objection that all knowledge involves contri-
butions from knowing subjects is correct. However, our theses are de-
signed to ca~ture a particular way of viewing nature anc science;
within this view, nature and science exhibit the sharp distinction be-
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tween objective and subjective factors described above, despite the
fact that all cognition involves a contribution from the cognizer.
None of this means that the conception of objectivity that we have em-
played is defective. Rather, the theses (T2)-(T4) are designed to cap·
ture a certain view of scientific objectivity, the physicalist's view
of objectivity in science. That view is not intended to be a general
view about all knowledge; instead, it is a stance taken from within
the practice of science as physicalistically conceived. Within the in-
stitution of science, there are a number of shared features (e.g.,
systems of representation, qeneral canons of method) which are fea-
tures relative to which science is practiced at a given time and which
are not themselves objective in the sense of being mind independent.
However, given these shared features,Sl a view of nature and science
can involve a sharp distinction between the subjective and the objec-
tivea physicalism, as we see it, is a doctrine which codifies such a
view of nature and science. It is part of the work of science on this
view to sort out the subjective "facts" (and claims) from the objec'"
tive facts (and claims). Thus, a theory of science and nature from
this perspective would substantiate the view of objectivity we are
considering from "the inside". None of these considerations implies
that this approach is "monopolistic" in the sense of being the only
approach to understanding nature or knowledge; none of this implieQ
11 The•• features may constitute a framework that is objective in the
.en.e of being shared by a community of cognizers or objective in
lome other sen••• See Putnam (1981) and Goodman (1978) for sugges-
tive discussion.
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the rejection of the insight that all knowledge involves a contribu-
tion from the knowing subject or that distinctions of the kind we are
talking about can only be made from within a system of concepts and
objects. We add to this highly conciliatory reply, however, that rel-
ative to certain cognitive goals the approach we are discussing may
constitute the best way of viewing nature and science. We think that
it is and that, at least, science as it is currently practiced also
embodies the assumption that it is.
(2) The theses of fact, truth and reference determination are not suf-
ficient for all scientific or cognitive purposes; hence, physicalism
(with respect to objectivity) is not a complete doctrine.
REPLY: This is quite obvious enough; it has been our view from the be-
t
ginning that it is a mistake to view ontological or determinationist
physicalism as adequate for all of the motives of even the physicalist
program itself, let alone for all cognitive purposes. Specifically,
such restricted forms of physicalism are clearly not adequate for ex-
planatory concerns as we argued in Chapter 2. However, the critics32
have been rather imprecise with their criticisms. The issue is not
whether physicalism is a complete doctrine - that isn't a very contro-
versial issue; the issue is whether it is adequate for a certain set
of cognitive purposes, and whether it is superior (for serving those
32 We have in mind here Putnam and Goodman. Neither has ever offered
any serious alternative to physicalism with respect to natural sci-
ence. This may indicate that they do endorse physicalism as a paro-
chial doctrine; hence, there may be substantial areas of agreement
between us.
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purposes) to other programs. It is the main purpose of this project to
develop a version of physicalism that is adequate for a certain set of
purposes; relative to such purposes, there is reason to believe that
physicalism is superior to other proposed programs. So, if the criti-
cs hold that physicalism purports to be a complete doctrine in some
highly monopolistic sense, then they are attacking a different program
from the one here defended. If they are claiming that physicalism is
not adequate to its own goals, much more argumentation is required
than has been offered so far, although it is granted that the theses
regarding ontology and objectivity are not sufficient for meeting
those goals.
(3) The relation of dete~ination is of no value in science since it
,
cannot be studied except in the presence of the stronger relation of
derivational reduction; there are no known cases of determination
without reduction. 3s
REPLY, First, at this point in our inquiry, the issue of utility is of
secondary importance to that of formulation; there is no reason to be-
lieve that there are not distinct relations of determination and deri-
vation, that one is weaker than the other and that both adequately ex-
prel. the relevant physicalist view regarding objectivity in science.
Henc., with respect to the adequacy of the formulation, the objection
i. not relevant. Second, it seems to be just false that determination
cannot be studied independently of derivation; of special interest in
II This objection was suggested by Hellman in conversation.
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the literature on the indeterminacy of translation have been alleged
violations of determination, such violations being identifiable as
such without any consideration based upon derivational reduction. 31
Third, however, the issue oi whether there are actual cases of deter-
mination without reduction hinges upon the thorny issues concerning
the expressive power of the language employed; in particular, if the
language is an infinitary language of sufficiently large cardinality,
then the formal system of science may inevitably involve derivational
reductions as well as determination.
(4) The theses of determination are trivially true and uninteresting;
since there are always physical differences corresponding to any actu-
a1 non-physical difference and, hence, there will always be covaria-
tion of physical with non-physical truth as well.
REPLY: The objection misses the point of the theses since, although
the contingent facts may be as described, the theses are concerned
with counterfactuals as well: the model theoretic constructions exhib-
it determination relations which have nomological force. Further, the
existence of accidental and "irrelevant" differences with respect to
specific attributes misses the real point of physicalist doctrine gen-
erally, which is that the world as conceived by the physicalist is the
way it is because of the way the physical attributes are di!.tributed.
This view ultimately points the way to discrimination of relevant31
84 The violations are established by constructing counterexamples to
the dete~inat1on cla~.
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from irrelevant physical attributes with respect to the instantiation
of given non-physical attributes. Hence, the mere existence of co-oc-
curing physical differences is not of interest unless they have nomo-
logical force and they are relevant. The objection, insofar as it de-
pends upon too weak a construal of the theses, is without force.
(5) Appeal to the physical ontology and doctrine as bases for objec-
tive fact and truth is of doubtful value since those bases are indet-
e~inate. There is no objective fact of the matter as to what the bas-
el consist in; hence, they cannot serve as bases for objectivity
within science.
REPLY. This objection depends upon the success of the objections con-
sidered earlier31 regarding the indete~inacy of the bases; insofar as
,
we have responded effectively there, the current objection carries no
additional weight. The position we are taking is that determination is
a physicalist requirement within science relative to ! selection of
physical~. The selection of bases may exhibit a component of
conventional choice which, relative to the purposes at hand, may be
arbitrary (i.e., all acceptable candidates may serve equally well).
However, this does not signal any malignant indeterminacy; rather, it
shoWI that there may be alternative ways of developing physics and
science which are equivalent relative to all purposes of scientific
II The notion of relevance here lead. into the explanatory motives ,of
the pro9ram to be discussed below.
al S•• Chapter 3.
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interest. Whichever way is chosen regarding the bases, the
physicalist's approach regarding objectivity requires that the theses
(T2)-(T4) must be satisfied. These theses impose constraints upon what
scientific objectivity consists in, given a choice of bases: the exis~
tence of equally acceptable alternative bases does not undermine this
requirement on the structure of science and nature.
(6) The relations of determination appealed to in the theses, being
semantical in nature, are themselves indeterminate relative to the
physical basesl there are no physical facts (truths) which fix the
facts (truths) about determination. Hence, by physicalist standards,
the theses are not objectively true or false and the relations de-
scribed by the theses are not objectively real.
REPLY; We defer discussion ~f this objection until the next chapter
where we discuss the use of physicalist principles for methodological
purposes. There we shall consider whether the physicalist can be ho-
isted on his own pitard. The objection here parallels the indetermina-
cy objection raised earlier with regard to (Tl)i the issues are wheth-
er ontological determination relations in nature present special
problems for physicalism and whether physicalist theses satisfy their
own demands.
4.3 THESES CONCERNING EXPLANATION
In the first section of this chapter, we saw that the ontological
thesis required that there be a mapping between physical and non-phys-
ical attributes which was nomological in force; this suggests
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that explanatory relations between physical and non-physical
attributes may be possible. In Chapter 1, the goals of the physicalist
program were seen to include a number of independent explanatory goals
which were related to increasing the explanatory power of the system
of scientific knowledge and, thus, the understanding that it yields.
Such explanatory power is gained through increasingly comprehensive
explanation of individual and general phenomena and through increased
unification and simplification of the whole scientific explanatory
system. In this section, we shall be developing a set of physicalist
theses which serve to express the physicalist's motivations concerning
explanation and which will clarify the nature of the "vertical" expla-
nation suggested by (Tl).
The physicalist program, as we have been construing it, focuses on
certain aspects of the system of scientific knowledge: in particular,
its "vertical" aspects. As we saw in Chapter 1, there are at least two
conceptions of unity of science which have been endorsed in the physi-
calilt literature. (1) the positivist conception of "unitary science"
the goal of which is the incorporation of all science within physics,
and (2) • view of science .s partitioned into distinct branches which
are related to one another in various ways and such that all branches
bear specific relations to physics. Our development of the physicalist
program falls clearly within this second camp; and the theses devel-
oped in this chapter are designed to capture some of the relevant re-
lations that all branches bear to physics without denyinq the dis-
tinctne•• of tbe branches from one another.
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In what follows, we shall focus upon theses regarding explanation.
Our approach is informed by the view that, given the existence of dis-
tinct branches of science, there are "inter-field"31 questions which
naturally arise; and, some, but not all of these questions, arise from
a physicalist outlook on the structure of nature and science. Physi-
calism, on our view, exerts a structuring influence upon science by
raising such questions.
To summarize: physicalism, as we conceive of it, e~resses the view
that science is partitioned into distinct branches which are connected
to the basic science and to each other by a variety of relations con-
cerning ontology, objectivity and explanation. The explanatory connec-
tiona between branches constitute a component of "inter-field" in-
t
quirY7 and, it is the nature of these connections and, hence, of this
type of inquiry that we shall be exploring below. sl
Before moving on to a discussion of the theses, we shall briefly
note the assumptions and constraints that we shall be working within.
First, as we have discussed in Chapter 2, the expression of explanato-
ry connections between branches must be made by reductive theses; and,
17 See Haull ana Darden (1977) for discussion of the notion of an in-
ter-field theory, the points we will be making in the text differ
lubltantially from their discussion of such theories.
S' Our primary focus, of course, is on relations that each branch of
Icience bears to the one balic science, physics. However, such re-
lotion, may b. mediated by relations that a given branch bears to
another non-b••ie Icience (e.g., relations between psychology and
phylici may be meaiated by relations between psychology and the
neuroscience. and between the neurosciences and physics.)
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they must not be purely non-linguistic in character. Second, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, we presuppose that there are principled divisions
between branches of science, such divisions being based upon the at-
tributes studied and the questions typically asked within branches.
Third, we assume that, contra a dominant tradition in the philosophy
of science, science is concerned with asking questions other than "why
questions"; in particular, questions asking in virtue of what physical
facts a given attribute or regularity occurs will be seen to be of in-
terest to the physicalist and not readily assimilated as a species of
why question. Finally, our discussion in Chapter 2 revealed that clas-
sical derivational reduction is both too strong and too weak as an ex-
pression of physicalist explanatory concerns. It is too strong in that
it requires, what is at best highly problematic, that there be explic-
it definitions in physical te~s of all scientific terms. It is too
weak in that it depends upon a flaw in the D-N model of explanation:
i.e., it assumes that derivation entails explanation. Thus, our devel-
opment of the explanatory theses must be strong enough to capture the
explanatory connections between branches without requiring implausible
physical definitions and without assuming a flawed picture of the na-
ture of explanation. These constraints point us to the rather vexing
problems of what the nature of explanation is and how we can identify
explanations, problems that we shall finesse as much as possible.
The physicalist's basic conviction is that all phenomena occur in
nature in virtue of physical phenomena. The notion of fact determina-
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tion expressed by (T2) serves to capture this idea from an ontological
point of view; the question remains of how this idea is captured with-
in the formal system of science. The theses about explanation should
provide an answer to this question by expressing the idea that all
phenomena are "explainable" in terms of physical phenomena. Despite
the apparent grandiosity of such theses, the task of formulating and
employing them is justified by the potential gains that we have dis-
cussed in Chapter 1. In what follows, we shall make precise the fol-
lowing ideal given that all individual phenomena, all regularities,
and all instances and exceptions to regularities that occur in nature
occur in virtue of physical phenomena, the physical doctrine provides
• basis for the explanation of all such phenomena.
By individual phenomena we shall be considering the instantiation
of attributes in regions of spacetime; instances of other ontological
categories (e.g., events, states) will not be considered. Further, we
shall be relying on a distinction between the "horizontal" and the
"vertical" study of the occurrence of individual phenomena. By "the
horizontal study of some phenomenon" will be meant the study of its
causal and, possibly, other relations to pre-existing, co-occurring or
subsequent phenomena that fall within the same "ontological level".
By "the vertical study of some phenomenon" will be meant the study of
its relations to phenomena that fall within different "ontological
levell". The specific ontological levels that exist are a matter of
scientific discovery, although, as science is conceived by the physi-
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calist, the physical level is identified along the lines discussed
above in Chapter 3 and is conceived of as the basic ontological level
for all of natural science. It is the vertical stu~y of phenomena
that is of special interest to the physicalist, because science, on
the physicalist view, is structured vertically by a set of relations
which relate the ontology and doctrine of all branches of science to
the physical bases.
With respect to the explanatioil of all individual phenomena, the
physicalist concern is with the vertical explanation of all phenomena
in physical te~s. Recall that the ontological th~sis called for a
physical attribute associated with each instantiated non-physical at-
tribute such that (i) the former is nomologically sufficient for the
t
latter and (11) the attributes occur in the same regions of spacetime.
Such a view suggests the potential for explanatory relations between
the attributes involved; and, it is to the nature of such explanations
that we now turn.
Vertical explanations may be seen as answers to questions of the
following form:
1. In virtue of what physical attributes did the instantiation of
such and such non-physical attribute occur?
2. In virtue of what did such and such physical attributes deter-
mine the instantiation of such and such non-physical attribute?
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A full answer to such questions consists in citing of the pertinent
physical and non-physical attributes and in explaining the instantia-
tion of the non-physical attribute in terms of the physical attribute.
To characterize the kind of explanation called for here, we shall
introduce the notion of a "realization theory for an attribute u • 3 '
Such an .dea is implicit in much work in the sciences and in a variety
of discussions in philosophy; the idee is that of an account of the
occurrence of a given attribute at one ontological level by showing
how the occurrence of attributes at a lower level are sufficient for
the occurrence of the higher level attribute. Examples of such theo~
ries include: the physical account of chemical valence, the microbial-
ogical account of genes and the transmission of traits across genera-,
tiona of species, functionalist accounts of mental states, theories of
the neurophysiological lttribut~s underlying psychological attributes,
the physical account of phenomenological properties such as transpar-
ency, temperature and pressure. In all such cases, appeal is made to a
theory of what physical attributes must be like if they are to provide
realizations of the given higher level attribute. Thus, functionalist
accounts of mental states would delineate the pattern of causal rela-
tiona which some physical system must exhibit if a given mental state
is realized by that system. The realization theory in this case con-
sists in specific characterizations of the pattern of causal relations
required without making any appeal to specific physical relations that
a, We .hall use the abbreviation 'RT' for this kind of theory.
- 249 -
might exhibit such a pattern. Then, for a given instantiation of the
mental state in question, the vertical explanation would consist in
(i) citing a set of specific physical relations and (ii) by appeal to
the functionalist RT, showing how those physical relations suffice for
the realization of th~ mental state.
To summarize: a RT provides an account of what it is in virtue of
which physical at~ributes realize non-physical attributes. The provi-
sian of RTs and the explanation of the realization of attributes in
terms of them is one of the goals of vertical science. The attainment
of such goals would also further the more general goals of the physi-
calist proqram in science by reducing the number of mysterious phenom-
ena in nature and by unifying science as a whole via vertical explana-
,
tory connections.
Given this brief ~~aracterizationof what ar, RT is the physicalist
explanatory thesis for individual phenomena is as follows:
(T5) All instantiations of non-physical attributes are explaina-
ble in terms of the physical bases and a realization theory
for the attribute instantiated.
The objective is, of course, to have an RT for every attribute instan-
tiated in nature. However, given the vastness of the number of attri-
but•• and given the probable "wierdness" of most of them, we are pre-
pared to retreat to the thesis that it is the instantiation of
scientifically important attributes that must be explained, where a
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scientifically importa~~ attribute is one which plays a role in scien-
tific explanations and theorizing. ~his may b~ vlewed as requiring
that any attribute introduced in science for explanatory purposes must
be accompanied by an RT such that every instantiation of that attri-
bute is explainable as required by the thesis. Whether or not we must
retreat to this position is not entirely clear to me, given that the
issue rests on such issues as how to individuate attributes and what
the range of ~ossible RTs is. At the minimum, however, the thesis does
serve the physicalist goals in vertical science in part, by requiring
the study of the realization of attributes appealed to in one branch
of science relative to the attributes in the physical basis.
It is important to see that RTs are not just explicit definitions
in physical terms as earlier versions of the program h3d it; even if
physicalist definitions were forthcoming,40 there would still be a
need tor RTs if the goals of explanation are to be served. This as-
s\'~es, what we take to be obvious, that attributes are not to be indi-
viduated by the criterion of nomological coextensivenessi if this were
the individuation criterion, then definability would lead directly to
identif~c.tion of the attributes expressed by the defined and the de-
fining terms. It is a major shortcoming of beth classical and recent
versions of physicalism that the role of explicit definitions has not
been very well understood in terms of the goals of the program.
40 And.. .1 we have seen in Chapter 2 this is not entirely out of the
qu••tion.
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Causey, for example,41 is at great pains to distinguish those nomo-
logical correlations w'lich express attribute identities and those
which express "causal relations": the criterion is the existence or
lack thereof of an explantory account of a causal relation between the
attributes in question. On our view, Causey falls way short of the
mark because his dichotomy is not exhaustive: he leaves out the possi-
bility of realization of one attribute by another and he takes much
too seriously the idea of attribute identity in science (it is a rari-
ty at best). He has the right idea in seeking explanatory accounts.
But, he encourages a false picture of the inter-dom~~n problem of how
attributes in one domain relate to those in others, at the expense of
appreciating the need for inter-domain explanations in general: the
goals of the program are sacrific~d by overemphasis on identity.
Further, as we saw in Chapter 2, Friedman's view that each non-
physical predicate is associated with a (possibly infinite) class of
physical predicates, although sufficient for his purpose of describing
thft relation of "weak reduction" in science, raises, but does not in-
dicate how to answer, the question "In virtue of what is each member
of the class of physical predicates a member of that class?" Simply to
say that each expresses an attribute which is a realization of the at-
t:ibute expressed by the non·physical predicate begs the explanatory
question, since, at the heart of that question is the quest for an un-
derstanding of why such and such a physical attribute realizes a cer-
41 See Causey (1977).
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tain non-physical attribute while other physical attributes do not. To
only respond that the former does and the latter do not begs the ques-
tion and leaves science with a large host of mysteries concerning re-
alization: the point of (TS) is to rid science of such mysteries.
The general point is that it does not matter for the achievment of
the explanatory goals of the proqram whether each non-physical attri-
bute is nomologically correlated with a single physical attribute or
whether, as Friedman and our own (Tl) allow, each non-physical attri-
bute is associated with an exhaustive class of nomological sufficient
conditions in the physical basis. Either way, the explanation of the
realization of non-physical attributes by physical attributes requires
something more if a large class of mysteries are to be eliminated from
our scientific representation of nature. The role of realization theo-
ries in science is the elimination of these mysteries. And thus, to
achieve the explanatory motivations underlying the physicalist pro-
gram, (T5) requires explanations, via RTs, of the realization of all
non-physical attributes by associated physical attributes.
We shall now turn to a discussion of theses concerning physicalist
explanations of regularities in nature. The original versions of the
physicalist program were concerned with what was called "the unity of
laws" 42 in science. The idea was, simply, that all laws of nature were
to be derivable from the laws of physics I such derivation was thought
42 See Carnap (1969).
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to be sufficient for the explanation of those laws and the
regularities they expressed. Although we fully support the motiva-
tions behind this version of the program, we are skeptical about the
specific thesis proposed. That is, we fully endorse the idea that the
physicalist program is motivated by a quest for increasing the expla-
natory power of the system of scientific knowledge by, inter alia,
vertical explanation of regularities, but we reject the classical the-
sis that expressed this motive. Our task now is to formulate an alter-
native.
The physicalist's conviction is th~t all regularities, their in-
stances and their exceptions are determined by underlying physical
phenomena; this conviction was captured from an ontological point of
,
view earlier by the thesis concerning the determination of fact, (T2).
Our question now is: How is this conviction to be expressed from the
point of view of the fonmal system of science?
Consonant with our introduction of the idea of vertical science
above, our approach here will center upon the following question:
given a set of non-physical regularities concerning some class of at-
tributes, what are the underlying physical attributes and regularities
which determine them? It is this and closely related questions that
are the object of inquiry within inter-field disciplines. In short,
vertical science is concerned with the lower-level mechanisms underly-
ing hiqher-level regularities. AI we saw above in discussing individ-
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ual phenomena, the questions of vertical science make no presumption
that higher-level attributes are realized uniquely by lower-level at-
tributes. Similarly now, no presumption is made that exactly one low-
er-level IImechanism" underlies a given higher-level regularity: there
may be multiple physical mechanisms which underlie the various in-
stances of a given regularity.
By a regularity, we shall mean a lawlike 43 relation between the in-
stantiation of attributes; such relations may be causal or not. By a
mechanism for ! regularity, we shall mean some set of physical attri-
butes and physical regularities which hold among members of the set;
again such regularities mayor may not be causal. The current point is
that, along with the idea that non-physical attributes may be multiply
realized is the idea that relations between such attributes may also
be multiply realized. 44
43 We shall not address the issues raised by the idea of "degrees of
lawlikeness" although their development could have an impact on how
the physicalist understands RTs and the nature of vertical explana-
tion. See Fodor (1975) and Davidson (l970) for preliminary explo-
ration of these is.ues.
44 We caution the reader about the complexities concerning these
points. depending upon how the issues concerning definition (cf.,
Chapter 2) are resolved, there may be "type-type" corre"lations be-
tween attributes, where the physical type is either disjunctive or
of higher order. ThuI, with respect to regularities there may be
lingle physical mechanisms reali&ing higher-level regularities,
where such mechanisms are "higher order" or disjunctive physical
mechanilms.
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Given these preliminaries, let us turn to the problem of formulat~
ing the physicalist thesis concerning the explanation of regularities.
Roughly, the view is that every possible instance and every possible
exception45 to the regularities formulated by the higher-level scienc-
es are explainable in terms of underlying physical phenomena. Such ex-
planations consist in identifying the non-physical attributes involved
in the regularity to be explained, identifying the physical attributes
that realize those non-physical attributes (on the specific occasion
to be explained) and providing an account of the relations between the
physical attributes in question which determine the relation between
the non-physical attributes that the regularity expresses. 16
For instance~ of a non-physical regularity, if a RT for each attri-
bute involved is known, and if the physical attributes that realize
the relevant non-physical attributes can be identified, and if the
physical relations between those attributes are known, then an in-
stance of a regularity is explained if the relation between the non-
physical attributes is explained in terms of the physical relations
between the physical attributes that realize the non-physical attri-
41 See Fodor (1975) for discussion of the idea that the regularities
in the higher-level sciences typically have exceptions.
41 Since the physical attributes may vary from occasion to occasion,
the issue of explaining the regularity itself, as opposed to each
po••ible instance, turns heavily upon the issues concerning defin-
ability. Since those iSlues are quite unclear, our formulation of
the physicalist theses focuses upon explanation of instances only.
We shall sU9gest that nothing more need be done to accomplish the
principal physicalist motivations regarding explanation.
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butes. That is, if non-physical attribute A is a cause of non-physical
attribute S, then an instance of this regularity is explained by cit-
ing the physical attributes C and D (which realize A and B respective-
ly) and by explaining (in physical terms) that C causes D. The physi-
calist thesis here is that every possible instance of a non-physical
regularity be explainable in this way, although it is not assumed that
,ali re,,'ations are causal.
The idea that regularities of the higher-level sciences typically
have "exceptions" has been emphasized by Fodor; the significance of
this idea for the concept of a law of nature is not entirely clear,
but for present purposes the issue can be by-passed. We shall assume
that Fodor is right in his claim and show how it can be fit into a
physicalist framework. Specifically, the physicalist requires only
that such exceptions be explainable along the same lines as the in-
stances. That is, if an exception to a regularity is a case in which
the antecedent but not the consequent attribute is instantiated (some
other attribute being instantiated instead), then such an exception is
explained if a physical explanation of the relation between the attri-
bute realizing the antecedent non-physical attribute and the attribute
realizing the non-physical attribute which replaced the expected at-
tribute exists and explains the relation between the two occurring
non-physical attributes. The physicalist view here is that every pos-
lible exception to a non-physical regularity has a physical explana-
tion.
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The physicalist thesis regarding the explanation of regularities is
as follows;
(T6) All instances and all exceptions to the regularities formu-
lated in the non-physical sciences are explainable in terms
of physical phenomena.
This thesis does not yield as a consequence the derivability of the
non-physical laws from the physical laws; hence, it does not appear to
capture the physicalist idea that the non-physical laws are explaina-
ble in terms of the physical laws as the classical views supposed.
However, it does not appear that such explanation of laws is required
to capture the idea that everything which happens in nature is explai-
nable in physical terms; (TS) and (T6) do not leave any room for some-
thing to take place without physical explanation. What goes unex-
plained are the regularities themselves (assuming definitions of the
right sort are not forthcoming), but this is not a major loss for the
physicalist as long as everything that could take place in nature ad-
mits of a physical explanation. Perhaps it should have been expected
that if not all attributes are physical attributes and if non-physical
attributes can be multiply realized by non-physical attributes, then
the regularities involving non-physical attributes would not in gener-
al be explailaable in terms of physical regularities. For now, we re-
ject the clalsical derivational thesis as well as the thesis that all
non-physical regularities are explainable in terms of physical laws.
In their stead we offer (T6) which, it should be pointed out, does not
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in the least preclude the possibility of finding uniqueness of under-
lying mechanism for some non-physical regularities or in finding phys-
ical explanations of non-physical laws: the point is that these are
not requirements of the program. Our contention is that the explanato-
ry goals of the physicalist program are served fully by (TS) and (T6).
We now turn to a consideration of two objections to the theses con-
cerning explanation; first, we shall discuss a claim that it is sub-
ject to indeterminacy and, second, we shall consider a claim that it
is "utopian" in character. As we shall see, both objections focus upon
problems that arise from the heavy employment of the notion of a real-
ization theory by the explanatory thesis.
The indeterminacy objection r~sts upon the claim that (T5) is de-
fective since it requires explanatory relations which are not objec-
tively real by physicalist standards. The argument for this claim is
as follows; the thesis supposes that for each attribute there exists
an RT which plays a central role in explaining the specific instantia-
tions of that attribute. However, there are no objective facts of the
matter (based upon physicalist considerations) concerning RTs, and
thus, the alleged explanatory relations between attributes are not ob-
jectively real.
In considering this objection, we shall assume that we have on hand
• well established physics and well established higher-level theories;
at issue i. the existence of RTs that are supposed to provide explan-
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tory accounts of the realization of the higher-level attributes. Spe-
cifically, is it the case that for each attribute there exists a un!-
que RT which provides "8 true account of what it is in virtue of which
the attribute gets realized"?
The idea behind the objection is that, if there are alternative and
equally acceptable RTs for a given attribute and if there are no ob-
jective, physical grounds for choosing among them, then there are no
objective facts concerning RTs or the "explanations" they provide.
Fuel for the objector's fire may be found in the Aufbau, where Car-
nap distinguish•• between (i) relation extensions and (ii) the essence
of • relation. The fo~er would correspond to the mapping between
physical and non~physic.l attributes a. described by (Tl); the latter
would correspond to our RTs and the explanation of the specific pair-
ings given by the mappings. Carnap held that accounts of the essence
of a relation were a species of metaphysical speculation since they
were not to be counted al objective or empirical; thus they are not to
be counted •• scientific. Analogously, it might be argued that RTs
are "metaphysical" accounts of mappings between attributes because
they are not empirically testable or based upon objeetive, physical
factl. 41
., For example, functionalist accounts of mental stat.s could be
cl.~.d to b. non-objective accounts of the e.lenee of the mental,
there bein; no fact of the matter a. to whether functionalism or
any of the opponent pOlition. (e.g., physicalilm, behaviorism,
Cartesian dualism) are the true account of the nature of mind. At
i ••u., of coura., i. how to argue for this cl.~ or for the claim
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According to the objection, it is entirely possible to introduce
RTs into the structure of science, but which RTs are introduced is a
matter that is not obj~ctive. The grounds for this claim are (i) there
are no empirical, methodological or theoretical considerations which
would decide between otherwise equally acceptable alternative RTs and
(ii) there are no physical considerations which determine which of
competing RTs are true and which are false. Hence, by the physical-
1st's own standard of objectivity, the choice between competing RTs
does not involve an objective matter of fact. In a nutshell, the ob-
jector poses the following question: what are the empirical and factu~
81 grounds upon which the choice between competing RTs rest? The ob-
jector's answer to this question is that there are none. It is to be
concluded that the introduction of RTs into science is not an objec-
tive, hence not a scientific, matter. Thus, the key notion upon which
the theses concerning explanation rests (viz., that of an RT) collaps-
es as do the theses themselves.
In reply to this line of objection, our strategy is to argue that
RTs are in no worse shape on the grounds suggested than any other kind
of explanatory theory in science and that what the objection shows is
that we must be careful in our understanding of how physicalism works
in providing structure to science. With regard to the first point, we
claim that with regard to testability, there is no reason to believe
that there is an objective fact of the matter about the essence of
mind.
• 261 -
that RTs are not subject to empirical test in the same way and to the
same extent as other theories. Compatibility with evidence, relations
to existing bodies of theory, and being subject to methodological
principles all apply to RTs in the same ways and to the same extent as
they do to other theories. "To the same extent" means up to the empir-
ical underdetermination of theory by evidence. It is not implausible
that, relative to all empirical considerations, there may w~ll be for
each attribute in science an equivalence class of theories that could
play the role of an RT for that attribute. But this, by itself, is not
sufficient to argue for the non-objectivity of RTs in general; among
other things, the point doesn't distinguish RTs from any other scien-
tific theory. As we argued above in connection with identifying the
physical ha~~s, 'we are faced in the situation imagined with an embar-
assment of riches (i.e., too many equally acceptable theories); and, a
choice must be made on "some" grounds for one of the alternatives.
Given such a choice, the resulting system of knowledge will be struc-
tured in accordance with (TS).
This reply, however, invites the following questionsl What is the
.tatus of the RT. within the physicalist system?, Do they formulate
claims that are lubject to physicalist principles? For example, is the
truth of the RTs determined by the physical basis as required by (T3)?
And, are instances of the claim formulated by a given RT explainable
in te~s of the physical basis as required by (TS)?
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If the cl.~ of the general non-uniqueness of RTs relative to all
empirical, theoretical and •• thodologieal considerations41 is true,
then it would appear that the truth of an RT (e.g., that mental state
" il realized by functional state F) i. not determined by the physical
balis nor are instances of it it explainable in terms of that basis. 4 '
Therefore, even if • given RT were to play the explanatory role re-
quired by (T5), it would appear to fall outside the scope of the phys-
iealist doctrine, and bence, either physicalism is false or RTs are
unacceptable parts of science. In such a case, physicalism is unaccep-
table by its own standards (i.e., it postulates a physicalistically
unacceptable relation).
To this argument, the physicalist has only one reply insofar .s he
I
intends to maintain that RT. are a part of natural science and he ac-
ceptl the general non-uniqueness of RTs. That is, the physicalist must
allow that RTs are "b.sic" within the system in that the choice of RTs
from -mong the many acceptable ones is made on non-physicalist grounds
and that, once made, it ia • feature of the system relative to which
d.te~in.tion and explanation of the non-physical levels of the system
are to be understood. in this respect, RTs are on a par with the bas-
•••••
41 Including physical conlideration., thu., there are no physical
facti which linv1e out one RT from amon9 the .any equivalent on.s.
4. Thu" for example, there i. no IT for the realization relation it-
••1f that would help locate the physical relation that realizes the
realization relation.
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~ '
We point out that this reply is not simply an ad hoc maneuver d~­
signed to save the doctrine of physicalism. The reaBon that t~lis is so
is that there is little reason to believe that RTs differ substantial-
1y from other scientific theories with respe~t to determination by
physical fact; and, this is the point at which care must be taken in
how to understand the role of physicalist doctrine in science. The
situation is, roughly, as followss relative to a given formulation l,f
physics, there are plausibly alternative formulations of the rest of
leienee: this is clearly true with respect to the choic~ of theoreti-
cal vocabulary for the special sciences, and it is conceivably true
for theoretical fo~ulations given a choice of vocabulary. Such alter-
natives may also be determined by differences in the RTs employed.
Now, the choice oetween f~ch alternatives may be underdetermined by
all empirical and methodological considerations including compatibili~
ty with physicalism (i.e., each formulation must be structured by the
principles of physicalism). The ditferences between such formulations
comes down to choices between explanatory structures employed in sci-
ence; and, these choices are not determined, nor are they suppos.d to
be determined by the physicalist, by physicali$t considerations. The
choice of which explanatory structures to em~loy in science is not ob-
jective in the physicalist sense, this is true of all such ~tructures,
not just those introduced by RTs. However, once these choices have
I' This doe. not mean that RTs or the bales are not revisable; it
m.~n. th~t the grounds for revision must be other than strictly
physicaliltic ones.
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been made, physicalist principles then structure the formulation of
scienG~ that em~loys them. Thus, physical~sm does not, as it should
not, fly in the face of the obvious com~onent of conventional choice
that exists in science. Thus, it is ~portant to understand physical-
ism a. not a doctrine which purports to provide principles that deter-
mine every choice made within science; physicalist principles charac-
terize the structure of science (and our view of nature) once certain
choices whicn are conventional in character are made.
AlthoU9h this strategy of reply successfully avoids th~ problem
posed by the general non-uniqueness of RTs, similar problems re-emerg.
with respect to the physi,calist status of (TS) and (T6) themselves.
For, if (TS) and (T6) are included ~ithin natural science, then they
,
must satisfy physicalist principles as follows I (i) their truth must
be dete~ined by the physical truth., (ii) the phenomena of explana-
tion must be "physicalized" (i .. e., there must be a set of physical at-
tributes each member of which is nomologically sufficient for some-
thing's being an explanation), and (iii) there must be an RT for
.~l.nation which explains how explanations are realized in nature.
ThUl, a. ~ith (Tl)-(T4), (TS) and (T6) have serious problems in sati!-
fying the demands of physicalilt doctrine on the assumption that they
are parts of natural science. As we shall see in Chapter 5, this
point i •••pecially importane with re.pect to understanding what kind
ot the••: the phylicalist th•••• are. In particular, we shill accept
the ide. that physicalilt doctrine is not objectively determined on
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physic.l~st grounds, and conclude that physicalism must be seen as not
just another body of theory within science, but rather as principles
that are chosen on grounds that fall outside of scientific theorizing:
they are principles that constrain such theorizing without being just
another instance of it.
The second objection to the theses concerning explanation has been
expressed by a number of authors: frequently the attacks have been di-
rected a9ainst classical reductionist views, but there is little doubt
that the objectors would launch similar attacks against our version of
physicalilm. Ca~sider the following I
It (Quine's version of physicalism] is not a reductionist
doctrine of the sort lometimes imagined. It is not a utopian
dreem of OU~ being able to specify all mental events in
physiological or microbiological terms. It is not a claim
that luch correlations even exist, in general, to be discov-
ered; the groupings of events in mentalistic terms need not
Itand in .ny sYltem_tic relation to biological groupings. 51
But the evidence for such physicalistic reducibility is
negligible, and even the claim is nebulous since physics it-
.elf il fragmentary and unstable and the kind and conse-
quence. of reduction envisaged are vague. 12
It may be that the operative principles's are not only un-
known but even bumanly unknowable because of limitations on
our own intellectual c.p.citie•••• ; our minds are fixed
biolo9ical sYltems with their intrinsic scope and limits.
II S•• Quine (1979), p. 163. Althou9h Ouine talks of the mental and
biolovy, it il quite likely that III of bil remarks apply to rela-
tions between the mental and physics and between other branches of
Icience Ind phYlicl.
II s•• Goodman (1978), p. 5.
II Chomlky 11 hire dilcu••in; physical or whatever other principles
may be required for a "physicalist" understanding of mind.
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We can distinguish between "problems," which lie within
these limits and can be approached by human science with
some hope of success, and what we might call "mysteries,"
questions that stmply lie beyond the reach of our minds,
structured and organized as they are, either absolutely be-
yond those limits or at so far a remove from anything that
we can comprehend with requisite facility that they will
never be incorporated within explanatory theories intelligi-
ble to humans. We may hope that the questions we pursue fall
into the domain of "problems" in this sense, but there is no
guarantee that this is 50. 54
The thrust of the objection that we shall consider is that there is no
good reason to believe that a program based upon the theses concerning
explanation will be successful. Such theses lead us to search for far
more than it is reasonable to expect that we shall find; in short, a
program based upon such theses is utopian.
The .,qumentsy for this claim appear to be of many types; none, how-
ever, are or purport to be "in principle" arguments. Rather, it is
suggested that (i) the meagre success of the program to date provides
us with some grounds for believing that the program is not likely to
succeed, (ii) there are examples that strongly suggest that the prac-
tical problems of actually carrying out the program is beyond us,
(iii) the enormity of the task (viz., to provide RTs for all attri-
butes that play an explanatory role in science and to describe the
mechanisms that underly all higher level regularities) makes it diffi-
cult to conceive of the program's being carried out, (iv) perhaps most
interestingly, there may be "mysteries" in Chomsky's sense which don't
14 Se. Chomsky (1980), p. 6. Although this is not couched as an objec-
tion to physicalism, the suggestion is that an understanding of the
physical blsel of mind may be beyond our reach.
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admit of solution by us. Rather than develop these objections in de-
tail, we shall simply offer a brief characterization of some lines of
reply. Below, we shall return to a consideration of the so-called
"utopian" character of the theses in our discussion of the empirical
status of the theses and their methodological roles in science.
First, it should be clearly noted that the current objection is not
one that concerns the adequacy of the theses. at issue is not whether
the motivations of the program are being served by the theses formu-
lated. Rather, the objection suggests that the theses are too strong
to be plausible; this consideration has led some (e.g., Quine) to re-
treat to a weaker form of physicalism. As our earlier discussion in
chapters 1 and 2 has been at pains to point out, such retreats involve
,
a tradeoff between adequacy and plausibility: to retreat to weaker
theses involves giving up some aspect of the motivations for the pro-
gram. In the present case, to give up the explanatory goals seems to
be giving up one of the prtmary goal of the program; it is for this
reason that ,it is more important to attempt to develop an adequate
version of physicalism than to retreat too quickly in the face of the
difficulties encountered in working out the program in science.
Second, a. we noted above, none of the arguments for the utopian
character of the theses are in principle arguments & it has not been
suggested that succe•• of • program based upon the theses of physical-
ilm i. a conceptual or logical impossibility. This raises some ques-
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tions about what kind of objection the charge of being utopian is and
whether or not physicalist theses are the kind of thesis for which
such a charge is pertinent.
With regard to the first question, the arguments based upon past
limited success and upon practical difficulty in carrying out the pro-
gram are not very compelling; such arguments suggest that being utopi-
an means to be implausible in the face of good evidence or to be not
within our reach for practical reasons. If this is what it means to be
utopian, then the arguments offered do not very strongly support the
charge; such arq~ents are not distinguishable from the typical skep-
tical arguments offered by "nay sayers" of any stage of scientific
progress. In support of this reply, we note that very little systemat-
ic study has been given to the explanatory proposals suggested (e.g.,
the role of RTs in inter-field research); what study there has been is
not anywhere near as gloomy as Goodman suggests. It is important to
escape from the classical picture of the physicalist program to see
that inter-disciplinary research is a rich area that has yet to be ex-
plored for the most part.
Chomsky's distinction between problems and mysteries is highly sug-
gestive; however, it is not always easy to distinguish the one from
the other and it is most important to keep lines of research open
rather than to close them off prematurely. The proponents of the pres-
ent objection have given neither a clear characterization of what
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"utopianism" is supposed to be nor a clear characterization of the
types of argument that they employ. The mere possibility of the exis-
ten~e of mysteries is not in itself any reason to close out the pro-
gram ba~ad upon the explanatory these~. In recalcitrant cases it is
better to "wait and see" than to jump on a slteptical bandwagon.
And finally, with regard to the second question posed above, even
if, in some sense, the program is utopian, it is not entirely clear
that this is a bad thing; it all depends upon the type of program
physicalism is. As an empirical research project it may mean that
eventually it must be abandoned; but, as a methodological ideal toward
which scientific research is directed, though it can never be at-
tained, it may Qe superior to any other in achieving the goals and
purposes toward which science is directed. Hen~e, the charge of being
utopian is not obviously a problem; below, we shall discuss this line
of reply to the objection further.
To summarize this chapter: we have developed three sets of theses
which are designed to jointly express the motivations of the physical-
ist program in science. The theses, (T1) - (T6), fully express those
motivations and, hence, are adequate by the criteria set out in Chap-
ter 1. With regard to their acceptability, we have considered a vari-
ety of objections, 80me of which we have rebutted, others of which are
Itill pending- Specifically, the two outstanding objections are (1)
tbat the the.es of phYlicllism Ire utopian and (2) that the theses of
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physicalism do not satisfy the demands they themselves make on claims
to truth in natural science. In the next chapter, we shall explore
ways of defusing the force of these objections.
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5. THE METATHESES OF PHYSICALISM
The purpose of this chapter is to formulate a number of metatheses
concerning the physicalist theses developed in the last chapter. The
importance of having metatheses lies in the clarification they provide
concerning (i) the kind of theses that physicalism involves (e.g., !
priori, ! posteriori), (i1) the kinds of considerations that are rele-
vant to acceptance or rejection of physicalist theses (e.g., empirical
developments in science), (iii) the kinds of things to which the thes-
es are supposed to apply (:.g., scientific theories and their do-
mains), and (iv) the ways in which physicalist theses can be used in
the conduct of scientific inquiry.1
,
During the past fifty years, there has not been complete agreement
regarding the metatheses of the program, although there has been some-
thing like a received or dominant view. As we shall formulate it, this
Received View consists of three metatheses as follows;2
(HI) The theses of physicalism apply to natural scienc~.
(K2) The theses are empirical theses of natural science.
(H3) The theses playa regulative role in the conduct of natural
leienee.
1 See Chapter 1 for discussion of the non-cognitive gains of the pro-
9ram.
a Ixpre'lion of such claims aa ("1)-("3) are found in Fodor (1975),
H.l~.n and Thompson (1975, 1977), Friedman (1975), Field (1972),
Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), Cauley (1977), and Boyd (unpublished).
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Despite the dominance of (H1)-("3), there have been voices of oppo-
sition from thinkers not entirely unsympathetic to physicalist
thought. For example, Chomsky has been quite outspoken in his attacks
upon the alleged empirical status of physicalist theses3 as well as
upon the ideas that such theses have a well-defined, independently
specified scope of application and that they play the methodological
roles attributed to them by physicalists. In addition, Schaffner and
others have urged that classical physicalist reductionism does not in
fact play the supposed methodological roles in biolOgy and microbiolo-
gy.4 Thus, at least some have claimed that (Hl)-(M3) are either too
vague or simply false.
Our plan in ~he remainder of this chapter is as follows: first, we
shall review (HI) and clarify some of the issues and alternative
claims a~ailable to the physicalist; second, similarly, we shall re-
view ("2) and discuss some of the issues and alternative claims re-
garding the status of the theses; third, we shall discuss (M3) along
similar lines but in more detail. Our goal in these discussions of the
metatheses will be to get a view of the "lay of the land" in order to
make tome decisions concerning whether to retain or revis~ the Re-
ceived View. Finally, since it is our position that the Received View
is not tenable as it stands, we shall suggest some lines of revision
and delineate some of the pertinent issues that should be explored in
SSe. Chomsky (1968, 1975, 1978) for such attacks •
• s•• Hull (1974), Schaffner (1977), Wimsatt (1976), Maull (1917).
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future research; as will be seen, such revision will also provide ways
of responding to the objections raised against the physicalist theses
(e.g., that they are utopian). That the Received View is defective,
as some critics have pointed out, is not seen by us as a disaster for
the physicalist program; rather, recognition of its shortcomings leads
us to a fuller appreciation of the physicalist program in science as
well as to a deeper understanding of the nature of science itself.
5.1 THE SCOPE OF THE THESES
---------
In our discussion so far, we have pretty much assumed that the
physicalist program is explicitly concerned with natural science.
However, this is not an assumpti~n universally shared by
,
physicalists; some view the doctrine as applying to all phenomena and
knowledge, not just that which occurs within the confines of natural
science. We shall identify two competing conceptions of the scope of
physicalist doctrine as follows:
1. broad physicalism - the view that physicalist theses apply to
all phenomena and all claims to knowledge.
2. narrow physicalism - the view that physicalist theses apply to
all phenomena and claims to knowledqe that fall within the
boundaries of natural science.
Perhaps, Quine is the most prominent proponent of broad physical-
ilm; this is how he expressed his position recently_
nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of an eyelid,
not the flicker of a thought, without some redistribution of
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microphysical states.!
Such a claim construes physicalism as an all encompassing doctrine
which applies to all claims that can be considered objectively true or
false and to all phenomena that can be considered real. Although we
are not entirely unsympathetic to this view, it is a view of physical-
ism which occasionally leads t~ embarrassment, as Quine himself has
publicly acknowledged. s Not only do the ordinary objects of our per-
ceptual world fail to fit cleanly into a physicalist framework, but
other kinds of knowledge appear to be problematic for the physicalist
(e.g., aesthetic, moral): Goodman has been quite concerned to remind
the physicalist of such liabilities.
Although we pelieve that the broad physicalist is not left with
nothing to say regarding such matters, we do not intend to explore
this dispute in the current project. First, whatever the outcome of
such dispute, all physicalists hold to the idea that the theses apply
within natural science. Second, historically, the doctrine is tied
most closely to natural science. Third, from a strategic point of
view, if ~he doctrine cannot succeed for natural science, then there
would appear to be little point in considering the broader construal;
and, as we have seen, narrow physicalism appears to have its hands
full in defending against objections. Finally, there is reason to be-
lieve that physicalist ideas have a central place in scientific
I See Quine (1978).
• See Quine (1981).
- 275 -
thouqht a. it now tak.s place; and, as we saw in Chapter 1, the moti-
vatioDa of the progr.m can be viewed a. being focused upon gains re-
sulting from a certain kind of growth of science (i.e., growth toward
• goal state with the structural features described by the theses).
For the•• re••on., we have assumed narrow physicalism and will contin-
ue to do 80 in the remainder of this project; whether or not a broader
construal of the program il viable is a matter we shall leave op~n.
Again, if the narrow construal fails, there is little need to explore
the i ••u.. that ari~. that are peculiar to • defense of the broader
view.
Another consideration militating for the narrow construal is the
erima facie impl.~libility of the broad view with regard to the expla-
natory these•• The idea of • realization theory for "beauty" boggles
the mind. On the other hand, oxplanatory concerns are, in general,
central to Icience, and the explanatory gains promised by the success
of the physicalist pro~cam are quite tempting; these same kind of ex-
plan.tory ;ains are not a. tempting with regard tu moral O~ aesthetic
matter•• And, a. we bave noted, they are le•• plausible. In science,
explanatory connections at all po~ntl and in all directions are at •
premiua, not 10 in all are•• of thought.'
, It i. aOlt likely the ca•• that physicalilm underwrites a clearcut
"fact-value" distinction in nature for roughly the rea.onl cited in
the text. i.e., there are not likely to be any phy.icalist account.
of value. to be had.
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So, given our assumption of narrow physicalism, the question of
greatest importance that arises 1~: is it possible to independently
characterize nature and natural ~cience? What hangs upon a satisfacto-
ry answer to this question is (i) whether or not the theses may be
said to have a well defined content, (i1) whether or not there are
clearly defined sources of confirmatory and non-confirmatory evidence
for the theses, and (iii) whether or not there is a well defined scope
of application for physicalist principles employed in the methodologi-
cal roleB supposed by physicalists (cf., ("3». Hore specifically,
satisfactory answers to this question will determine whether or not
physicalist theses are vacuous or not, empirically testable or not,
and usable or not. What, then, is natural science and its intended
I
object of study?
Clearly, a full answer to such a (.uestion is well beyond the scope
of the current project; in what follows, we shall briefly survey the
situation and attempt to set up the problem as it pertains to physi·
calism more fully. Barly physicalists, such as Carnap and Feigl, were
concerned to distinguish natJral science from formal science (e.9-,
logic and mathematics) and to distinguish the natural order from the
abstract re.lm. Itudied within the formal sciences. Thus, the natural
crder was construed as a spacetime manifold the extents of which put
upper limits upon the phenomena with which we may be in causal con-
tact. Not only doe. such. picture put l~its upon what is to count as
natural phenomena (e.g_, mathematical objects are ruled out, for exam-
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ple), but there is implicit endorsement of the idea that only th~se
types of phenomena with which we' have some kind of causal connectio&~
are legitimate objects of knowledge within natural science (e.g.,
again, knowledge tof abstract entities is not knowledge withir. natural
science.) Thus, knowledge concerninq some phenomenon must be mediated
by cau,al contact with the phenomenon if it is to count as knowledge
within natural science.
Further, early physicalists conceived natural science as not in-
eluding theory of values (e.g." moral or aesthetic phenomena). Al-
though such phenomena are part of the natural order, knowledge con-
cerning them is not part of natu,al science. (The reasons for this
claim presentedpy the early physicalists would take us too far
afield.) However, we shall tAke it for granted that the claim is in
fact corract (i.e., that value theory is not part on natural sci-
enee).'
Finally, Putnam' has suggested a distinction between "hard" and
"soft" sciences. The distinction is not clearly made, but it appears
to be based upon a marked difference between the methods of the two
kinds of science. soft sciences are infected with "interest relativi-
ty" whereas hard sciences are not. As a consequence, soft sciences do
• If value. are a part of the natural order, then t~is exclusion m':ans
that natural science is not concerned with Qll AI :cts of the n4tu-
ral order; there are other conditions besides onto~o9ical condi.tions
which bear on whether or not Eomething is a part oi natural science.
, See rutn-m (1975).
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not conform to physicalist standards whereas hard sciences do. We are
nOL in a position to layout succinctly what interest relativity is
supposed to be or ~O judge whether it is a coherent notion. Putnam
seems to think that it is and that psychology, semantics and the 50-
cial sciences satisfy it, whereas physics and biology do not. We
shall read Putnam as holding that it is the: "softnt.ss" of certain sci-
ences which lead to their failure to conform with physicalism; hence,
the distinction he suggests does not, on our reading, depend upon sat-
isfaction of physicalist theses For present purposes, then, we shall
remain open to Putnam's alleged distinction betwen sciences (we shall
read "hard science" as "natural science"), but we shall not stand com-
mitted to his particular assi~ nents to one or the other kind. Hence,
it is p~s8ible that scientific knowledge includes soft and hard sci-
ences as Putnam su)geet~, but that the ~pecific sciences he claims to
be soft may be "hard", at a minimum, they are hard cases to decide
upon. Again, for our purposes, the division is to be seen as separat-
ing natural (harrl) science from other bran;hes of kno~,ledge on the ba-
sis Qf methods; methods which involve reference to the interests of
the knower and which involve ~ertain forms of projection and rational-
ization are not natural science. 10
11 We are incli~ed to agree with this claim, but think it incorrect to
attribute such n.ethoda to psychology or semantics and, hence, to
view them as not properly within the scope of physicalist theses.
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To summarize to this point: our problem is, independently of physi-
calist theses, to characteriz~ natural science and its subject matter.
So far, we have gone through a series of exclusions from which we may
conclude that strategy for delimiting the boundaries of natural sci-
ence proceeds along two fronts: (i) ontology and (ii) method. Thus,
formal science is excluded on the grounds that its ontology is not
part of the nat\lral order; value ":«heory and the "soft sciences" are
excluded on the grounds that their methods of inquiry and justifica-
tio" depart from those characteristic of natural science, despite the
fact that values and the subject matter of the soft sciences occur
within nature.
We observe that if part of the method of natural scien~e is to re-,
quire that phenomena and knowledge that fall within its domain must
conform to physicalist principles, then an independent characteriza-
tion of the scope of such principles is not going to be forthcoming.
If, on the other hand, such principles are not part of the method,
then the only burden would appear to be that of developing an accepta-
ble characterization of the method and ontology of natural science
which correctly constrain what is to count as natural phenomena and
knowledge within natural science. BecaU6e (M3) requiles that the
theses playa methodological role in science, it is not at all clear
that the physicalilt can escape the objection that the scope of the
the••• i8 not independently characterized and thus that tl.e theses are
••If·lupporting and trivial. For the present, we shall leave open
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this issue. However, we shall return to it below to consider whether
or not it is possible to include physicalist theses within the class
of principles which delimit natural science without trivializing the
physicalist program.
5.2 THB EMPIRICAL STATUS OF THE THESES
("2) has been a quite central tenet of the Received View. Its 5ig-
nificance is, at least, twofold: first, the theses are viewed as sci-
entific hypotheses subject to confirmation or
refutation by arguments based upon empirical evidence and Lhe methodo-
logical principles of natural science; and second, given (M1), the
theses, being a part of natural science, apply to themselves. In what
,
follows, we shall discuss these points in turn with an eye toward
problems that may exist for ("2). As we shall see, some rather serious
problems do in fact exist and later in this chapter we shall consider
the possibilities for revision concerning the type of theses that
physicalist doctrine is constituted by.
The alleged empirical status of the theses raises the following
questions, (1) what kinds of evidence and forms of argument are perti-
nent to the confi~ation of physicalist theses?, (2) what kinds of ev-
idence and forms of argument are pertinent to the disconfirmation of
physicalist theses?, and (3) what is the nature and status of the pro-
gram for gathering evidence and presenting arguments bearing on the
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theses?11
As suggested by proponents of the Received View, the primary sourc-
es of evidence for the evaluation of physicalist theses are develop·
ments in science; given such developments, there ~re, at least, four
types of argument that might be proposed in the service of confirma-
tion of the theses. First, it might be thought that only by an exhaus-
tive study of all cases within the structure of scientific knowledge
and ontology could an a~!quate assessment of the theses be made; thus,
only in some ideal limit of scientific development could the theses be
evaluated. Only the complete unfolding of science will reveal whether
or not the theses are true. Now, not only is this a totally impracti-
cal proposa. because it simply defers indefinitely the empirical as·
I
sessment of the theses, but it also is not a sound proposal since the
structures of knowledge and ontology are "too big" for a case by case
assessment conducted by humans. This method of assessment has been
mentioned only to point out some of the issues that must be met by a
more acceptable one: first, assessment must take into account the tem-
poral unfolding of science and hence it must reach into the future;
and second, aSlessment must take into account the inaccessible parts
ot the knowledqe and ontology of science.
11 8.c~u.e the the••• are more or less logically independent and be-
eaule they Ire of quite dift.~ent types (e.g., linguistic and non-
linguistic), thtt ki~d. of evidence and arguments pertinent to their
evaluation may '~ary considerably. Hence, a full treatment of the
above qu••tionl m".t take this potential variability into account.
In the pr•••nt project, we shall avoid the full complexity of this
talk.
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A second strategy for marshalling evidence to support physicalist
theses involves some form of induction based upon developments in sci-
ence. Such a strategy is perhaps the dominant one and is clearly su-
perior to a case by case study insofar as it promises to permit access
to temporally distant versions of science as well as to all pointa in
the structure of scientific knowledge and ontology: such access is to
be based upon the consideration of a finite number of actual develop-
ments. However, despite these virtues, there are problems with this
approach, not all of which are easily fended off.
First, in a recent monograph, 12 Boyd has discussed what looks lik~
a fatal flaw in the general conception of how physicalism is to be
tested: if phy~icalism is an ontological view which is expressed in
t~rms of the ,ioctrine of definitional and derivational reduction of
the vocabularies and theories of all branches of natural science to
physics, then inductions upon successful reductions are not legitimate
confirmatory arguments for the ontological view: "they commit the fal-
lacy of arguing from the features of a formal system to features of
the lnterpretation of the system". 13 Boyd's point i~ well taken and an
important insight into the problem of the empirical testing of physi-
calist theses. However, the critical point is not clearly pertinent to
the testing of our version of physicalism since we have gone to great
lengths to differentiate linguistic and non-linguistic theses within
12 See Boyd (unpublished).
II See Boyd (unpublished), p. 32.
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our formulation and we urge the independent testing of such theses.
The issues of whether or not this is possible and of how it is to be
done if possible are outside of the scope of the current project.
Boyd's point should be kept in mind when these issues are addressed,
needless to say.
Se~ond, Goodman suggests 14 that the scientific developments that
have in fact occurred which are supportive of physicalism are quite
minimal; thus, of course, an inductive argument for physicalist theses
cannot get off the ground. In response, we are here concerned only
with the acceptability of certain forms of argument, not with their
actual merit vis! vis physicalism. Further, Goodman's discussion is
so brief as to qat permit close scrutiny of his claim. Is he, for ex-
ample, talking of classical redu~tionism or of some other form of
physicalism? More importantly, what is the argument for his scepti-
cism? Has Goodman done the survey of current science as it bears on
physicalist theses that is required for his pronouncement? If not,
then it is difficult to take his claim seriously. Any serious assess-
ment of the empirical standing of physicalist theses must involve a
detailed survey of various branches of science and their interconnec-
tions. 11
14 S~e Goodman (1978).
1. S~. Opp.nhe~ and Putnam (1958) for perhaps the only serious effort
in the physicalilt literature to conduct the required survey.
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Third, there are a number of questions regarding the nature of an
inductive argument based upon developments withln natural science
which have not been adequately addressed by physicalists. It ib in the
difficulty in providing satisfactory answers to these Questions that
the real problems for inductive strategies for confirming physicalism
exist;
1. What counts as a representative sample of cases sufficient for
provid1nQ Q basis for an induction? (e.g., are there specific
criti';al cases that must be included in any sample?)
2. What counts as a good case such that it belongs within the ba-
sis for an induction? (any science, mature science, .•. ?)
3. Is there a well defined principle of induction which permits
the inference from the basis to the entire structure of sci-
ence?
4. What assumptions &re made about the structure of science and
nature which permits the application of inducti\'e methods? Is
there some assumption of uniformity made which may underwrite
an induction but which may also be question-begging vis ! vis
physicalism? Is it assumed that all natural SC1ences are alike
in some respect? If so, what respect?
S. Does the employment of inductive methods presuppoBe that the
Icope of the physicalist doctrine is well defined? If so, then
tn. fate of inductive arguments depends ~pon satisfactory reso-
lution of the difficulties that (Hi) faces.
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Full exploration of the issues raised by these questions fal~s out-
side of this project. However, we contend that no satisfactory r scus-
sion of these issues exists anywhere in the physicalist literature and
that the implicit and explicit reliance on inductive forms of argument
for physicalism is not justifiable at this time. This suggests that,
if these questions cannot be satisfactorily answered and if no other
fo~s of emp.rical argument for physicalism are provided, then the em-
pirical status of the doctrine is dubious. We shall now leok at some
alternative forms of argument that have been suggested to see if any
are clearly acceptable.
A third form of confirmatory argument that might be employ~d in
support of physicalism runs as follows: if assumption o[ the tru~h of
,
physicalist th~~es leads to certain kinjs of scientific success (e.g.,
discoveries, theoretical advances), then a plausible explanation of
such success is that the yssumption is true, and herl~\J, S~ are the
theses. If, further, all other available explanations of success are
inferior, then the physicalist theses would gain support via an infer~
enee to the best explanation.
The virtues of such a fo~ of argument are similar to those of in-
ductive arguments (i.e., it ~ermits inference on the basis of a finite
set of actual cases to the entire structure of fully developed science
and its ontology). However, the liabilities of inductive strategies
dre also shared; analogI to the questions raised above can be easily
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formulated for the form of argument now being considered. Thus, the
identification of le9it~ate cases for which a success argument ap-
plies, the conditions and assumptions which underwrite the employment
of "inference to the best explanation", and satisfactory solution to
the problems besetting (H1), are all part of the burden that support-
ers of the present form of argument must bear. As indicated above, we
are skeptical about the prospects for meeting these difficulties.
The last form of supportive argument that we shall consider has
been offered by Boyd. 11 He suggests that support for physicalism can
be obtained from "possibility arguments" which undermine inappropriate
scepticism and provide some plausibility for the theses. He cites
three cases drawp from contemporary science which ar~ alleged to dem-
onstrate that traditional thorns in the physicalist's side are not as
sharp as opponents of physicalism think. Thus, he suggests that (i)
functionalist metatheories for psychology, 11 (ii) the discovery of mi-
crobiological mechanisms for genetic transmission of traits, and (iii)
developments in artificial intelligence research all provide grounds
for rejecting stock skeptical arguments against physicaljsm by showing
the possibility of physical realization of non-physical phenomena
(e.g., intentionality, intelligence, life).
11 See Boyd (1980).
11 We observe that the promise of functionalism has significantly fad-
ed in recent years, given its apparent inability to handle ment~l
Itltes with either propositional or qualitative content.
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We shall not consider the specific merits of Boyd's possibility ar-
guments here; but, we suggest that as a form of confirmatory argument
for physicalist theses these arguments ~ ~e subject to the same diffi-
cultie$ faced by the previous forms. That is, although they may
achieve their purpose of undermining inappropriate scepticism, it is
not at all clear how much support they provide for the theses and
whether or not it is possible to specify and defend the conditions and
assumptions upon which such arguments can be said to confirm the thes-
es. The principal issue facing all of the forms of argument we have
considered is whether or not they can b~ justified as legitimate forms
of argument with respect to physicalism without making assumptions
which beg the question in favor of physicalism; that is, what assump·
tions permit the inference from a finite set of cases to all of sci-
ence without begging the question?
W, now turn to a consideration of disconfirmatory evidence and ar-
guments. As we shall see, the situation is problematic in roughly the
same way as fOL confirmatory evidence and arguments. The second ques-
tion raised by the alleged empirical status of the theses can be res-
tated as follows I what are the kinds of developments in science that
would provide an evidential bc'sis for disconfirmatory arguments
against the theses ot physicalism? In addressing this question, the
first and principle form of argument th4t we shall consider is that of
providing an explicit counterexample to physicalist theses. As natural
as this form of argument is, it is beset with several difficulties.
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The first such difficulty is that identifying legitimate counterex-
amples is quite problematic. There are, as Field18 has pointed out,
quite probably no "crucial experiments" that would decide the fate of
physicalism once and for all; thus, there are no easy routes to the
discovery of counterexamples. Further, as empirical theses, the physi-
calist theses are alleged to possess a considerable amount of "cen-
trality" within the corpus of scientific knowledge. 1. Thus, there is a
stronger conservative pressure to retain physicalist theses as com-
pared with specific clalms which constitute counterexamples to those
theses. In addition, such centrality as well as the important methodo-
logical roles played by physicalist theses suggest that the thes~~
would not be easily given up unless viable alternative views capable
of filling the gaps left by physicalist doctrine were available.
Finally, as Chomsky has suggestively discussed, science may abound
with "myste:ries" which are beyond the sc.)pe of our capacities to find
solutions. This possibility suggests that we may, in many cases, havc~
difficulty recognizing a counterexample as opposed to a mystery or,
merely, a "problem" for which we have not ye". found a solution. 2D The
existence of repeated failures at trying to establish that certain
18 See Field (1972), p. 357.
11 See Quine (1953) and Putnanl (1962) for discus~ions of the notion of
centrality.
2. See Chomsky (1975, 1980) for dibcussion of problems and mysteries;
allo see Bromberger (1966) for a discussion of p-predicaments and
related notions.
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physicalistic relations exist may provide some grounds for believing
that a counterexample exists; but such grounds will be substantial
only if the alternatives mentioned here can be plausibly ruled out
(i.e., only if we can rule out the existence of a recalcitrant problem
or a mystery). Deciding when "enough is enough" is not a very clear
enterprise at all; and, the thousands of years of scientific change
should warn us against too hastily deciding to give up on a problem,
So, if the main form of disconfirmatory argument is one based up~n
the discovery of a counterexample, then the above considerations sug-
gest that such a counterexample search is likely to be extremely dif-
ficult. We now turn to som~ considerations which suggest that such a
strategy may su~fer from more principled difficulties.
A further ~omplication In regard to identifying a real counterexam-
ple to physicalist theses involves the satisfactory resolution of the
problems with the scope of the theses (i.e., the problems with (Hi».
Unless we have some clear idea of what counts as a branch of natural
science, we will have no clear idea of whether a given putative coun~
terexamp.e is real or not. Something cannot be a counterex;mple to
physicalism if it falls outside of the scope of the doctrine: insofar
as the scope is unclear so will the class of possible counterexamples.
Thus, for example, if mentalistic psychology is not legitimate natural
scienc., then its failure to conform to physicalist principles is not
• real counterexample to them; if it is legitimate natural science,
then such failure does count as a real counterexample.
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Finally, not only is it a problem for the empirical testability of
the theses if their scope is not well defined; but, it is also quite
problematic if physicalist theses play an important role in determin-
ing what is and what is not legitimate natural science. 21 It would ap-
pear that if physicalism is an important criterion in deciding upon
what counts as legitimate natural science, then the possibility for
there being a counterexample to the theses is significantly reduced,
possibly to the point that physicalism is not empi.rically testable be-
cause It is employed in a manner that screens out putential counterex-
amples. The problem hera is fundamentally that of not having an inde-
pendent test of what counts as natural science. Below we shall explore
in more detail the methodological roles of the theses and their bear-
,
ing upon the empirical status of the theses.
We shall simply mention two additional forms of disconfil"matory ar-
gumerA~S that may be brought to bear upon physicalist theses. The dif-
ficulties of the form of argument just discussed are likewise diffi-
culties for the forms of argument that follow: first, Boyd's
possibility arguments suggest that the failure to provide such argu-
ments would be grounds for rejecting the theses; and, second, analo-
goul to the success arguments mentioned above, "failure arguments" in-
volving an inference to the falsity of ~,hysicalist theses as the best
explanation of a scientific failure migbt also have some negative
force vis ! vis physicalism. Both of these argument forms suffer from
21 See below for discussion of the methodological roles of the theses.
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all the difficulties of their positive analogs.
To summarize: both confirmatory and disconfirmatory arguments suf-
fer from both severe practical difficulties in their application as
well as some potentially serious principled difficulties. As a result,
the possibility that physicalist theses are not empirically testable
must be seriously entertained. We shall return to this issue below,
after we have discussed (M3).22
The second point of significance regarding M2 is that, given Ml,
the theses, being a part of natural science, ap~ly to themselves. As
a consequence, the idea that the physicalist theses are "overarching
emlJirical theses" of science, though quite natural and widely adhered
to, raises serious difficulties that may not be easily met. In a nut-
shell, because the theses involve semantical and intensional notions
(e.g., nom~logicality, explanation, truth determination), viewing the
theses as a part of natural science presupposes that these notions are
"physicalisticallyacceptable" (e.g., that the truth values of sen-
tences involving them are determined by the truths of physics, that
there exists an RT for each such notion, etc). As we shall see, the
issues here do not lead to definitive objections to physicalism, but
they do set the task of working out the physicalist program at a very
22 The third question raised by the empirical status of the theses was
a question concerning the nature and status of the research program
whose goal it is to amass evidence bearing upon the theses. Such an
assessment falls outside the scope of the present project, and we
shall only briefly comment upon it toward the end in our discussion
of the acceptability of the program and future research.
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high level (i.e., the success of the program depends upon incorporat-
in; these notions within natural science). And thus, as we shall see
below, the issues here create a certain a~lI,ount of embarrassment for
Ouine who has steadfastly held to both the empirical status of physi-
calism and the scientific unacceptability (on physicalist grounds) of
semantic and ~ntensional notions. Por now, let us observe that ("2)
raises the question of how physicalist doctrine is to be located in
relation to natural Icience; and, the specific solutiJn it expresses
(viz., that the theses are an integral part of natural science), has
lome potentially quite serious liabilities.
5.3 THE METHODOLOGICAL ROLES OF THE THESES
--------
The last meta(hesis, ("3), expresses the idea that physicalist doc-
trine plays a methodological role in the conduct of natural science.
This is, of course, compatible with the empirical status of the theses
as well as with the denial of such status (i.e., (M2) and <"3) are in-
dependent of each other, • fact that will loom large below). A clear
understanding of <"3) requires us to distinguish between normative and
descriptive interpretations of its content. that is, we must distin-
guish between the claim that physicalist theses do, in fact, play I
certain methodlogical role in Icience and the claim that tl.1ey OUt:lnt
to. Purther, it is important for this purpose to distinquish between
implicit and explicit functioning of the theses in tLeir methodologi-
cal employment. the th•••• may be operative despite the fact that they
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are not used explicitly in scientific deliberations (e.g., they.may
inform a whole approach to • subject matter or they may be the unspo-
ken and not even consciously thought hidden premises in a pie~e of
scientific reasoning). The issues here concern whether or not a theory
of scientific practice must be a theory of the psychology of scien-
tists or a correct rational reconstruction of scientific practice,
etc. IS We shall not directly address these issues; rather, our ap-
proach will involve assuming that a thesis plays a role in scientific
practice if a rational recons~ruction of that practice says so. The
explicit employment of a thesis will be taken as a sufficient, but not
necessary, condition for such an attribution.
Our strategy in this section will be to address the following ques-
t
tiona. (1) What are the roles that physicalist theses d%ught to play
in the conduct of Icienctific inquiry?, (2) Do they in fact play such
roles?, (3) Ought they to play those roles?, and (4) Are there any
difficulties with the view that physicalist theses either do or ought
to play such roles? In a nutshell, we shall conclude that the theses
do have and ought to have a place in science; the road to this conclu-
lion, however, is neither short nor easy.
II Barbara Von Eckardt hal discus.ed these distinctions in Von Eckardt
(unpublished).
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What, then, is the methodological role of physicalist theses sup-
posed to be? There are two quite distinct roles:
(Rl) Physicalist ~heses guide research in that they define re-
search questions and problems.
(R2) Physicalist theses provide a basis for assessing the scien-
tific acceptab~lity of theories advanced within science.
We shall consid~r each of these in turn.
In our discussion above of vertical science, we m~ntioned a number
of the questions and problems raised as a consequf;nce of taking physi-
calist these~ seriously vis ! vis the relations between the ontologies
and doctrines of different branche~ of science. It is the raising of
such questions and the provision of some constraints upon answers
,
which constitutes part of the impact Qf physicaliist theses upon the
course of scientific research. From the physicalist point of view, the
theses define a set of research questions and problems which provide
structure to what has '.)een called "inter-field research". Our own
preference is to view the theses as defining new fields of research,
and, thus, we have employed the phrase, "vertical science". Such in-
ter-field problems (e.9., the problems of microbiology, neuropsycholo-
gy, physical chemistry, etc.) arise roughly as follows: if a theory of
some phenomena is developed in one of the "higher-level" branches of
science (e.g., psychology), then physicalist doctrine entails that (i)
the attributes posited by the theory are physically realizable and, in
actual cases, are physically realized, (ii) the theory is truth deter-
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mined by physical doctrine, (iii) for each of the attributes posited
by the theory there is an RT which provides an account of the realize-
tion of that attribute, and (iv) there are explanations possible,
based upon physical doctrine, of the occurrence of each indi~idual
phenomenon in the domain of the theory and of each instance and excep-
tioD of the regularities expressed by the theory. Such consequences
provide the basis for a prima facie plausible research program aimed
at studying the physical basis for the phenomena with which the high-
er-level theory is concerned.
An example, from the study of language, proceeds as follows. Given
the development of theories of natural language, theories of its
structure, acquisition and use, which posit various properties of lan-
,
guage including semantic properties, and given physicalist doctrine, a
research proqram aiming to answer (at least) the following questions
is suggested. (i) How i8 it possible that semantic (and the other lin-
quistic) properties of language are realizable by physical systems?,
(1i) In virtue of what physical properties and relations are semantic
(etc) properties actually realized?, (iii) What is the nature of the
physical systems that instantiate the regularities, their instances
and exceptions, that theories of language express? A constraint upon
the answers to such questions and any others are that the higher-le"el
theory and its ontology, and physical theory and its ontology, conform
to the the,•• of physicalism.
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It is important to distinguish between (1) the physicalist doctrine
(i.e., presuppositions (Pl)-P3), theses (Tl)-(T6), and metatheses
("1)-("3» and (2) the specific projects within vertical science which
are, in effect, the working out of the physicalist program in science.
AI conceived above, the general program, unlike classical reduction-
ism, ia quite compatible with considerable variation in the form of
theories in vertical science from one area to another. The constraints
are that realization theories be provided, that the determination
theses be satisfied and that explanations be provided. The details of
the fo~ that these theories and explanations take are not relevant to
the program as presently conceived.
A proper clarification and development of these programmatic claims
,
would involve close scrutiny of specific examples drawn from science.
Such examples might include (1) physical theories of valence (cf.,
Field (1972», (ii) microbiological theories of genetic transmission
(cf., Schaffner (1969), Hull (1974», (iii) neuropsychological theo-
ries of depression (cf., Clark (1980», (iv) fundamental physical
theories of such "phenomenological" physical properties as tempera-
ture, pressure, transparency, etc, and (v) theories of the physical
b••is for linguistic and semantic.l phenomena (cf., Field (1975».
Such scrutiny of ca.es i. not part of the current project; the reader
i. referred to the reference. cited for initial discussion of some of
the examples.
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So, the claim is that the first methodological role that the theses
play is to guide research by defining proble.ns and questions for- re-
search in "vertical science". It is far from uncontroversial that the
theses either do or ought to play such a role in science. Philosophy
of science has witnessed during the past 15 y~~rs a number of attacks
on exactly this claim with respect to the employment of the theses of
classical reductionism. Whether the objections apply, mutatis mut~­
dis, to the physicalist theses proposed above is an open question giv-
en the rather significant differences between those theses ~nd classi-
cal reductionism. With this issue in mind, we shall now address the
questions of whether physicalist theses do play the alleged role in
science and whether they ought to play such a role.
That physicalist theses do play the role (Rl) attributed to them is
best argued for in terms of specific examples in which implicitly or
explicitly they guide the thou~ht and research activity of practicing
scientists. That the history of science can deliver such examples is,
we think, beyond doubt; the examples cited above are a beginning to a
long list of such cases. 24 Hore specifically, with regard to physical-
ist ontological and explanatory theses, the search for the physical
bases of depression, genetic transmission, valence, phenomenological
properties of classical thermodynamics and optics indicate implicit or
explicit belief that such bases plausibly exist and that they can be
understood and used to understand the higher level phenomena. A spe-
24 Pace Goodman.
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cific reconstruction of each of these examples is required to make
good on this claim. Such reconstructions, however, must be deferred.
Supplementary to such positive arguments are negative arguments de-
signed to deflect the objections of critics and place the burden
-quarely on their shoulders. First, there is a substantial lack of
clearly articulated alternative construals of research into the physi-
cal bases of various phenomena. If physicalist theses are denied the
role attributed to them by (Rl), then what reconstruction of scientif-
ic activity constitutes a plausible replacement for them? The lack of
such an alternative is a severe liability for the sceptics. Second, a
number of the negative arguments of such critics of (Rl) as Schaffner,
Wimsatt, and Haull and Darden are directed at classical reductionism;,
they cite the lack of interest in derivational and defini.tional reduc-
tion by bi.ologists as well as the highly limited construal of inter-
theoretic relations that such reductions stand for. On the first
count, we can only agree and claim that such lack of interest is be-
side the point with regard to the physicalism cited here. On the sec·
and count, we also agree, but neither classical reductionists nor con-
temporary physicalists clatm that inter-theoretic relations are
exhausted by the theses propQsed. The critics have a good point if
they are claiming that other relations have been neglected. But such
neglect is benign and not grounds in itself for rejecting the positive
claim. of reductionism or physicalism. On our view, the vast majority
of extant critical arguments with regard to (Rl) are not relevant to
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the physicalist doctrine; however, really close scrutiny of the role
of this doctrine is yet to be done.
The sketchy character of this discussion needs to be supplemented
by the detailed work of exploring the many cases, both cited and un-
cited, which would clarify whether or not the theses put forth actual-
ly play the role (Rl). For now, we shall proceed on the assumption
that the r~sults of such work will yield a positive answer.
We turn now to discussion of the question whether physicalist thes-
es ought to play the role (Rl). The central preliminary issue concerns
what are the best ways for arguing for or against the claim that the
theses ought to play such a role. We shall layout three different
strategies that have been suggested for supporting the claim that the
theses ought to be employed in the role (Rl) and discuss the merits
and difficulties of each one.
Perhaps, the most common line of argument is one that runs as fol-
lows. The employment of physicalist principles has been quite fruitful
in leading to scientific progress; hence, the continued use of such
principles is both jufttified and mandated, given that the alternatives
are likely to be 1es1 fruitful. Admittedly, such an argument requires
fleshing out and considerable support for its premises; however, the
intent is clear. Physicalist principles have been used with success in
the past, thus they should continue to be used. The power of this ar-
gument depends upon two things. first, that there has, in fact, been
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the kind of success in science resulting from employment of physical-
ist principles, and second, that there is sufficient uniformity among
branches of natural science such that it is reasonable to expect that
what has been successful in one branch of science will be successful
in others (i.e., what assumptions underwrite the employment of princi-
ples, that have been successful in one area, in other areas?).
We observe that, with regard to the question of fact, there is oon-
siderable disagreement: on the one hand, Goodman writes in The Ways Of
Worldmaking that physicalism has had only limited and mostly partial
success; others would contend that there is a broad spectrum of suc-
cesses resulting from the methodological employment of physicalist
principles. As we claimed above, resolution of this disagreement,
awaits a detailed survey of the empirical facts regarding success or
failure in many areas of science.
With regard to the issue of uniformity in science that underwrites
generalization of successful principles, issues similar to those that
arose with respect to inductive support for the principles arise here.
The idea that a successful principle is one that ought to be used gen~
erally should not be confused with the idea that successful principles
in one area are worth trying in different areas until they fail. It is
the "ought" that is problematic. It is difficult to see how one could
argue for the required uniformity without assuming that physicalism is
true, anything less would seem to justify giving the principles a try,
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but not that they ought to be employed. 25
A second line of argument for the claim that physicalist principles
ought to be employed in role (Rl) is as follows: if physicalist theses
are true then they ought to be employed in methodological role (Rl)
(and (R2»i thus, insofar as we have reason to believe that the theses
are true, we hLIe grounds for believing that they ought to be employed
in the conduct of science. The burdens of this argument are quite
heavy. First, as we have seen there is dispute about the kinds and
amount of support that the theses have - the truth of the doctrine is
very much up for grabs. Second, even if the doctrine were known to be
true, it does not follow that it ought to play methodological roles in
science. Such a further claim involves detailed argument of a very
I
practical nature. Truth, by itself, does not guarantee that a thesis
will be usable in science or that it will be productive: these things
depend upon further facts about science and scientists. The point here
is that this line of argument must be considerably developed before it
25 Chomsky has contended in his debates with Quine regarding indeter-
minacy that physicalism does not seriously constrain the activity
of practicing linguists and psychologists: that their activity can
and does proceed without any thought about whether their theories
conform to physicalist principles. It would appear to follow from
this that it is false that physicalism ought to play the roles al-
leged by the metatheses. But, this is, of course, not a conse-
quence of Chomsky's view as can be seen by the fact that elsewhere
he takes quite seriously the idea that research lnto the physical
bases ~f mind has an important place in the overall res~~rch pro-
gram in psychology. His point is that the employment of auch prin-
ciples has its time and place, in psychology the time is not now
because of its ~ature status. Similar points apply to (Rl) and
(R2) as we shall see below.
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leads to the desired conclusion.
The final line of argument that we shall consider is one that we
have highlighted throughout this project: viz., that the potential
gains of the program provide strong motivation for pursuing it, and
that in the a~~ence of solid grounds for not pursuing it and in the
absence of better alternatives, the program ought to be pursued; and,
hence, the theses ought to play the methodological roles attributed to
them. This is not an endorsement of a "monopolistic" physicalism; cer-
tainly, other programs are possible and of potential value. It is to
say, however, that if the premises in the argument are true, then
there is some prescription for pursuing the program. The burden is, of
course, to secure support for those premises. Since our purpose here
t
is only to sketch the arguments and point out the burdens, we shall
not develop this argument now (it is, in fact, a very elaborate under-
taking). What the current project is designed to do, vis! vis this
argument, is to clear away a number of objections to the program which
are quite current (e.g., indeterminacy of the theses, lack of empiri-
cal status, poorly defined scope, utopian character of the theses,
monopolistic character of the program). If we are successful in this,
then at least some of the grounds for not pursuing the program will
have been undercut. The force of this line of argument will increase
insofar as we are successful.
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To summarize; there are three lines of argument in support of the
clatm that th6 theses ought to play methodological role (Rl), (i) the
argument from success, (ii) the argument from truth, and (iii) the ar-
qument from potential gains. All are in need of substantial elabora~
tion and defence, the first two being beset by difficulties encoun-
tered earlier when we discussed (HI) and (H2).
We shall now turn to • discussion of the second methodological
role, (R2) (i.e., the evaluative role of the theses). That physicalist
principles play a role in the evaluation of theories in science has
been thought by a number of philosophers of science.
"
According to
such philosophers, the theses function as a constraint upon what is to
count as acceptable natural science. For example, Quine has argued for
I
many years that it is because certain kinds of psychology and linquis-
tics fail to conform to physicalist standards that they are to be re-
jected as not good science. He alleges to have demonstrated that,
given the physicalist theses and given a very broad conception of the
physical bases, theories in linguistics, semantics and "mentalistic"
psychology fail to bear the physicalistically correct relations to the
physical bases. As a result, he concludes that such theories are not
appropriately considered to be a part of natur41 science. Such rea-
loning gives rise to • number of 'luestionsa (1) What is the structure
of the methodological situation in scienc~ that such reasoning con-
2. The li.t includes at l ••st the following. Tarski, Putnam and Oppen-
he~, Quine, Field, Podor, Friedman, Hellman and Thompson, and Kim.
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cerns?, (2) Given such. situation, in what ways might it be
resolved?," (3) What considerations are pertinent to resolving such
situations?, and (4) Why, if at all, should such situations be taken
seriously? under what conditions?
Our plan is, first, to give a detailed characterization of the kind
of methodological situation that the evaluative role of physicalist
theses can give rise to and to delineat~ the various ways in which
such situations can be resolved; second, to sketch the kinds of con-
liderations that are pert1nent to resolution; and, finally, to discuss
the conditions under which such. situation should be taken seriously.
Throughout this discussion, we shall use the debate concerning the
physicalistic acceptability of semantics as an example. This example
I
is especially relevant to the current project since it bears directly
upon the objections discussed above regarding whethlr or not the thea-
•• were subject to indeterminacy and hence not acceptable a';cording to
phyli'Jlist standards.
What then is the structure of th~~ethodologic.l situation to which
the evaluative role of the theses can give rise? Because it is the
thesis that Quine has focused upon in recent years, we shall restrict
our discus.ion to the thesis of truth determination; it is clear, how-
ever, that any of the other theses would be equally appropriate and
that everything we .ay applies mutatis mutandis to them. Now, as we
17 Quine ha., in fact, opted for one of four possibilities.
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understand Quine, he has employed the physicalist thesis of truth
determination in an argument with the following structure:
1. If translation theory is not truth determined by physical theo-
ry, then it is not acceptable natural science,
2. Given current conceptions of translation theory and physical
theory, truth determination doesn't hold,
3. Thus translation theory is not acceptable natural science.
As we shall construe the violation charged by Quine, it is that
given a version of physical theory (i.e., all the truths of physics)
and, given a view about the nature of translation (i.e., a realization
theory for translation),Z8 specific translation between any two lan-
guages is not determined (i.e., there are equally acceptable transla-
I
tions that are incompatible with each other and equally compatible
with the physical truths). This is a violation of physicalist doctrine
insofar as truth determination requires that the physical truths fix a
unique translation. The key to the indeterminacy here is that, given
the physics and given the realization theory for translation, there is
a multiplicity of translations that are possible: this is what indet-
erminacy relative to the physical basis consists in. z,
28 For example, a translation between two languages, Land L', is a
meaning preserving mapping from the sentences of L into sentences
of L', where 'meaning' refers to stimulus meaning. See Quine (1960)
for discussion of such a theory of translation. See also Pu~nam
(1975) for an elternative theory.
2. The indete~inacy here is quite dif£ccent from the indeterminacy
discussed above in chapters 3 and 4 which resulted from the exis-
tence of alternative physical bases, alternative realization theo~
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The general methodological situation might be viewed as follows:
at some point in the course of scientific development (i) given a high
level (i.e., non-physical) theory, T, which appears to satisfy scien-
tific standards of adequacy (e.g., compatibility with available evi-
dence, simplicity relative to its subject matter, explanatory power
superior to its known rivals, etc), (i1) given all lower level theo-
ries (i.e., all physical theories), P, at that time, and (iii) given
tl;e known realization theories for all constructs in T, it appears
that the theses of physicalism are not satisfied for T (e.g., T is not
truth determin~d by P).
Because, in its second methodological role, physicalist doctrine
requires that suph theses be satisfied (and, hence, that the relevant
physicalist relations hold between P and T), something mU1t give in
the situation described. There are four possible ways of resolving the
conflict: (i) reject T, (ii) reject P, (iii) claim that it is false
that T and P do not satisfy physicalist theses, and (iv) reject physi-
calism. It is interesting that each of these options has been taken by
some party or other in the recent debates regarding semantics; we
shall now turn to a discussion of (i)-(iv) in relation to those de-
bates.
ries for attributes or from alterr.ative mappin~s from the ontology
of a special science into the ontology of physics. These latter
forms of indeterminacy are completely general in science and not
subject to physicalist constraint; they require resolution on other
9rounds •. Physic.lilt indeterminacy, on the other hand, assumes res-
olution of the•• sources of indeterminacy and exists despite such
resolution.
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That the high-level theory (e.g., reference assignments, mentalis-
tic psychology, translations)3Q should be rejected in the above de-
scribed type of situation has been the favored option of Quine all
along. The apparent failure of translation to be physicalistically ac-
ceptable, given current conceptions of physics and of the nature of
translation, has seemed sufficient for its rejection as a branch of
science: it is not objective on physicalist grounds in the way that
scientific enterprises ought to be. There are, at least, two problems
with Quine's view that he has not resolved: first, his discussion of
translation i~ based exclusively on a behavioral theory of meaning
and, second, he has not offered reasons for why it is the rejection of
the high-level theory rather than one of the other optionc that should
be adopted. The tissues here are quite complicated and cannot be dis-
cussed fully now; but, Quine would certainly reply to the first prob-
1em that the burden of proof is clearly on the shoulders of someone
who thought he had an alternative theory of meaning or translation. 31
3D The issues regarding translation are to be sharply distinguished
from tho3e concerning reference and psychology, although they may
eventually be related in certain strategies of reply (e.g., reduc-
tive theories of meaning where meaning is reduced to either refer-
ence or mental state). It is the general structure of the situation
that we are focusing on; the dis~ussion of the different areas will
var1 considerably in detail.
31 See Putnam (1975) for explicit statement of this roply in his de-
fence of the indeterminacy thesis.
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The second option, viz. to reject P, has had two proponents; first,
Hel~an and Thompson have viewed physicalism as a constraint upon the
adequacy of physics. 32 Given their extensionalist leanings, the crisis
with translation may not arise in a serious way; however, it appears
that they would consider the rejection of physical theory as a viable
option in situations of conflict although they, like Quine, have not
elaborated very clearly what the rationale for preferring one of the
various options over the others might be. Second, Chomsky likens the
situation with translation to that of electromagnetic theory at the
turn of the century and suggests that, if necessary, physics could be
altered to incorporate a new fundamental type of phenomena. Again,
when it is appropriate to take this line over others has not been
clearly characterized.
The ~hird option, perhaps the most interesting, has a number of
variants. First, as Field and Friedman have both suggested, it could
be that, although it has not been discovered yet, T and P do relate to
each other in the physicalistically required way: showing this is an
as yet unsolved problem in science. Solving such a problem may involve
simply showing that the existing RTs are sufficient for relating T and
P correctly or it may involve developing new RTs. Second, however, it
could be that the task of establishing that T and P are appropriately
related is a mystery and that, although there is not in fact a viola-
tion of physicalism it is not within our cognitive reach to know this
12 See Hellman and Thompson (1975, 1977).
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or to show it. How to make such a move without its being just a cheap
defense of a position in the face of serious difficulties is not at
all clear. But, the idea th&t we should keep trying to solve recalcit-
rant problems rather than opt for easy and premature rejections of ei-
ther T ~r P is an important one.
Finally, it has occurred to some t~lat it is physicalism that is the
trouble maker in the situation described above and it should be aban-
doned as a not very viable program ~n science. Goodman has declared
the program to be pretty much of ~ failure; while, as we have seen,
Chomsky has declared the program to be trivial, insignificant and ir-
relevant. Putnam appears to reject physicalism as not correct for ref-
erenee, although it is not clear whether he is saying that the doc-
trine is irrelevant, false or utopian. 3s Much of the burden of the
current project is to show how many of the objections to physicalism
fail and how the conception of the program might be altered in a way
that meets the other objections but retains the significance of the
program for science. The claim that the program, however conceived, is
• failure, is at best controversial and surely quite premature.
II See Putnam (1975). It is now apparent that Putnam rejects physica1-
11m a. • monoplistic doctrine that purports to resolve all problems
of Uf,derdetermination in our knowledge; construed this way, as •
brand of "metaphysical realism", it is clearly unacceptable. We do
not view physicalism in this way.
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Given this range of options, let us look at the situation regarding
semantics to see how they apply. Translations between languages, ref-
erence schemes for languages, content assignments for mental states,
etc are not, according to Quine, determined by physical doctrine; on
our view, this means that, given the physical basis for doctrine and
given the realization theories for the attributes involven, there is
not a unique translation34 compatible with them (i.e., there are mul-
tiple translations that are compatible with physical doctrine and the
realization theories). As noted above, Quine has opted for the rejec-
tion of translation on the grounds of its failure to satisfy physical-
istic conditions for objectivity in science. Putnam also appears to
take this option. The idea that physics needs revision in the face of
this claim has not to my knowledge been seriously entertained, al-
though it is a possibility that Hellman and Thompson, Chomsky and oth-
era would entertain under some circumstances: what those circumstances
are is quite difficult to pin down. According to Goodman, the situ-
ation suggested probably does not seriously arise (although he has
other grounds for questioning semantic phenomena) since physicalism
appears to be a bankrupt programs the failure of a well established
area of knowledge to fit into a physicalist scheme provides additional
grounds for rejecting physicalism. So, if translation were to be es-
tablished firmly on the basis of other scientific criteria, then the
program, rather than translation, would be found lacking.
34 We shall focus on translation although the points apply to all the
attributes and theories mentioned.
- 311 -
Thus, there is some feeling that translation ought to be rejected
from science, no serious feeling that physics ought to be rejected,
and some feeling that physicalism ought to be rejected. The final al-
ternative, i.e., to hold off on any rejection notices and to explore
more deeply the nature of the connections between phi'sical and seman-
tical phenomena, has been endorsed by Field and FrieQnan: it seems
clft~rly the best course. Their view35 appears to be th,at if we keep on
working we will eventually see that, appearances to the contrary,
translation is determinate; what we need to develop is the right real-
ization theory for translation and then to see how, given that theory,
translation is determinata. 36 As noted above, there are two ways of
pursuing this line: (1) the RT is correct and it is a matter of seeing
how the physics'and the RT determine the translation, (2) the known
RTs are not correct and it is a matter of finding the right RT and
then establishing the connections. Field and Friedman appear to adopt
(1) while (2) appears to be more appropriate to the situation. Notice
also that the other line in the wait and see strategy is to consider
the possibility that we have a mystery on our hands: meaning and ref-
erence could fall under that heading. Hence, it could be that, al-
though we will not ever understand it, ~ranslation is determinate.
31 See Field (1915) and Friedman (1975).
31 Friedman does not put things quite this way although they are sug-
gested by what he lays; his primary failing is to not appreciate
the importance of realization theories in these issues.
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The situation with respect to translation appears to be something
like what Sylvain Bromberger calls a "B-predicament", roughly a situ-
ation in which every possible answer that we can think of to a given
question can be refuted on the basis of our background knowledge and
the constraints imposed on correct answers to the question. In this
case, we are asking, "What is the nature of translation?". The con-
straint imposed is that, given the nature of translation (i.e. given
an RT for translation), translations between languages are physicalis-
tically determinate; at present, every answer offered fails to be ac-
ceptable. It is unclear whether this is because one of the known RTs
is correct and translation really is physicalistically inueterminate
or because we have not solved the problem of discovering a correct RT
,
for translation or because the nature of translation is a mystery for-
ever beyond our epistemic reach. The "wait and see" strategy has the
liability that one never knows if one is waiting too long.
At the present time, interest has flagged to some extent in the i5-
sues concerning the physicalistic standing of translation, partly be-
cause we have run out of things to say, partly because interest has
turned to other issues concerning reference and mind and partly be-
cause we have adopted the wait and see approach. The detailed work re-
quired for constructing linguistic, biological and psychological theo-
ries leaves little room for speculation about indeterminacy. However,
although it may not be appropriate now to worry about such matters,
with increased understanding the issues will eventually come to the
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fore; at that time a more definitive statement regarding the four op·
tions cited above may be possible. In preparation for that time, we
now turn to a discussion of the kinds of considerations "relevant for
choosing among them.
To deepen our understanding of the methodological situation that
physicalist principles can give rise to, we shall review, first, some
of the considerations that are pertinent to deciding whether or not
such a situation has in fact arisen and, second, some considerations
pertinent to how such situations might be resolved. Because physical-
1st doctrine constitutes a description of • "goal state" in science,
the issue of when to apply such a description during the activity of
doing science is important. it may not be appropriate at every stage
,
of scientific growth to apply principles that characterize an ideal
state of development. Thus, it is important to clarify when such ap·
plication is or is not appropriate. And, further, as we have seen,
even if it is appropriate, it may be quite unclear in given situations
what to do when conflict exists.
Pirst, the methodological conflict envisioned above should be taken
.eriously only when the theories, T and P, are "reasonably mature"; it
i •• notoriously difficult problem in current philosophy of science to
mike this notion precise, but the notion is not without content. 17
17 The development of luch notions a. that of • working hypothesis, a
"paradigm", a rei.,reh program, and, the development of tools for
repre.enting and ••aelling rel.areh program. will contribute to
addin9 content to the ide. of a mature science.
.. 314 •
Second, no real assessment of the physicalistic connections between
branches of science can get off the ground without extensive study of
the "inter~branch connertions" (i.e., study of how T and P relate to
each other). The importance of the development of Uinterfieldu theo-
ries as research areas in their own right is only now coming to be
fully appreciated. As we have sugqested, the formulation of realiza-
tion theories and of theories of lower level mechanisms that underlie
higher level processes and functions is crucial to the full develop-
ment of physicalist science.
Third, there should not be either any good grounds for believing
that the study of the connections between T and P is beyond our cogni-
tive reach or an, good arguments for the indeterminacy of T relative
to P (e.g_, arguments like Quine's, but good arguments). That is,
there should not be any good reason for believing that the issue is
not resolvable or that it is closed.
Fourth, a clear understanding of how physicalism works should be
developed (the point of the current project) so that premature and in-
appropriate judgements of "non-reducibility" are blocked. The recent
discussions in the philosophy of science have been seriously marred by
• f~ilure to appreciate the nature of physicalism in contrast to clas-
sical reductionism. This is really to say that '-Ie can employ the thes-
es in their methodological role only if we are clear on what they re-
quire; not an outrageous demand, but one whi~n, in more or less subtle
ways, is sometimes not honored.
- 315 -
Fifth, it is appropriate to consider physicalism as a serious con-
straint on scientific development only if there are good reasons for
pursuing the program (i.e., it is a motivat~d program) and only if
there a~e grounds for believing that it can be worked out.
The above five conditions are quite minimal with respect to the ap-
propriateness of taking seriously the physicalistic acceptability of
inter-theoretic relations in science; but, it is obvious that much de-
bate in recent years concerning the indeterminacy of semantics as well
as issues con~erning reduction in biology and psychology have failed
to honor them. Given these conditions, the conclusion of the last sec·
tion that the "wait and see" approach is superior to the other op·
tions, in the case of translation, receives additional support be-
I
cause, (i) the relevant higher level theories (i.e., linguistics,
plychology) are immature, (ii) the theory that meaning is just "stimu·
Ius meaning" is un6cceptable, (iii) there is some reason to believe
that meaning and translation may be conceptually beyond our reich,!'
(iv) research based upon a clear conception of physicalist demands has
rarely been done, and (v) the evidence on the justification of pursuit
of the program haa not been evaluated.
al We are surely in a "S-predicament" with regard to the question
"What il meaning?"; all the known possible answers are unaccepta-
ble.
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Let us now assume that the methodological situation described above
has appropriat~ly arisen; what considerations are pertinent to its
resolution? first as we have discussed above at length, any modifica-
tions made to physics (i.e., option 2) ought not to be simply ad hoc.
The revision of physical theory so as to establish a physicalist rela-
tion between the relevant branches of science, must be accomplished in
a way which preserves the integrity of that body of theory and which
is appropriate to the questions addressed in the research program of
physics.
Second, if option 1 is pursued (i.e., modification of T), then
principles of conservation ought to be adhered to: i.e., modification
or rejection of T ought to leave no large gaps in scientific knowledge
that are not fillable (or for which strategies for filling them are at
least conceivable). In the case of mentalistic psychology the whole-
sale rejection of representational theories of mind would, at the cur-
rent stage of development, constitute an unacceptable scrapping of
what Fodor is fond of calling "the only game in town". The alterna-
tives to such theories are either incoherent or unacceptable on other
ground,_
Third, a serious decision regarding the status of realization theo-
ries for attributes musl be capable of being made. 3 ' At present, with
3' Por example, questions of the form IIAre the available RTs for at-
tribute A correct?" and "Are we in a a-predicament with regard to
RT. for A?" must be assessable.
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regard to semantics, both Quine's behavioral theory of meaning and the
popular "projective theories of interpretation of mental states""O are
unacceptable on grounds that are independent of the issues concerning
physicalism. Further, functionalist and "physicalist" realization
theories with respect to the nature of mind are likewise unacceptable.
The significance of these facts however is not clear. An adequate res-
olution of the methodological conflict depends upon how such facts are
undtirstood (e.g., that we currently do not have a coherent and accep-
table conception of meaning and mind; that there are mysteries or un-
resolved problems regarding the nature of meaning and mind, etc). If,
for example, it is decided that the nature of meaning is simply an un-
solved problem, then a "wait and see" approach would make most sense.
However, if it is decided, following Quine, that a behdvioral theory
of meaning is the only one we are likely to be able to develop, then
the indeterminacy arguments will go through and linguistics and psy-
chology will be ultimately rejected from natural science.
Fourth, the rejection of physicalism should not leave a large gap
in our understanding of the nature and goals of scientific acti?ity.
As we have been at pains to emphasize, physicalism provides a set of
41 See Dennett (1971), Putnam (1975), Stitch (unpublished), Quine
(1960), Lewis (1973), and Davidson (1970, 1973). Such a theory of
interpretation has it that, unlike hypotheses in physics, biology,
etc, an interpretive hypothesis is not an empirical hypothesis con-
cerning the states of an individual. But rather, it is a "rational-
ization" of the person's behavior in relation to the environment
which is sensitive to the interests, goals and cognitions of the
rationalizer in ways that normal empirical hypotheses are not.
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principles that capture a view of nature and the structure of science
that is deeply ingrained in most scientist's understanding of science
and its object of study; such a view constitutes a deep understanding
of how phenomena relate to each other and how theories of those phe-
nomena oyght also to be related to each other. To reJect this view,
and it is conceivable that such could be done, would be to leave a
large gap in the scientist's and the philosopher's understanding of
what science is about. At a minimum sO.~e alternative conception
should be available which is a serious alternative; without such an
alternative, it is not clear that pursuing the old program is not bet-
ter than not having a program. 41
Fifth, in deGiding on a course of action, the justificatory status
of the program to date should be understocd. That the status is poor
is Goodman's claim; whether it is or not now is 'ln~lear. But, it is
true that if it is poor, then the option to reject physicalism is more
plausible. This is the obvious point that, in considering 4 range of
options, the epistemically least valued one is, other things being
equal, the first one to be rejected. As we observed in the last con-
sideration, other things ar6n't always equal.
41 There are two ways of construing these issues. first, what ought to
be our co~~eption of science?, second, what is the scientist's ac-
tual conception of science? In either case, the burden of rejecting
physicalism is to provide some alternative understanding of science
that i. better then the physicalist understanding. Those who have
advocated rejection of physicalism heve been quite cavelier in do-
ing so, paying little attention to this problem. It is almost in-
conceivable to many scientists that physicalism should be rejected;
thi~ in it.elf places I burden on the opponents of the program.
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The above sets of conditions on appropriateness and resolution are
offered to convey just how complex the issues are that are raised ~y
the methodological employment of the theses. That the theses have been
so used is undeniable, but the point here is that such use must take
place under certain circumstances only, and even then, the outcome of
their use is subject to complex considerations that presuppose much
auxiliary knowledge. It is pretty safe to say that many actual uses of
the theses in recent years have been inappropriate and untutored. Fur-
ther, at the present lime, the situations of appropriate use may be
severely restricted given the manifest failure of many sciences to
satisfy the conditions of appropriateness and given the notable lack
of much of the needed auxiliary knowledge required for resolution of
conflict situations. Nonetheless, the idea that such methodological
employn.~nt ought never occur seems to be seriously mistaken; and it is
to this final issue regarding (R2) that we now ~urn, briefly.
As we have discussed nbove, there are at least three kinds of
grounds for taking seriously the methodological employment of physi-
calist theses: (i) past fruitfulness of such USP, (i1) heavy empirical
support for their truth, and (iii) the promised gains if their use is
successful. These grounds would be sufficient for taking the program
seriously; and, relative to the conditions of appropriateness, the
theses ought to be used if the program is taken seriously. But, as we
have seen, although (iii) is not problematic, (i) and (ii) are. The
reasons for taking the theses as true have serious problems as w~ have
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seen and the past fruitfulness of their use is the subject of debate
regarding both how much they have been used and how that use general-
izes to other domains. It is also of some concern whether or not the
theses are usable: e.g., it is not clear how the thesis of truth de-
termination can be effectively used if stronger reductive theses are
false. The most we can say at this point then is that if the program
is accepted, then the theses ought to be used when it is appropriate
to do so; the issue of acceptance of the program, however, is still
quite problematic.
This concludes our discussion of (M3). That the theses are supposed
to play methodological roles in science is clearly part of the physi-
calist doctrine;, the issue of whether they ought to play such roles in
science comes down to whether the program is operating within science.
The main goal of our project is to provide an adequate formulation of
the doctrine and to defend that formulation against objections; if we
are successful in this, then a large step toward the acceptability of
th~ program will have been taken. The remaining steps involve the
working out of the program in science, and assessing the degree to
which it is successful. But, as we have seen, there have been a number
of objections that have not been satisfactorily responded to (e.g.,
indeterminacy, empirical status, utopianism, scope); in the next sec-
tion, we shall round out our discussion by making a proposal for how
the.e objections can be plausibly dealt with.
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5.4 PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF THE METATHESES
- - -----
Our discussion to this point has left us with the following cata-
logue of difficulties for the physicalist doctrine we have formulated:
(1) the scope of the theses is not clearly and
non-circularly defined, (2) the theses are not clearly empirically te-
stable, (3) the theses are utopian in character, (4) the theses, con-
cerning semantical and explanatory relations, may not be acceptable
natural science for physicalist reasons, and (5) the constraints on
the physicalist bases do not guarantee that non-physical entities
(e.g_, mental entities) will not be in the bases.
Our problem in this section is to show that each objection is ei-
,
ther true but not a problem or false. In doing this, we shall reexa-
mine the kind of program physicalism is and chall~nge a basic assump-
tion that most physicalist philosophers have made: viz., that the
theses of physicalism are empirical theses of natural science (i.e.,
(H2». Our strategy for dealing with the objections will be to reject
("2) and offer an alternative construal of the theses; our main prob-
lem will be to do this without becoming committed to some unacceptable
bifurcation in our knowledge (e.g., the analytic-synthetic distinc-
tion) •
With the exception of some suggestive comments made by some physi-
calists that the theses are "regulative ideals" in science, the major-
ity of physicalists have appeared to view the theses as empirical
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theses of natural science. This, as we have seen, is a claim with a
number of problems: (i) the identification of confirmatory and discon-
Eirmatory empirical arguments is fraught with difficulties, (ii) the
theses may be self supporting insofar as they are used as methodologi-
cal principles, (iii) the theses may be in violation of their own pre-
scription of what counts as acceptable natural science. The other me-
tatheses, viz., that the theses apply to natural science and that they
playa methodological role, are crucial to capturing the intent and
motivations of the program; thus, their rejection would constitute
giving up the point of being a physicalist at all. This, we contend,
is not true of the alleged empirical status of the theses. So, if it
is possible to modify (H2) while retaining (Ml) and (H3), in such a
way as to fend off the objections to the program, then the original
formulation would incur minimal losses while overcoming major obsta-
cles to the acceptability of the program. It is this line that we pro-
pose to follow. We shall begin by showing how rejection of (M2) pro-
vides a means of responding to most of the objections listed above.
Let us, then, reject the idea that the theses of physicalism are
empirical theses of natural science while retaining the ideas that
they characterize natural science and that they play the roles (Rl)
and (R2) in the conduct of natural science. Thus, we might, as has
been sU99.::;ted, describe the theses as "regulative ideals" for natural
~cinnc. which structure scientific knowledge and our scientific view
of nat.ure., What happens to the objections discussed above?
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First, regarding the scope objection, the theses of physicalism be-
come part of whatever set of principles there are for delineating the
boundaries of natural science; it is, on this view, consLitutive of
what natural science is that it and its object of study be structured
by physicalist principles. Appearances to the contrary, this does not
trivialize the theses of physicalism by any means: it is entirely pos-
sible that science cannot both be structured by physicalist theses and
eucceed in its other goals. Such a development, were we sure that we
were presented with it, would be grounds for reconsidering whether or
not we wanted to be physicalists. What the proposal does mean is that,
although a complete characterization of natural science has not been
given, this is no longer a concern for physicalism: whatever natural
science is, it satisfies the theses (i.e., they are nec~sary condi-
tions for anything being natural science.) The current proposal does
not have the untoward consequences that the empirical status and cor-
rect methodological employment of the theses are threatened by circu-
larity or ill-definition of the scope of the doctrine. Thus, rejection
of (H2) frees us of the need for independent specification of w~at
natural science is in order to assess and use the theses.
Second, with regard to the utopianism objection, it is certainly
true that physicalist theses pose difficult, possibly t~o difficult,
problems for scientific inquiry. As empirical theses this might appear
to put assessment of their truth out of reach and thus make their ac-
ceptance quite speculative. But, with this much said, what is the
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force of the objection, given that we have withdrawn empirical status
from the the theses? Physicalism does appear to be a very demanding
master for scientific inquiry; but, is this an objection? We think
not; rather, it means that science, on a physicalist construal, is
faced with very difficult but potentially quite rewarding problems if
they can be solved. What we have argued above is that anything less
than the physicalist program as we have construed it could lead to a
much inferior brand of science. In this regard, the onus is very much
on those who would reject physicalism in science in favor of a much
weaker alternative conception of how science is structured.
Third, the objection that physicalist theses could be unacceptable
natural science pn its own terms arose because (1) the theses concern
semantical and explanatory relations between different parts of sci-
ence, (2) such relations may not bt:: capable of being "physicalized"
and (3) the theses concerning them may not be truth determined by the
the physical truths. The problem here can be conceived of as either
the doctrine's entail~n9 that semantic and explanatory relations and
theses are physicalistically acceptable or the doctrine's potentially
playing a role in its own rejection. Neither prospect is part of the
42 It surely is not intended by physicalists that the doctrine can
succeed in being acceptable only if semantics and explanation are
physicalistically legitimate parts of natural science; most current
physicalists appear to view the fate of physicalism and semantics
to be quite independent. The point here is that this isn't possible
it physicalism is part of natural science and hence applicable to
it.elf.
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intention of the physicalist. 42 It strikes us as just a mistake 13 to
construe the theses as a part of natural science and, hence, applica-
ble to themselves. Quine, especially, is faced with tension in his
views here: he cannot jointly maintain that (i) physicalism is a~ em-
pirical thesis of natural science, (i1) semantics is physicalistically
indeterminate, and (iii) physicalism plays the methodological role,
(R2), and hence provides the grounds for rejection of semantical
cla~ns from science.
Our suggestion44 is to reject (H2); as a consequence, neither of
the construals of the current objection arise. And, thus, it can be
maintained that the theses play a role in the structuring of scientif-
ic knowledge without requiring, what is at the least highly problemat-,
ic, that semantics and explanation be incorporated into physicalistic
science as part of its subject matter.
The final objection affected by rejection of (M2) concerns the dif-
ficulties associated with the empirical testability of the theses.
These, obviously, are not problems for the view that the theses are
not empirical theses. However, it does raise the question of what the
measures of acceptability of the theses are, and, whether or not those
measures are in any interesting way different from those involved in
43 A mistake that, for some, was born of the fear of creating untena-
ble divisions in o~r knowledge.
44 A sU9gestion that does not take Quine off the hook entirely since
he maintains the "monolithic" character of our knowledge.
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viewing the theses as empirical. We shall return to this and related
issues below.
Having pointed out how most of the outstanding objections to the
doctrine can be fended off by rejecting (M2), we now turn to a discus-
sion of the issues that arise concerning our reconstrual of the nature
of physicalist theses. As we have indicated, our proposed alternative
to ("2) is;
("2') The theses are regulative ideals for natural science.
The question that immediately arises is, "what is a regulative
ideal?", In the present context, a regulative ideal (RI) is a princi-
pIe which structures our scientific representation of nature, but
which is not itself a part of that picture. Alternatively put, it is a
part of the metatheory for scientific knowledge. Thus, for example,
the claim that the physical truth determines all the truth in science
is a cla~ about scientific knowledge but is not itself part of that
knowledge.
With regard to the regulative character of RIs, such principles de-
scribe goal states of knowledge in science (e.g., our ultimate charac-
terization of the intended interpretation of scientific knowledge
ought to exhibit all attributes as supervening upon the physical at-
tributes). As such, RIs play an ~xplicit regulative role at appropri-
!!! times in the conduct of scientific inquiry.41
41 Th~3 does not mean that RIs are not always in force; it means that
their useful application can only take place under certain condi-
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The above two considerations strongly suggest the RIs are not ap-
propriately viewed as being true or false as much as successful or un-
successful. As part of the metatheory of science, they can be viewed
as true of science; but at the level of scientific knowledge, they are
not part of science and do not constitute scientific truths. Rather,
they are claims about 110W we are going to structure our knowledge of
the world; thus, the issue of assessment of such claims is more along
the lines of whether knowledge so structured is forthcoming: i.e., Is
the program, the goal of which is to construct knowledge with this
structure, successful or not?
Thus, RIs are not to be viewed as ! priori truths nor truths by
convention; they stand apart from our scientific theory of nature.
t
Nor should they be thought of as instances of Carnap's external frame-
work principles; his commitment to the analytic character of such
cla~D is not in the spirit of the current proposal. RIs are not ana-
lytic truths; they are principles which structure a representation but
which are such that, if they are not satisfied, no logical violation
or nonsense 114S been committed.
On the current proposal, we are distinguishing R~s from the empiri-
cal knowledge that constitutes the natural science to which they ap-
ply. This distinction is not based upon the analytic-synthetic dis-
tinction at a111 the theses are not construed as analytically true.
tions that we have specified above.
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Further, we are contending that the theses are not to be construed as
part of scientific knowledge that is "highly central" within the sys-
tem of such knowledge. Our argument against this specific interpreta-
tion is briefly stated as follows: if the theses are part of natural
science, th~~ it follows that the semantical and intensional notions
employed in ~heir formulation are physicalistically acceptable; but,
this is surel¥ unacceptable to all "physicalists" for whom it is an
empirical matter whether any non-physical notions will fit into a
physicalist body of knowledge. The only way to avoid this difficulty
is to not include the theses among the claims which are subject to the
requirements formulated by those theses. Hence, for physicalists who
reject semantical and intensional notions from science as well as for
those who think'it an independent matter whether such notions are ac-
ceptable in science, the view that the theses are highly central parts
of our corpus of scientific knowledge is clearly unacceptable.
What we are seeing is that, if we are going to be physicalists,
then we cannot hold to the view that there are no interesting cleavag-
es in our knowledge. The notions of analytic, ! priori, and conven-
tional do not exhaust the possibilities for the kinds of principles
that may be distinguished from the claims constitutive of the empiri-
cal knowledge of natural science. We suggest that what we are calling
"regulative ideals", which are not analytically, conventionally or !
2riori true parts of our scientific knowledge, but which stand apart
from that knowledge as principles concerning its ideal structure, pro-
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vide another alternative. 46
In summary, what we have done in this section is to reject (M2) in
favor of (M2') with the result that four of the five outstanding ob-
jections to the doctrine we have formulated are defused. The remaining
objection, i.e., that "non-physical" entities may appear in the physi-
calist bases despite all the constraints imposed, will be discussed
further below. A consequence of our discussion is that physicalists
must seriously reexamine the idea that there are no interesting epis-
temic bifurcations in our knowledge; more specifically, the distinc-
tion between empirical truths of science and regulative ideals for
science is a motivated one and deserving of a serious role in the phi-
losophy of scie~e.
5.5 SUKHARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
To this point, the principal steps we have taken are as follows;
1. In Chapter 1, we clarified the central motivations of the phys-
icalist program as ;t has appeared in recent years;
2. In Chapter 2, we reviewed and rejected many of the extant for-
mulations of physicalist doctrine on the grounds that they are
not sufficient for realizing the motivations of the program;
.1 As we indicated above, we are not saying that there are no empiri-
cal issues associated with RIs; there are such issues concerning
the success or failure of programs based upon them. What we are
saying il that it is important to distinguish RIs from the empiri-
cel truths formulated within a system of knowledge structured by
them.
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3. In Chapter 3, we addressed the problem of the principled iden-
tification of the physicalist bases and we formulated three
presuppositions of any adequate formulation of physicalist
theses; the problem that the bases could include paradigmati-
cally non-physical entities (e.g., mental entities) was not
fully resolved, although all other objections were seen to be
harmless;
4. In Chapter 4, we formulated a set of physicalist theses which
were designed to avoid many of the sources of inadequacy found
in previous formulations; the objections that the theses are
"utopian" and that they may be unacceptable on their OWf, terms
(i.e., being concerned with semantics and explanation, they may
,
exhibit indeterminacy or some other failure to satisfy physi-
calist demands upon acceptable science) were not completely de-
fended against;
5. In Chapter 5, we have formulated a set of three metatheses that
express the "Received View" among physicalists concerning the
nature of physicalist theses; but, in the light of the three
objections discussed in earlier chapters in addition to two
further objections (i.e., the scope of the theses is ill-de-
fined and the empirical status of the theses is doubtful), we
rejected the claim that the theses are empirical theses of nat-
ural science in favor of the claim that they are "regulative
ideals" that stand apart from the body of scientific knowledge;
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as a result, all but the objection concerning the bases were
defused.
In closing, we shall consider three final issues: (1) the alleged
monopolistic character of physicalism, (2) the problem, raised in
Chapter 3, regarding the contents of the physicalist bases, and (3)
the status of the program with regard to its acceptability.
First, we have emphasized throughout this project that physicalism
is not a "monopolistic" doctrine purporting to resolve all cognitive
conflict or to determine all aspects of our knowledge. The view we
have taken is that physicalism is, roughly, an lIarchitectural" doc-
trine concerning the structure of the formal system of science and
concerning the structures that provide interpretations fo)- that sys-
tem. As such, physicalism has a limited scope of application, being
restricted to natural science. Further, this brand of physicalism does
not purport to be an instance of what Putnam has referred to as "meta-
physical realism": i.e., it does not purport to provide an account of
physicalistic scit.!nce as constituting "the" true theory of the ulti-
mate nature of reality. Rather, to borrow Goodman's term, science is a
"version" of reality; according to physicalist doctrine this version
is structured in certain ways which, as we have argued, have a number
of epistemic rewards.
It is true that physicalist science may also attempt to provide an
account of semantics and of how representations relate to what they
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represent; but, this should not lead one to think that science may ul-
timately become metaphysically realistic in character. All. such
theorizing occurs within science and in its own terms; hence, even if
such theorizing is successful, it can never provide an account that
would succeed in fixing exactly one interpretation of the language of
science and it can never be more than just a version among many possi-
ble ones which compete for our attention and use on the grounds of
succ_ss in achieving cognitive and non-cognitive goals. Thus, a suc-
cessful physicalist account of semantics and explanation would provide
us with an account of how our theories work and how they attach to the
world; but, such an account would be an "internal" account. It would
not, under any circumstances, warrant the attempt to parlay such suc-
,
cess into a completely general account that would resolve all cases of
underdetermination in our knowledge (e.g., those cases encountered in
chapters 3 and 4) and that would uniquely fix all interpre ~tion of
languages. a physicalist account of semantics and explanation can only
get off the gruund after such issues have been resolved on non-physi-
calist grounds. 47 Thus, it is not conceivable, on our view, that P_1YS-
icalism could ever becorn3 a completely monopolistic doctrine in the
ways that Putnam and Goodman ct~rge some physicalists with dreaming
47 We note, as we have pointed out earlier, that theorizing about se-
mantics and enplanation in physicalist science may fail because
such phenomena are understood to be radically different from the
phenomena studied in science or because understanding such phenome~
na is just too difficult. Physicalist doctrine has been loc~ted
outside of natural science to allow for the possibility of such
failure. while still leaving room tor us to be physicalists about
Icience.
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about. 48
Next, we take final note of the deep significance of Chomsky's ob-
jection regarding the principled identification of the physical bases
for our construal of the physicalist program. It must be allowed
that, given our essentially "architectural" approach to physicalism 4 '
and given our strategy for characterizing the physical bases,so there
is room for a certain development in science which is unacceptable to
the spirit of the physicalist program: i.e., that certain entities
that physicalists have always been concerned to keep out of the bases
(e.g., mentalistic entities, semantical entities) could be in them.
This is because the only demands we have made on what is in the bases
is that something play a motivated role in theorizing in the research,
program of physics; thus, a mentalistic construct might find its way
into physics in the same way that electromagnetic constructs did. 51
41 See Goodman (1978), Putnam (1979).
49 Th3t is, our taking physicalism to prescribe certa~n structural re-
lation. for an ideal fo~ul.tion of scientific knowledge •
• 1 That is, characterizing a research program for basic physics ~nrt
developing the basel in terms of • theory which satisfies the char-
acterization and is empirically acceptable.
11 We hive argued that this is not achievable in as easy a way as
Chomsky suggestl, although we ao allow that it is possible; and,
that, of courle, is problem enough for the program. What we have
oppo.ed i. that the boundaries of the physical bases are completely
mal.able and arbitrary subject to socio-historical forces or ad hoc
modification by desparate physicalistle
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We agree that this is an unacc~ptable possibility for the physical-
ist program where 'physicalist' retains its classical content. There
are two possible courses of action at this point: first, one could
reject the classical motivation of the program to keep out of the bas-
es certain entities, perhaps on the grounds that the bases are now so
unrecognizable as "physical" in any traditional sense that there is no
need to be concerned about the contents of the bases. What is impor-
tant, on this view, is that physics is "basic science" no matter what
turns out to be a motivated component of its theories or domain. Thus,
physicalism is just an architectural doctrine concerning structural
relations between all branches of science and the basic science. A
second course one could pursue, however, would be to preserve the
classical motiva~ion by introducing further ccnditions of adequacy for
fo~ulations of physicalist doctrine: e.g., that mentalistic, semanti-
cal, biological and spiritual phenomena not be elements of the bases.
This move has the virtue of preserving the classical ontological sig-
nificance of the program, but at the cost of being ad hoc. We do not
propose to choose among these options in the current project, although
our inclination is toward the first (i.e., to view physicalism as a
purely structural doctrine).
In closing, we shall briefly discuss the status of the program with
respect to the issues of acceptability. In this regard, the following
objection raised by Goodman and Putnam is pertinentl the physicalist
program il like the phenomenalist program in that both are worthwhile
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because they have important goals but both are bogged down in unful-
filled promises that do not appear to be likely of fulfillment. We
agree that both have important goals and observe that they are differ-
ent: the phenomenalist program is epistemologically motivated, while
the version of physicalism put forth here is concerned with ontology,
objectivity and explanation. However, we disagree with the claim that
the two programs are equally bogged down and equally unlikely of sue·
cess. It is quite clear that, whereas the phenomenalist program is not
part of current scientific practice and thought, the physicalist pro-
gram is; the scientific exploration of the physicalist basis of all
phenomena studied in science is, at least from the point of view of
the scientific community, a live project. Finally, both ptograms are
I
constructional in a broad sense, although as we construe physicalism,
the criteria of correctness of constructions are quite different in
the two programs. 52 How this difference effects the relative prospects
of success is not clear. Our tentative conclusion is that there are
enough differences between the physicalist and phenomenalist pr~grams
that the simple analogy suggested by Putnam and Goodman is of little
value. Further, since the actual assessment of the succesc or failure
of the physicalist program in science has not been conducted by any-
52 It might be argued by Goodman and Putnam that any criteria employed
by the physicalist is available to the phenomenalist. However, as a
matter of fact no phenomenalist has employed the kind of criteria
of correctness we have employed in our version of physicalism; and,
it il not at all clear that, for example, the notion of a realiza-
tion theory is a coherent one for a phenomenalist constructional
IYltem.
- 336 -
one, it is hard to take seriously the contention that it is failing as
badly as the phenomenalist program.
Consideration of the acceptability of the formulation of physical-
ism presented above reveals that we have an adequate formulation with
respect to which there is one objection that cannot be readily defend-
ed against; we have left it open whether this objection is ultimately
devastating to the formulation. The development of detailed informa-
tion that would allow an assessment of the likelihood of success of
the program is, as we have observed at various points, lacking. We
take thiB to be, not a measure of a failure to fulfill promises, but
as indicative of the ~aturity of many sciences, especially the in-
ter-field disciplines. Thus, we cannot now say how likely the program
I
is of success. It is the development of such information that is the
next step in the process of assessment of acceptability.
With regard to 'he actual working out of the program in science,
work in biology, psychology and linguistics/semantics is especially
critical. It is clear that the current project has not solved the
problems traditionally thought to stand in the way of the success of
ph~.~c~lisml namely, the problems of finding a place for life, mind
and meaning in a physical world. Fortunately, this was not the goal of
the current project. Rather, the version of physicalism put forth in
this project construes those problems in a somewhat differen~ way:
namely, the problem facing physicalist science is to determine the
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boundaries of knowledge ~f a certain kind (i.e., knowledge of the kind
that satisfies physicalist principles). The issue is, how broad is
physicalist science? Unlike the older distinction between the natural
sciences and the social sciences whi~h was based upon differences in
method, the current distinction is based upon ontology, objectivity
and explanation in relation to the physicalist basis. The goal of the
physicalist program is not to subsume all that is legitimately called
knowledge under physicalist principles; rdther, it is to delineate a
body of knowledge that hangs together in a certain way and yields a
particualar kind of understanding. That this goal is worthwhile is be-
yond dispute; whether it can be attained is beyond our current capaci-
ty to say. Nonetheless, this kind of understanding is prized and
sought after widely in science and the project of pursuing it should
not be abandoned in haste.
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